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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Hannah Ann Holleman 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Sociology 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: Energy Justice and Foundations for a Sustainable Sociology of Energy 
 
 
This dissertation proposes an approach to energy that transcends the focus on 
energy as a mere technical economic or engineering problem, is connected to sociological 
theory as a whole, and takes issues of equality and ecology as theoretical starting points. In 
doing so, the work presented here puts ecological and environmental sociological theory, 
and the work of environmental justice scholars, feminist ecologists, and energy scholars, in 
a context in which they may complement one another to broaden the theoretical basis of the 
current sociology of energy. This theoretical integration provides an approach to energy 
focused on energy justice.  Understanding energy and society in the terms outlined here 
makes visible energy injustice, or the interface between social inequalities and ecological 
depredations accumulating as the social and ecological debts of the modern energy regime. 
Systems ecology is brought into this framework as a means for understanding unequal 
exchange, energy injustice more generally, and the requirements for long-term social and 
ecological reproduction in ecological terms. Energy developments in Ecuador and Cuba are 
used here as case studies in order to further develop the idea of energy justice and the 
theory of unequal ecological exchange. The point is to broaden the framework of the 
contemporary critical sociology of energy, putting energy justice at its heart.  
 
 v 
 
This dissertation contains previously published and unpublished co-authored 
material. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL RIFT AND ENERGY JUSTICE: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY 
OF ENERGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY  
 
 The section on Max Weber in this chapter is adapted from portions of an early 
version of a manuscript co-authored with John Bellamy Foster that is now published as 
Foster and Holleman (2012). The writing and research in the remainder of the chapter is 
my own.  
Climate change and environmental justice: The call for sociological convergence 
 The near global recognition of climate change has led in the past twenty years 
especially to a renewal of sociological attention to the energy/society nexus. Also during 
this period environmental sociologists, assessing the field, have called for more 
integrated theoretical approaches bridging ecology and radical sociology while drawing 
lessons from global movements. As the social and ecological dislocations of capitalism 
increase and the resistance has yet to keep pace with the growth in crises, broader 
publics, activists, and academics are seeking ways to understand these developments as a 
whole. Recently, critical environmental sociologists, in tune with the environmental 
justice movement and broader environmental sociological theory, have started working 
out the theoretical connections between these issues by moving between, and to some 
extent synthesizing, sociological, ecological and movement perspectives. The ecological 
rift theory in environmental sociology, it is suggested here, provides a context in which 
such a synthesis is possible as the basis for a critical sociology of energy for the twenty-
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first century with energy justice at its heart. The development of this integrated 
framework is the task of this thesis.  
 This thesis thus represents an attempt to expand the theoretical basis for the 
sociology of energy, transcending the focus on energy as a mere technical economic or 
engineering problem, and integrating issues of race, class, gender, and international 
inequality. The goal is to build on previous work, putting theoretical developments in a 
context in which they can complement one another. An attempt is made, in particular, to 
forge links between critical environmental sociology, environmental justice research, and 
the work of ecologists focused on energy. This approach emphasizes the biophysical 
realities of energy developments and inequality by bringing the work of systems 
ecologist, Howard T. Odum, into environmental sociology. Odum’s work is used to 
develop a method of analyzing ecological unequal exchange with a focus on energy. 
However, the possibilities for integrating systems ecology extend beyond this application.  
 The theoretical development of this dissertation, expanding our understanding of 
the ecological rift, is used to introduce an “energy justice” framework, which I argue is 
the heart of a critical sociology of energy for the 21st century. To ground this theoretical 
work empirically, I studied systems ecology’s contributions to understanding trade 
inequalities in ecological terms, using recent and historical developments in Ecuador as a 
case study to further advance the idea of energy justice and the theory of ecological 
unequal exchange. I also carried out fieldwork in Cuba, studying ongoing changes in the 
Cuban political economy, what these changes mean for their energy system and 
environmental goals, and the implications for our understanding of environmental justice 
and ecological transformation. These two countries were chosen as case studies because 
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of their environmental efforts, proximity in the World Wildlife Fund’s measures of 
national sustainable development, colonial histories, and divergent paths toward de-
colonization and addressing oppression. Both of these countries’ efforts have included the 
assertion of environmental sovereignty, which is a necessary step toward overcoming the 
historical burdens of ecological unequal exchange and colonial oppression. In addition, 
Cuba and Ecuador are both common reference points in the literature on environmental 
justice. 
The sociology of energy: An opportunity for integrated theory 
 In developing a sociology of energy for the twenty-first century we have an 
opportunity to illustrate the links between theoretical perspectives that makes explicit the 
social and ecological stakes of current crises, like climate change, while pointing toward 
the kinds of change for which we must strive. Energy practices are an especially useful 
social and ecological indicator as these practices delimit society’s engagement in 
ecologically oriented change and expose its true social, environmental, and economic 
commitments. Sociologists, Rosa, Machlis, and Keating (1988), write that “energy plays 
a crucial role, perhaps the crucial role, in the link between societies and their biophysical 
environments” (155).  
 Climate change, along with other ecological problems, is now on the domestic 
and foreign policy agendas of nearly every government and recognized by every major 
scientific body in the world  (Foster 2002; Oreskes 2004; Hansen 2010; Waugh 2011). 
Since the 1990s, the world’s largest corporations also have changed tack publicly both to 
acknowledge, and posture themselves as part of the solution to, climate change while 
continuing to fund activities undermining large-scale reform and detracting from 
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environmental science (Pulver 2007; Domhoff 2009; McCright and Dunlap 2010). 
Regardless of the actual environmental impact of governmental policies, or firm 
behavior, the widespread acknowledgement that environmental problems require human 
action represents a major political shift over the past two decades. These events led to a 
renewed call for attention to the human drivers and environmental and social 
consequences of the modern energy regime.  
 In spite of these calls, in the 1990s significant barriers remained a sustained 
attention to energy in sociology:  
Over the past twenty years, a variety of devices have been 
successfully used in interdisciplinary energy analysis to 
diminish the importance of the social, and to marginalize 
the contributions of the social sciences. This is unfortunate 
because insights from sociological studies of the energy 
system are of considerable value in both disciplinary 
theory-building and interdisciplinary environmental policy-
making. These external limits on sociological analysis are 
only part of the story.  
 
Sociology's own theoretical unease with technology and the 
physical/natural world, and its insular tendencies in regard 
to other disciplines, have significantly contributed to a 
decline of sociological work on energy-environment topics 
over the past decade. Given growing interest by natural 
scientists in the human dimensions of global environmental 
change, the time now seems right for a renewal of energy 
research by sociologists-although the initiative must come 
from within the discipline.  (Lutzenhiser 1994, 58) 
 
As Lutzenhiser helps explain above, attention to energy in the discipline of sociology up 
until the 1990s was characterized by “a pattern of successive intellectual paroxysms” that 
came and went with supply-side energy crises (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988, 168).  
 While energy studies remain dominated by technical economic and engineering 
problems, the amount of sociological work on energy and climate change has grown 
 5 
significantly the past ten years. The number of articles with “energy” or “climate change” 
in their titles listed in Sociological Abstracts quintupled between the 1990s and 2000s. 
The real jump, however, has occurred just in the past six years. In 2005 there were 71 
such titled articles. In 2010 there were 467. Overwhelmingly these articles have climate 
change as their subject and are classified as dealing with “issues of sustainable 
development.” This dwarfs any reference to energy alone, or any other related subject 
listing or classification. While this is a big change in the attention of social scientists, it 
has occurred outside of the main sociology journals. From 2005 till today, not a single 
article with “energy” or “climate change” in the title appears in the top-ten ranked 
sociology journals. This signals that energy has yet to make headway into the broader 
discipline of sociology. These changes also reflect the greater focus in contemporary 
sociology on climate change than the development of the sociology of energy “as a 
distinct sub-area of investigation” (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988, 168).  
 Sociological work on climate change generally falls into three categories (Nagel, 
Broadbent, and Dietz 2009): sociological analyses of the causes of global climate change, 
sociological approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and sociological 
perspectives on the impacts of global climate change. Sociologists study everything from 
personal energy consumption and political views to broad socio-ecological patterns of 
development and their implications. The report on a workshop held in 2008 assessing 
Sociological Perspectives on Climate Change (Nagel, Broadbent, and Dietz 2009) offers 
a useful overview of developments in the field to that point.  
 All work on energy, society, and climate change may be divided into two broader 
theoretically significant categories based on its main underlying assumptions. On the one 
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hand, there are sociologists whose proposals to solve global issues like climate change 
involve tweaking the system through policy, personal consumption choices, or 
technological change. On the other hand, you have sociologists calling for system-wide 
social and ecological change. In other words, some sociologists limit their studies to 
changes that are possible within the capitalist system, while others document the ways in 
which capitalism is incompatible with ecological and social justice goals and call for a 
more significant transformation of the world system.  
 One reason this central divide is so relevant to energy studies is that climate 
change has been driven by the economic growth inherent to capitalism. The key conflict 
that arises in climate negotiations, and which is constantly alluded to in environmental 
negotiations between nations, is that between ecological, social, and economic priorities 
(Clark and York 2005; Bazilian 2009; York 2010). Energy developments are conditioned 
by these competing priorities. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2008) 
puts the issue plainly: “Energy use is largely driven by economic growth.” Problems with 
energy developments are thus in large part problems of scale related to the level of 
economic throughput. And the scale of energy consumption remains coupled in capitalist 
economies with economic growth in spite of efficiency gains, as critical sociologists of 
energy have demonstrated (York 2010; York, et al. 2011). For this reason, energy 
debates, like other issues in environmental sociological theory, often center on the tension 
between economic growth and ecological change. There are striking differences in how 
this tension and the possibility of overcoming it are understood by various theoretical 
positions. The most influential approach to energy issues in the broader society and 
policy circles is mirrored in environmental sociology in the ecological modernization 
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perspective. It is the most optimistic that the tension between economic growth and 
ecological change may be transcended (social justice is not integrated in their analysis.) 
 Ecological modernizationists emphasize “the possibility, actuality and desirability 
of a green Capitalism” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 23). They claim there is a “growing 
independence of ecological rationality vis-à-vis other (e.g. economic and political) 
rationalities” (22) in the governance of society and institutions. “The basic premise of 
ecological modernization theory is…[that there is a] centripetal movement of ecological 
interests, ideas and considerations in social practices and institutions of modern society” 
(Mol 2002, 93). The authors see “continued industrial [and technological] development 
as offering the best option for escaping from the ecological crises of the developed 
world” (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001, 702). This new breed of modernizers suggest “we 
have entered a new industrial revolution, one of radical restructuring of production, 
consumption, state practices and political discourses along ecological lines” (Sonnenfield 
2009, 372).  
 Ecological modernization began as “essentially a political program” (Mol and 
Jänicke 2009, 18) and remains geared toward influencing policy (Mol, Sonnenfield, and 
Spaargaren 2009, 11). That this perspective might be popular in a world where those in 
power suggest capitalism will solve the climate crisis it created is not surprising. 
Ecological modernization theorists themselves have represented the significance of their 
ideas via the extent to which they share the perspective of those in power, and by the 
taming of the environmental movement, which was forced into an establishment mold 
(Spaargaren and Mol 2009, 72–75).  
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 Though it integrates popular assumptions, the ecological modernization 
perspective actually is in conflict with over a hundred years of sociological and 
ecological analyses (starting with that of the classical theorists, like Marx and Weber, and 
early energy scholars developing the study thermodynamics). This insidious perspective 
also is in conflict with the founding principles of environmental sociology, based on the 
New Ecological Paradigm, which include “recognition of: (1) limits to growth, (2) non-
anthropocentrism, (3) fragility of nature’s balance, (4) untenability of exemptionalism, 
and (5) ecological crisis” (Foster 2012).  Therefore, Foster (2012) refers to the ecological 
modernization perspective as the new exemptionalism and the third stage of denialism 
hindering necessary and urgent scientific development and change:  
The third stage of denial has the look and feel of greater 
realism, but actually constitutes a more desperate and 
dangerous response.  It admits that capitalism is the 
problem, but also contends that capitalism is the solution. 
 This general approach emphasizes what is variously 
referred to as "sustainable capitalism," "natural capitalism," 
"climate capitalism," "green capitalism," etc. In this view 
we can continue down the same road of capital 
accumulation, mounting profits, and exponential economic 
growth -- while at the same time miraculously reducing our 
burdens on the planetary environment.  It is business as 
usual, but with greater efficiency and greater accounting of 
environmental costs. (Foster 2011a) 
 
Ecological modernization is a way then to avoid any significant challenge to the status 
quo. Because of this it ignores the seriousness and scale of ecological degradation (York 
and Rosa 2003), but also the inequalities necessarily embedded in the social relations of 
capitalism. There is no real gender, race, class, or any kind of social justice analysis there, 
even if justice is mentioned in passing in their work (usually in response previous 
criticisms).  
 9 
 Despite all of these problems, the penetration of the assumptions undergirding this 
perspective is clear in the sociology of energy and climate change. The conscious and 
unconscious adoption of the main tenets of the modernization framework stands out in 
the sociology articles published since the boom in climate change research starting in 
2005. A key term search in Sociological Abstracts of the 1,734 peer-reviewed articles 
published since 2005 with “climate change” or “energy” in the title yields the following 
results: many more mention technology (424), technological change (96), alternative 
energy (110), or renewable energy (160) than mention energy conservation (120), 
economic growth (96), or capitalism (35). Shockingly, only 22 mention inequality and 
only 9 equality.  
 The blinders imposed by perspectives such as ecological modernization in the 
sociological work on energy and climate change, and broader environmental sociological 
theory, means that  
environmental sociology today is therefore faced with a 
double challenge, emanating both from without and within: 
developing means to combat the planetary rift, and 
confronting the new exemptionalism, which threatens to 
overthrow environmental sociology as a critical tradition. 
With respect to the latter challenge, the problem is to be 
found not in the concept of ecological modernization itself, 
which is obviously useful in limited contexts, and reflects 
real-world processes, but rather the elevation of ecological 
modernization into an overall environmental theory 
resurrecting the basic postulates of human exemptionalism. 
(Foster 2012) 
 
This makes the theoretical perspective proposed in this thesis all the more important and 
urgent, for the sociology of energy and for environmental sociology as a whole. Because 
the sociology of energy is taking off, the climate crisis is only worsening, and new 
scholars are being trained en masse, it is a crucial moment in the theoretical development 
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of what will now be sustained sociological attention to energy. As bad as things are, they 
are only expected to get worse. Energy increasingly will be forced onto the broader 
sociological agenda (Dunlap 2010; Webler and Tuler 2010). If energy justice is not at the 
heart of the sociology of energy that takes root, our formulations will necessarily impose 
blinders that make it impossible to understand, or propose meaningful changes to address, 
the interpenetrating depredations of social inequality and environmental destruction 
associated with the modern energy regime.  
 While the dominant ideological response of the establishment to environmental 
crises is clearly reflected in much of the work on energy and climate change in sociology, 
there are strong foundations for a critical sociology of energy integrated with broader 
theoretical developments starting with classical ecological and social theory.   
 As was developed in classical theory, today the strongest critical approaches to 
energy integrate attention to biophysical and sociological realities shaping the structure 
and consequences of the modern energy regime (York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003a, 2003b; 
Foster, Clark, and York 2010; York 2010, 2012; Ergas and York 2012). However there is 
still work to be done in fully developing energy justice as the heart of a distinct sociology 
of energy. The following sections will explain the classical antecedents and contemporary 
theoretical developments informing this thesis. Put in a context in which they may 
complement one another, the perspectives developed here provide great insights for 
contemporary critical sociologists of energy.  
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Antecedents for this work: The physical properties of energy and implications for 
social science 
 In human societies energy resources are used to extend the power of labor, which 
in the capitalist system, along with nature, is exploited for the sake of accumulation by a 
tiny proportion of wealthy individuals, or what is now called the “1%” (within which 
white men play a predominant role). Theoretically, energy resources can be used to meet 
social justice goals, to make life easier and more fulfilling for everyone, or can be used in 
processes that increase inequality—making life easier for some and not others, with 
energy monopolized to maintain power economically and militarily. Modes of extraction 
and distribution of energy resources can attend to the needs of ecological reproduction, 
or, as is currently the case, create globally toxic environments causing environmental and 
human degradation that is unequally distributed. Understanding energy sources extending 
both the power of labor and the reach of those with access, helps explain the significance 
of energy for social justice struggles and the difficulty of socially addressing pressing 
problems like climate change.  
Energy and entropy: The queen of the world and her shadow 
 It is important here to explain the way in which this analysis integrates and is 
based in an understanding of the biophysical properties of energy resources and their role 
in the open energy system of the biosphere. “Energy” is used in this thesis usually to refer 
to concentrated energy sources, such as fossil fuels used for fuel or the generation of 
power, more dispersed energies such as solar, and the energy represented by all human 
labors. However, it is based on a broader understanding of the properties of energy and 
matter and energy flows within ecosystems, society, and the larger biosphere. These 
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properties make concentrated energy resources, like fossil fuels, unique materials and 
help explain the environmental consequences of their exploitation in society, as well as 
their sociological importance.  
 In common usage and in what we call “the sociology of energy,” the term 
“energy” typically refers to resources harnessed to generate power and fuel human 
activities. Available energy, or potential energy, in the stricter scientific sense, is most 
often defined as “the ability or capacity to do work” (Odum 1997, 79). This scientific 
meaning relates to “energy as the generalized attribute of physical transformation and 
change” (Peet 1992, 144). Social scientists’ understanding of the ecological 
consequences of various “energy” (fuel and power) systems (whether they are solar, 
biomass, or fossil-fuel based), are the result of centuries of philosophical and scientific 
inquiry into the nature of energy itself and energy transformations that make all of life 
possible. Modern ecology was shaped by investigations into the behavior of energy, the 
cumulative understanding of which is formalized in the laws of thermodynamics. 
Subsequently, ecology influenced the environmental movement and the development of 
environmental sociology.  
 While concern with the role of energy in human life predates Western science and 
is pervasive in cultures around the world, contemporary scientists’ notions depend upon 
important discoveries made in the mid-nineteenth century. “With the discovery, between 
1845 and 1847, of the principle of the conservation of energy during its transformations, 
the importance of energy in human life and progress was fully recognized, and scientists 
gave energy the romantic name of the ‘Queen of the World’…[S]cholars discovered 
entropy, a measure of the degradation of energy, twenty years later” (Alekseev [1978] 
 13 
1986, 10). Energy and entropy, or “The Queen of the World and her Shadow,” “came out 
of darkness full of uncertainty into broad daylight only about the second half of the 
nineteenth century, after centuries of work by talented philosophers, researchers, and 
engineers” (13). 
 Other scholars have traced the impact of these developments for critical social 
science, wherein an ecological critique of the modern social order entailed a critique of 
capitalist economic growth, and orthodox social science, on thermodynamic grounds (e.g. 
Martinez-Alier 1987; Mirowski 1988; Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988; Peet 1992; 
Burkett and Foster 2006). Perhaps the most essential implication of the laws of 
thermodynamics for social science is that human society, including economic processes, 
are not exempt from natural limits. Because we can neither create nor destroy matter or 
energy, only transform and degrade them through our activities, which can never be 
100% efficient, we are constrained by their availability and their unique properties. These 
properties, and the natural laws governing the universe, such as the laws of 
thermodynamics, determine the ways in which matter and energy can be transformed and 
used, and the consequences of these transformations. While there are other ways to look 
at the environment/society nexus, and measure biophysical outcomes of social processes, 
tracing the role of energy in the earth’s natural and social processes provides an 
especially useful means to understand the interconnections between society and the rest 
of nature. Odum writes, “if one were to pick out a single common denominator of life on 
earth, that is something that is absolutely essential and involved in every action, large or 
small, the answer would have to be energy” (Odum 1997, 79).  
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The critical sociology of energy 
 Today it is clear to critical scientists from multiple disciplines that societies are no 
more exempt from natural laws, such as the laws of thermodynamics, than are the 
elementary particles studied by physicists. However, this does not mean that the laws of 
motion of society are reducible to the laws of motion in physics (or determined by other 
natural processes, such as evolution). While it is absurd to study society as if it were 
exempt from natural laws, it is equally absurd to study society as if it were solely the 
product of natural forces acting without the intervention of human consciousness or 
purpose, as some contemporary social Darwinists still do (see for example the recent 
publication and praise of The Darwin Economy). But many social scientists, including 
orthodox economists and environmental sociologists influenced especially by 
modernization perspectives, have yet to take social or ecological science seriously in their 
studies. Without taking into account natural limits as determined by natural laws, as well 
as purposeful human action, you can neither study nor understand the effect of human 
choices on other humans, or their impact on the environment. You are then stuck in an 
epistemological trap where you cannot explain historical social change, or produce 
knowledge necessary to address today’s social and ecological challenges. 
 Today, the dominant perspective in sociology remains congruent with the 
dominant ideology, which continues to see energy as a technical problem, or otherwise 
disconnected from the social relations in which our energy regime is embedded. Some of 
the strongest forms of social denialism with respect to ecological problems have been 
associated with sociology in the form of what had been called (by environmental 
sociologists) the dominant “human exemptionalism,” which has been transformed today 
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into a “new exemptionalism” (Foster 2012). Even so, critical sociology, while its 
progress in this area has been uneven, is methodologically equipped to address the 
relationship between social processes and biophysical realities, without resorting to 
reducing one to the other. From the classical period forward, critical sociologists have 
addressed major ecological and social problems, without falling into either natural or 
social reductionism. Many sociologists have refused to take anything for granted, 
including the entire social system. Antecedents for the critical sociology of energy today 
may be found, in fact, in the classical sociological tradition.   
Classical syntheses between social and natural science 
 Work toward uniting developments in social and ecological science, bringing 
together in theory what is joined in reality, falls in a long line of efforts to understand the 
relationship between energy, environment, and society. For sociologists, “that energy 
would be important to sociological concerns was recognized from the beginning of the 
discipline…but the subsequent history of the topic was to be punctuated with intellectual 
discontinuity, vast shifts in focus, and, at times, total silence” (Rosa, Machlis, and 
Keating1988, 149-50). Classical sociologists, for example, recognized the dependence of 
capitalist industrialization on increasing energy and material throughput, and understood 
many of the environmental and social consequences these developments. Classical 
sociology thus provides direction in how “a fundamentally physical variable” (149) like 
energy may be understood in terms of sociological theory as a whole.  
Classical foundations for a critical sociology of energy 
 Rosa, Machlis, and Keating (1988) published their overview of scholarship on 
“Energy and Society,” in the Annual Review of Sociology before much significant work 
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was done on the ecological insights found in the classical sociologies of Marx, Weber 
and Durkheim. 
 Karl Marx and Max Weber, writing from the mid-1800s to just after the First 
World War, both saw the beginning of industrial capitalism as marking a dramatic shift in 
human relations to each other and to the environment. Marx wrote about the alienation of 
humans from each other and from the earth. He recognized that capitalism initiated and 
pushed to all corners of the earth, via capitalist globalization, the ecological rift between 
human society and nature. Marx, along with Frederick Engels, did much to expose the 
detrimental effects of industrial agriculture. They also tied the consequences of the rift 
with nature to an analysis of the enclosure of the commons and inequality and 
exploitation at the heart of capitalism. Max Weber wrote about the disenchantment of 
nature, the rapacious destruction of forests and consumption of natural resources 
necessary for the growth of commodity production, and the loss of meaningful life in the 
industrializing world.  
 The ongoing influence of the legacies of Marx and Weber on sociology as a 
whole, and the possibility of learning from the ways in which they integrated ecological 
insights, including those on energy and society, into macro-sociological frameworks, 
necessitates an overview of their work. Unlike many historical studies of energy, both of 
them avoided teleological views of the role of energy in social development, and the 
mistaken notions that increased energy use, or efficiency, equals increased social well-
being or maturity—ideas that plague social scientists even today.  
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Marx’s theory of metabolic rift, expropriation, and breaking the solar energy 
budget 
 Classical foundations for a Marxian sociology of energy are suggested by Foster 
and Burkett (2006) in their article analyzing Marx and Engels’ response to Podolinsky’s 
outline of energetic foundations for a labor theory of value. Marx and Engels, these 
writers demonstrate, “relied on an open-system, metabolic-energetic model that adhered 
to all of the main strictures of ecological economics—but one that also (unlike ecological 
economics) rooted the violation of solar and other environmental-sustainability 
conditions in the class relations of capitalist society” (109). Capitalist development is 
predicated upon the forced expropriation of the masses, “of the agricultural producer, of 
the peasant, from the soil” with “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly, force, 
play[ing] the greatest part.” This separation/expropriation/alienation is maintained and 
reproduced “on a continually expanding scale” (Marx [1867] 1990, 874, 668-69). The 
alienation of human society from the land, the subsequent and ongoing polarization of 
town and country, and the tendency toward ever-expanding capitalist accumulation, are 
social conditions for the growing metabolic rift between human society and nature. This 
rift is a product of capitalist expansion, driven by fossil fuel exploitation, or what Engels 
referred to as the colossal “squandering of past solar heat.”   
 Marx and Engel’s understanding of the relationship between the ecological rift of 
capitalism, human exploitation and immiseration, and the role of energy in these 
processes is in sharp contrast to many energetic theories of society that developed around 
the turn of the century, such as that represented by Herbert Spencer’s “energetic 
sociology” (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988; McKinnon 2010). Many mainstream 
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scientists from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, contra Marx, came to believe 
that increased energy use was indicative of “progress” and greater societal well-being. As 
in the case of mainstream political economy, the ability to make use of energy resources 
justified, in the eyes of many scientists, the extraction of resources from external lands 
through imperial domination. The exploitation of energy workers (like coal miners) both 
in England and Europe and abroad was both necessary for capitalist expansion and 
justified in terms of expediency, despite the forms of domination and exploitation that it 
entailed. 
 In contrast, Marx’s “analysis of capitalist mechanization provides a structural, 
class-based explanation as to how and why human production definitively ‘broke the 
budget constraint of living on solar income and began to live on geological capital.’”  His 
approach “helps explain the unprecedented growth in labor productivity and matter-
energy throughput generated by the capitalist system” (Burkett and Foster 2006, 110). 
Unlike reductionist energetic theories of society or value, Marx maintained the historical 
primacy of social relations and analyzed “the crucial enabling role of power supply and 
transmission in the industrial revolution…[which grew] in response to the energy 
demands of increasingly complex and large-scale machine-tool systems” resulting from 
the centralization and growth of the means of production facilitating ever-increasing 
(capitalist) efficiency in the accumulation process (131-32). Along with the insatiable 
appetite for increasing quantities of resources under capitalism, Marx emphasized the 
qualitative transformation energy and matter undergo in the production process and the 
irreversibility of this transformation—overcoming mechanical models at the heart of 
much of energetics—respecting “the arrow of time.” 
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 Marx wrote about energy in every volume of Capital (e.g. Capital vol. 2, ch. 6; 
vol. 3, ch. 5) and in other works, and current writers have drawn out the implications of 
Marx and Engel’s contributions to our understanding of the energy regime of capitalism 
(e.g. Burkett 1999, 2006; Foster 1999, 2000, 2009; Foster and Burkett 2004, 2006). For 
Marx and Engels, the energy regime of capitalism reflected broader systemic dynamics, 
especially the growth imperative. The ecological consequences of endless accumulation 
in a finite environment are summarized as a rift in the earth’s natural metabolism. The 
sum of Marx’s insights on this topic are first presented by Foster (1999) as Marx’s theory 
of metabolic rift. This is developed further in the contemporary theory of the ecological 
rift (Foster, Clark, and York 2010), which is the overarching framework for the sociology 
of energy proposed in this thesis.  
Max Weber, the disenchantment of nature, energy depletion and the inorganic era, 
and response to energetic theories of culture1 
 Within ecological economics Weber’s contributions to the sociology of energy are 
well recognized (Martinez-Alier 1987, 183-92), though this has only rarely penetrated 
into sociology itself (for an exception see Foster 1999, 370). Modern industrial 
capitalism, for Weber, was “the age of iron,” but it was just as much the age of coal, “the 
most valuable and most crucial of all products peculiar to the western world” (Weber 
[1919-20] 2003, 190-91). Since coal was viewed as an inorganic or nonrenewable form 
of energy, modern capitalism was, in Weber’s conception, an age dependent on 
“substituting inorganic” for “organic” materials/energy (Weber 1946, 364, 368).  
                                                
1 This synopsis of Weber’s views on energy draws on material in Foster and Holleman (2012).  
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 For Weber coal was more important and indispensable than even the 
revolutionary technologies that it made possible. Rather than seeing coal as the basis of 
the steam engine, with the latter as the object, he turned this on its head: arguing that the 
steam engine, used first in mining, “made it possible to produce the amount of coal 
necessary for modern industry.” The ready supply of coal then allowed for the 
development of bigger steam engines. “The most revolutionary instrumentality known to 
industry,” the railroad, was a product of “the age of iron” and coal (Weber [1919-20] 
2003, 297, 304-06).  
 The burning of fossilized coal in blast furnaces, and its use as a means to steam 
power, constituted a major transformation in human society, liberating it from its 
traditional relation to nature. As he wrote in his General Economic History,  
In the first place, coal and iron released technology and 
productive possibilities from the limitations of the qualities 
inherent in organic materials; from this time forward 
industry was no longer dependent upon animal power or 
plant growth. Through a process of exhaustive exploitation, 
fossil fuel, and by its aid iron ore, were brought up to the 
light of day, and by means of both men achieved the 
possibility of extending production to a degree which 
would have previously been beyond the bounds of the 
conceivable. Thus iron became the most important factor in 
the development of capitalism; what would have happened 
to this system or to Europe in the absence of this 
development [made practical by the introduction of coked 
coal in iron smelting] we do not know. (Weber [1919-20] 
2003, 305) 
 
 Dependence on animal power and plant production decreased with the increased 
reliance on fossil fuels. “The mechanization of the production process…through the 
steam engine liberated production from the organic limitations of human labor” (Weber 
[1919-20) 2003, 305-06). As Weber ([1909] 1984, 39) observed elsewhere, the “relative 
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energetic significance of human energy” for production in modern industrialized 
capitalist society decreased due to the substitution of fossilized coal. The decline in the 
energetic importance of human labor in industry, was mirrored, in an increasingly 
industrialized agriculture, by the accelerated “liberation of the peasants,” and the 
dissolution of the organic relation to the land (Weber [1919-20] 2003, 92, 96). Coal and 
iron thus introduced the inorganic, disenchanted age, based on the demise of earlier 
organic relations. “Iron and coal,” in Mumford’s (1934, 163) words, “dominated the 
[new] paleotechnic period.” In the highly mechanized world of steam power, as distinct 
from the earlier era dominated by water power, the modern machine is no longer “the 
servant of the man,” but rather “the inverse relation holds” (Weber [1919-20] 2003, 302).  
 Weber’s emphasis on and understanding of energy in society is also present in his 
remarkable critique of the Nobel-prize-winning chemist Wilhelm Ostwald in relation to 
thermodynamics. For Weber, Ostwald’s account of the potentially unlimited supply of 
energy emanating from the sun, which human beings had not yet tapped fully, was 
questionable if taken to the extreme of denying scarcity—the foundation of economics in 
the marginalist or neoclassical view. Economics, after all, was “bound up with the 
application of scarce material means” (Weber 1949, 65). He thus strongly questioned 
Ostwald’s claim that a “‘squandering of our inheritance’ [with respect to energy and 
natural resources] seems totally unthinkable” (Weber [1909] 1984, 37). Not only was 
Weber skeptical about the end of dependence on fossil fuel, but he argued—anticipating 
in this respect the founder of modern ecological economics Georgescu-Roegen (1971)—
that the entropy law could be seen as applying to essential raw materials as well as energy 
as such, so that the squandering, for example, of iron ore and copper, could prove crucial 
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in limiting production and enforcing conditions of scarcity (Martinez-Alier 1987, 185). 
For Weber, Ostwald’s views of energetic abundance were naïve in that “the indispensable 
chemical and form-energy of every substance used for production, transmission, and 
utilization of the most important energies that are used is equally irretrievably dissipated. 
This, after all, is the case with all free energy according to the law of entropy” (Weber 
[1909] 1984, 38).  
 The historical-sociological significance of Weber’s treatment of energy lay in the 
fact that he was the first major social thinker to argue that industrial capitalism was 
dependent on a particular environmental or energy regime: the fossil-fuel economy 
(Foster and Holleman 2012). Every society has its own social-metabolic relation to the 
rest of the biosphere, defined in large part by its energy regime, a key to understanding a 
given society’s broader ecosocial relations. Social transitions, such as that from 
precapitalist to capitalist society, entail changes to the entire social metabolic order and 
can thus be understood as distinct “ecohistorical periods.”  While human activities have 
always entailed environmental consequences, it is possible to distinguish “broad 
‘ecohistorical periods’—periods in which ‘human activities have led to (relatively) 
uniform changes in nature over vast areas’” (Foster 1999, 34; see also Mumford [1934] 
and Haila and Levins [1992] on energy and technical phases of social development and 
environmental regimes).  
 The current ‘ecohistorical period’ may be defined in terms of its energy and 
broader environmental regime and distinguished by “two traits specific to capitalism” 
that shape both of these (Foster 1999, 35):  
First, capitalism has been so successful over the last few 
centuries in “conquering” the earth that the field of 
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operation for its destruction has shifted from a regional to a 
planetary level. And second, the exploitation of nature has 
become more and more universalized, because nature’s 
elements, along with the social conditions of human 
existence, have increasingly been brought within the sphere 
of the economy and subjected to the same measure, that of 
profitability. (35)  
 
These features of the system thus shape the energy regime of capital, which is a 
historically specific development. Weber explained it in this way:  
This [modern economic] order is now bound to the 
technical and economic conditions of machine production 
which today determine the lives of all the individuals who 
are born into this mechanism…with irresistible force. 
Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossil 
fuel is burnt. (Weber [1905/1920] 1930, 181, translation 
slightly altered; Bell 1998, 150-51).2 
 
In other words, Weber saw the social and energy regime of capital as having no self-
imposed limits or boundaries and as being driven inexorably toward exploitation at all 
costs until there is nothing left. Under these conditions, dealing with the impending 
climate catastrophe, means changing the system, ushering in a new ecohistorical era 
defined by a new energy regime embedded in a more humane and ecologically 
responsive social order.  
                                                
2 This is quoted in Foster and Holleman (2012). Although employing the Parsons 1930 translation of The 
Protestant Ethic here and throughout this article, we have altered this passage slightly in conformity with 
Kalberg’s 2009 translation (Weber [1905/1920] 2009, 157) to refer, as Weber did, to “fossil fuel” (Kalberg) 
as opposed to “fossilized coal” (Parsons).  
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The age of exuberance and the energy lacuna in post-WWII sociology   
 The classical sociologists thus provide powerful foundations for a sociology of 
energy. However, post-WWII era sociology failed to develop these classical insights.  
This period is known as the Age of Exuberance, which infected sociology and led to a 
significant denial and ignorance of the thermodynamic limits to growth and the interface 
of social inequalities and ecological degradation, or energy injustices, characterizing the 
modern energy regime. Assumed energy abundance dominated in this period. “The 
combination of petroleum supply availability and the vision of a nuclear age engendered 
a belief in the unlimited availability of energy such as had never before occurred in the 
history of humanity” (Radkau 1996, 17). The critique of this form of denial, or “human 
exemptionalism,” has been undertaken in environmental sociology since it’s founding 
(e.g. Buttel 1976; Catton and Dunlap 1978a, 1978b; Catton 1980; Schnaiberg 1980). The 
consequences of the energy regime too often were ignorable (as today) because they were 
borne by disenfranchised communities, other nations, and ecosystems. 
 However, there were exceptions to the dominant exemptionalism amongst 
sociologists even in the 1950s. For example, Cottrell (1955) dealt critically with the topic 
of energy, and the need for human society to “replace the energy…use[d] up in the 
process of living [because] a permanent deficit makes life impossible,” (4; see also 
Catton 1980, 44). With the 1970s oil crisis the reality of a limited energy supply, which 
had been exceedingly unsustainably harvested, caught the attention of more sociologists. 
As Catton (1980) wrote, “recognition of the social significance of physical energy 
remained almost nil among politicians and social scientists until depleted resources began 
failing to meet persistently exuberant demand” (44). Critical social and natural science 
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developed new alternatives to the significant ecological blinders and lack of cross-
discipline understanding that still characterized the dominant view in the 1970s and 80s, 
and which continues to ignore the relationship between energy, social organization, and 
environmental degradation  (Meadows, et al. 1972; Daly, ed. 1973; Mazur and Rosa 
1974; Odum 1974; Georgescu-Roegen 1975; Anderson 1976; Commoner 1977; Daly 
1977; Lovins 1977; Kakela 1978; Catton 1980; Schnaiberg 1980). 
 In the 1970s and early 1980s, three distinct approaches to energy and the broader 
interaction between society and the rest of the environment began to take shape and may 
be somewhat illustrated by the following works: (1) Catton’s Overshoot and the techno-
energy/population drivers of ecological degradation (human ecology); (2) Lovins’s 
studies of ‘soft energy paths’ (foreshadowing ecological modernization); and (3) 
Schnaiberg’s studies the role of energy as a resource, mediator and indicator in the 
treadmill of production (political economy). A few studies also initiated the examination 
of gender and race inequalities embedded in the energy regime (e.g., Women’s Research 
Center 1981; Rodney 1982; Bullard 1983). As York, Rosa, and Dietz (2003a) point out, 
the three main perspectives that became significant in environmental sociology by the 
1990s were: human ecology, political economy, and ecological modernization. This triad 
is distinguishable today in energy studies in sociology, with the technological approach 
adopted by ecological modernizationists and others sharing their assumptions most 
common.  
 Of the sociological work developed in the post-war period through the 1990s, this 
thesis builds especially on political economy traditions, which link to critical human 
ecology (York and Mancus 2009) especially in terms of the critique of capitalist 
 26 
economic growth and the modern energy regime, and the environmental justice literature 
that developed in the post-war period. Systems ecology, which developed concomitantly, 
also is integrated as the ecological basis for understanding the ecological rift of 
capitalism and its inherent environmental inequalities. The following sections discuss the 
integration of these with the main contemporary developments in environmental 
sociology that are brought together in this thesis including: the overarching framework of 
the ecological rift theory building on Marx’s theory of “metabolic rift,” feminist ecology, 
and the work of environmental justice scholars. The point is to bring together the insights 
of several generations of critical natural and social scientists to help us better face our 
energy challenges today.  
The social and natural science basis for a contemporary, critical sociology of energy  
 Linking our knowledge of social and ecological crises creates a basis for an 
approach to energy that is sociologically coherent (recognizing systemic injustices and 
power inequalities) and ecologically grounded. Recent work towards making such links 
may be found in systems ecology and in broader environmental sociological theory, in 
particular, the theory of the ecological rift, feminist ecology, and the environmental 
justice literature. Scholars from each of these latter perspectives have called for more 
integrated theory in environmental sociology, with greater attention given to the 
relationship between injustice and ecological degradation (Pellow 2000, 2007; Salleh 
2009; Foster, York, and Clark 2010). Coming out of the natural sciences, systems 
ecologist and energy scholar Howard T. Odum also went to significant lengths to unite 
social and ecological science, with a focus on the urgent need for society at one and the 
same time to address environmental inequalities and restore the earth’s systems, disrupted 
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as a result of capitalism’s growth (Odum 2007). Odum worked to overcome the 
nature/society dualism highlighted as a theoretical weakness in sociology by feminist 
ecologists, among others, by bringing economy and ecology under a unified ecological 
analysis. My goal is to put these theoretical developments in a context in which they can 
complement one another and informs the ongoing development of the critical sociology 
of energy.  
The ecological rift: A framework for synthesis 
 Feminist ecologist Ariel Salleh (2010) highlighted that we remain in need of 
developing an integrated ecosocial analysis that recognizes the primary importance of 
“reproductive activities and regenerative provisioning” and includes “inputs by class, 
race, and sex-gendered others” (213, 215). Salleh sees the basis for an integrated 
theoretical approach in the ecological rift analysis emerging from Marxist sociology:  
Climate change, biodiversity loss, and social precarity are 
each results of capitalist overproduction. In responding to 
this globalizing overshoot, activists need a materialist 
analysis of social relations, as well as a materialism that 
engages ecological processes. The dialectical tools of 
Marxist sociology already offer a basis for such a synthesis, 
but it remains a big ask for wider publics, because 
Eurocentric convention splits economics and ecology apart. 
(205)  
 
The ecological rift framework, which integrates social, economic, and ecological 
analysis, also puts social justice at its center. Because it adopts an openly emancipatory 
framework, in ecological and social terms, it is an instance of  “strong reflexivity” in 
theory, characterized by a critical distance from the status quo that makes it possible to 
question everything (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 305). This separates it from 
approaches characterized by what feminist standpoint theorists refer to as examples of 
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“weak objectivity” that “attempt to separate the positive from the normative” (305). 
Objectivity, the way it is sometimes understood, is never possible in this society “because 
science is a socially embedded and often an elitist activity, such exclusion of values is 
impossible” (305). Not acknowledging this reality results in social science that 
unreflexively adopts the master perspective, therefore often reflecting the conceptual 
limits of the dominant ideology. 
 Absent “strong reflexivity” on the part of social science, it is impossible to see the 
ways in which “our ontological concepts of nature are often bound to systems of 
oppression” (305). Strong reflexivity in environmental social science demands adopting 
the vantage point of those deemed “Others” and a basis in critical ecology (306).  Such 
reflexivity is at the heart of the ecological rift perspective. It thus builds on the best 
classical work and at the same time is part of the development of critical approaches in 
environmental sociology, such as critical human ecology, feminist ecology, and 
environmental justice, that break down disciplinary boundaries and make a 
contemporary, critical sociology of energy, with energy justice at its core, possible. 
 The reflexive perspective of the ecological rift theory thus makes it possible, as 
Salleh suggests, to integrate feminist ecology, and also issues of environmental justice, 
under this overarching framework. This integration forms the sociological basis for 
developing a critical sociology of energy connected to broad theoretical developments in 
sociology and ecology. This makes possible a deep understanding of how the costs of the 
modern energy regime are borne by women, people of color, and poor people around the 
world unequally and accumulate as the social and ecological debts of capitalism. K. 
William Kapp (1950) referred to capitalism as a system of “unpaid costs.” Charles 
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Anderson (1976) published a remarkable book for its time, The Sociology of Survival, 
prefiguring many of today’s ecosocial analyses. Drawing on Kapp’s analysis and Marx’s 
critique of capital’s externalities, Anderson noted that “the growth society operates as if it 
had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; the accumulation of capital is pursued without 
regard for the side-effects or for long-range consequences, leaving to nature and the 
larger community these uncalculated costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions 
and movement framing, Anderson referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or 
externalities as “the ecological debt,” the result of the exploitation of both nature and 
humans for the sake of economic growth at all costs (142-43), undermining the natural 
and social conditions of production.  
 In chapter three of this dissertation, I show how bringing the work of systems 
ecologist, Howard T. Odum, into the ecological rift framework, provides a basis for the 
synthesis called for by feminist ecologists such as Salleh, and ecological rift theorists 
themselves, with attention to environmental inequalities. In the same chapter, I show how 
Odum’s work provides an ecological basis for understanding ecological and social debts, 
as well as a way to assess socio-ecological practices in terms of what Salleh calls “eco-
sufficiency,” and critique practices and social organization that “externalizes costs on to 
others as debt” (Salleh 2010, 214). This also answers the call of environmental justice 
scholars for theoretical development that is better grounded in ecology (Pellow 2000).  
 Before this, in chapter two, I illustrate the basis in Marxist theory for 
understanding the social rift, which includes divisions, exploitation, and oppression based 
on race, class, and gender, among others, and is the foundation of the ecological rift. 
Drawing on the environmental justice literature and feminist ecology, the links between 
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the ecological and social rift are made clear, and these provide the basis for 
understanding energy injustice and, on the other hand, possibilities for and challenges of 
realizing energy justice, which I argue is the necessary heart of contemporary energy 
studies. Energy injustice is defined here as the interface between social inequalities and 
ecological depredations associated with the modern energy regime. Grounded in this 
theoretical development, in chapter four I explore developments in Cuba, based on my 
field research there. In this chapter I show how a broader understanding of the ecological 
and social rift allows a deeper analysis of the case of ecological change in Cuba than is 
traditionally presented in the literature. In the chapter on Cuba, the literature review on 
Cuba is partially drawn from material co-authored with Christina Ergas that we hope to 
publish later, though the writing and research in the remainder of the chapter are my own. 
 Unlike those environmental economists and some feminist thinkers who seek to 
internalize nature and women’s work within the capitalist value system (thus 
“internalizing the exernalities”), the theoretical development outlined in the following 
chapters is instead an effort to “externalize the internalities,” as Odum put it (see Foster 
[2002], 26-43, on the problem of economic reductionism). On this basis, a radical vision 
is applied to understand the current relationship between energy, environment, and 
society, and the true unpaid costs of our current energy practices in social and ecological 
terms, rather than market terms.  
 Beyond just developing such an understanding, this approach provides a way of 
seeing alternatives as well. The hope is to develop the theoretical basis for a critical 
sociology of energy that will provide a way of envisioning our decision-making and 
practices around energy as part of a larger process of socio-ecological transformation. 
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The goal of such a transformation is the realization of a society democratically organized 
on the basis of provisioning for social and ecological reproduction. Under such 
circumstances, energy justice is the basis for energy decision-making, and the point is 
maintaining, ecologically and socially speaking, “the free development of each” as “the 
condition for the free development of all” (Marx and Engels [1848] 1998, 41).  
 32 
CHAPTER II 
 
THE HUMAN RIFT: A CALL FOR ENERGY JUSTICE  
 
The promise of an integrated approach: The ecological rift and energy justice 
 As indicated in the previous chapter, classical sociologists drew on natural and 
social science and integrated a social and ecological critique within their broader 
theoretical perspectives. This made possible their powerful analyses of the role of energy 
in society and the consequences of this for the environment. These early insights were 
rediscovered in environmental sociology in the past twenty years just as scholars sought 
again a more integrated approach to theory based on advanced social and ecological 
science, and drawing on the lessons of social and environmental struggles.  
 Assessments of environmental sociology since 2000 suggest theoretical 
development to move the discipline forward, incorporating environmental justice 
insights, ecology, and more global perspectives. For example, Foster (2002) emphasized 
the need for “more attention directed to environmental justice—that is, the struggle 
against environmental racism, environmental sexism, the environmental injuries of class, 
and the ecological consequences of imperialism” (58). Pellow (2000) called for an 
approach to environmental justice that is more nuanced, historical, and united with 
ecology than previous efforts. And Salleh (2010) highlighted the necessity of greater 
recognition of the gendered nature of the ecological rift and the leadership of the global 
South and women in environmental change, proposing a focus on unpaid reproductive 
labor as essential to ecosocial analyses. These scholars are amongst those who have 
advanced the most “sociologically radical” (Foster 2002, 58) agendas of environmental 
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sociology, coming primarily out of three traditions: political economy, environmental 
justice, and feminist ecology.  
 Although there are diverse strands of each of these perspectives in environmental 
sociology, much of their work is complementary as a result of shared commitments to 
uniting materialist social and ecological analyses and connecting theory and praxis, 
moving back and forth between the academy and experience on the ground. These 
perspectives have developed parallel to ecological theory, where system’s ecologist 
Howard T. Odum’s emergy analysis provides a method for evaluating social inequality 
and ecological degradation on a common footing in ecosystem terms.  Put in a context in 
which they may complement one another, the combined insight of these critical 
developments provides a powerful basis for insight into issues of energy justice.  
 In environmental sociology, the theory of the ecological rift provides the context 
in which the linked insights of these perspectives may inform work on energy. While the 
implications of Odum’s work are developed in the following chapter, the rest of this 
chapter is devoted to providing the sociological context for linking the ecological and 
social rift of capitalism and the implications of this for centering energy justice in the 
broader sociology of energy. In doing so, I will illustrate how the classical foundations of 
the theory of ecological rift provide insight into the links between this contemporary 
theoretical development and the environmental justice literature. I will also build on 
feminist ecologists’ understanding of the gendered nature of the ecological rift. This 
theoretical development is used to introduce the concept of energy justice, taking 
seriously that “in an era of feminist and postcolonial liberation, gender and race become 
integral to any such analysis” (Salleh 2009, 4).  
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 In the following analysis environmental injustice is defined as the interface 
between environmental depredations and inequalities associated with class, race, gender, 
and international inequalities (imperialism) (Foster 2002, 40). Energy injustice represents 
that element of environmental injustice directly related to energy flows. An underlying 
assumption of my argument is that the ecological rift between human beings and nature 
corresponds to a social rift amongst human beings. Following Liebig, Marx, and Weber, 
the relation of capitalism to nature can be described as a Rabbau, or robbery, system, 
while in Marx’s case this applied to human social relations as well (Foster 2002; Foster 
and Holleman 2012). In describing the development of industrial agriculture Marx wrote, 
“all progress in modern agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the 
worker, but of robbing the soil (Marx [1867] 1990, 638). In this perspective questions of 
the ecological rift and the human rift are wrapped up together. The ecological debt to 
nature overlaps with the ecological debt owed to some human beings by others.   
Environmental justice and the ecological rift: Classical integration 
 A key link between political economy, environmental justice, and feminist 
ecology perspectives is their common focus on capitalism’s unpaid costs and 
accumulated injustices, both social and ecological, and their commitment to transcending 
this “omnicidal” system (Pellow 2007, 51). Feminist ecologist Ariel Salleh (2010) thus 
sees the basis for an integrated theoretical approach in the ecological rift analysis 
emerging from Marxist sociology, which has at its core the critique of capital in social 
justice and ecological terms:  
Climate change, biodiversity loss, and social precarity are 
each results of capitalist overproduction. In responding to 
this globalizing overshoot, activists need a materialist 
analysis of social relations, as well as a materialism that 
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engages ecological processes. The dialectical tools of 
Marxist sociology already offer a basis for such a synthesis, 
but it remains a big ask for wider publics, because 
Eurocentric convention splits economics and ecology apart. 
(205)  
 
 Marx’s work on energy, as noted in the previous chapter, was so insightful 
because he focused on human oppression and exploitation of the environment as related 
issues. In fact, his greatest work was dedicated to exposing the oppressive nature of 
capitalism. Fracchia (2008) observes that:   
The manifest purpose of Marx’s critical review of the 
capitalist mode of production, Capital, is to deconstruct the 
categories of political economy in order to expose 
capitalism as fundamentally exploitative. But this entire 
critique of political economy is embedded in, and made 
possible by, Marx’s materialist conception of history, the 
‘first fact’ of which is, as he stated in The German 
Ideology, ‘human corporeal organization.’ (38) 
 
The focus on ‘human corporeal organization’ and its “consequent relation to the rest of 
nature” (Marx and Engels [1845’6] 1976, 31) makes possible Marx’s insights into what 
we would now call environmental inequalities.  
 Documenting the differential immiseration related to the exploitation of energy 
resources is an important part of energy analyses concerned with energy justice. The 
antecedents for this kind of work, and the importance of it for theoretical development, 
can be found in Capital, where:   
[T]he middle third of the first volume of Capital… literally 
and analytically the centrepoint of Capital [are the sections 
dealing with the literal effects on workers’ bodies of the 
Capital relation.] Their disproportionate length results from 
the wealth of historical detail that they contain, in contrast 
to the other chapters that are much more theoretically taut. 
It would, however, be facile to view that historical detail as 
‘extraneous’ and serving only ‘unnecessarily’ to elongate 
the theoretical discussion. For it is precisely the rich 
 36 
historical detail that completes and complements the 
theoretical critique, allowing Marx to explain the 
immediate and inseparable link between exploitation and 
immiseration. He does this by systematically applying 
corporeal norms to both the vast social artefact, the 
capitalist mode of production, and to individual material 
artefacts, specifically the means of capitalist production. 
Here, he explains how the meaning of capitalist relations of 
production is inscribed on the bodies of those whose labour 
produces unprecedented social wealth. And he reads this 
corporeal text in order to decipher another kind of 
hieroglyphics: the corporeal hieroglyphics, barely visible to 
the observing intellect, inscribed on the wage-labouring 
body in pain. (Fracchia 2008, 40-41)  
 
This central focus on exploitation and immiseration is inextricably bound to Marx and 
Engels’s analysis of pollution and ecological degradation more broadly speaking. In 
Marx’s work, the rift in the earth’s metabolism brought on by capitalism is a product of 
the social rift engendered by the social relations of capitalism, which are inherently 
hierarchical and exploitative. However, the ecological degradation that characterizes 
what we now call capitalism’s ecological rift, as it develops, generates its own social 
dislocations, including new and exacerbated inequalities. Therefore, the relationship 
between ecological degradation and human exploitation and immiseration is a dialectical 
one.  
 In Marx’s analysis, for example, the rise of industrial agriculture with the 
development of capitalism in England was made possible by the expropriation of the 
majority of the rural population and the exploitation the few who remained. Ecologically, 
this resulted in a rift between the growing urban centers and rural areas. Food and fiber 
increasingly were exported from the countryside to the towns, where the wastes 
associated with this and industrial production accumulated in the form of industrial 
pollution. The worst effects of this pollution and rural exploitation were of course visited 
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upon the poor and working classes.  In the countryside, the development of capitalist 
agriculture, geared toward profit rather than meeting human need, entailed such intense 
and unsustainable practices that the reproduction of the fertility of the soil was 
compromised while the rural population was both cut off from the means of subsistence 
and exposed to new environmental dangers. Marx, studying the most advanced soil 
scientists of his generation, saw the relationship between humans and the rest of nature in 
terms of social metabolism:   
A metabolic relationship involves regulatory processes that 
govern the interchange of materials. Natural systems, such 
as the nutrient cycle, have their own metabolism, which 
operate independently of and in relation to human society, 
allowing for their regeneration and/or continuance. Each 
mode of production generates a particular social metabolic 
order that influences the society-nature dialectic, regulating 
the ongoing reproduction of society and the demands 
placed on ecosystems. (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 348) 
 
As part of the larger capitalist “social metabolic order,” industrial agriculture “disturbs 
the metabolic interaction between man and earth, i.e., it prevents the return to the soil of 
its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it 
hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil” 
(Marx quoted in Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 350).  Indeed, “capitalist agriculture 
created a metabolic rift in the nutrient cycle,” and came to be understood as a Rabbau 
system, or system of robbery (351, 354; Foster 2002, 155-70). This robbery of nature was 
bound up with the exploitation of human beings domestically and abroad.  
 The decline in soil fertility in England and other developing capitalist countries, 
brought on by the metabolic rift between town and country, led to the global search for 
fertilizers (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 345-72). Massive guano deposits were 
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discovered in Peru and once the British understood its significance for increasing 
agricultural yields, this region’s fate was sealed. The imperial entanglements in which 
Peru became ensnared resulted in a “guano curse” for the people of Peru, with all the 
trappings of what we now call the “resource curse,” associated with ecological 
imperialism, or ecological unequal exchange. This pattern continues today with the ill 
effects experienced primarily by the poor in countries that export their ecological riches 
to the wealthy capitalist centers, often at gunpoint or through undemocratic agreements 
between first and third world elites. Characteristics of the resource curse, from Marx’s 
era to the present, include the impoverishment of local peoples and lands, and increased 
indebtedness of the exporting nations. The local population of Peru was exploited, and 
often outright murdered, all for the enrichment of the local elites and global capitalist 
class.  
 While recognizing the localized effects of capitalist development and imperialism, 
Marx also saw that peoples across continents were brought into contact with the 
depredations associated with the rise of capitalism and industrial agriculture. African 
slaves were brought to the new world by the shipload. As part of the guano trade, Chinese 
and Indian workers also often were deceived or outright kidnapped by British and 
European human traffickers who brought them to harvest guano in Latin America.  Like 
all forced to work for the enrichment of an elite class, the people brought to the new 
world with the guano trade as laborers were de facto or literally enslaved, toiling under 
murderous conditions to provide fertilizer for British and European fields. A similar story 
was repeated over and over where the search for profits spread. Marx reported on these 
proceedings, as the ecological and social rift of capitalism went global, accelerating to the 
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present day. Now entire planetary systems are threatened and too many communities, 
cultures, and peoples have been sacrificed on the altar of “accumulation without end” 
(Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 18; Mészáros 2012).  
 Along with Marx’s analysis of the guano trade in association with his study of 
industrial agriculture, Marx and Engels’s combined work on Ireland also serves to 
illustrate the historical connection between colonial exploitation of humans and the 
environment (see Foster 2000, 164; Marx and Engels 1972; Marx (1867) 1990, 860). 
Moreover, Engels studied urban pollution, affecting especially the expropriated rural 
population now forced to live in urban centers, including the problems associated with 
the use of coal, in The Condition of Working the Class in England in 1844 ([1845] 1958; 
see Foster 1999b and Waitzken 2000 for reviews of Engels’ remarkable work in this 
regard). “For Engels, such features of urban life as crowding, poor housing, inadequate 
sanitation, and pollution combined with social class position in the etiology of disease” 
(Waitzken 2000, 57-58).  These are just a few examples of Marx and Engels’s penetrating 
analyses of the relationship between capitalism’s unpaid social and ecological costs, or 
“externalities,” which are not included in capitalist accounting schemes, though they are 
internal to the working of the system.  
 It remains difficult in current political and academic debates to bring or sustain 
attention to interrelated ecological and social injustices. However, this was a central 
feature of Marx and Engels’s work and it is therefore not surprising that scholars and 
activists today continue to draw insight and inspiration from this work as the 
globalization of the accumulation process has left no corner of the land, sea, or air 
untouched. The cumulative insights of Marx’s studies into the social metabolism of 
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capitalism were presented by Foster (1999a; 2000) as Marx’s theory of metabolic rift. 
Today this perspective, drawing on contemporary and historical interdisciplinary 
scientific developments, and the lessons of the social and environmental struggles of the 
past hundred years, has been developed further as the theory of the ecological rift.  This 
approach carries forward the commitment to understanding ecological and social crises in 
relational terms and to transcending a system in which, in terms of the planet’s ecology 
and its people, the destruction of one is the basis of the destruction for all.  
Ecological rift and a critical sociology of energy  
 In developing the theory of the ecological (or metabolic) rift of capitalism, Foster 
(1999a; 2000) and Foster, Clark, and York (2010), along with others, have developed the 
work of Marx and Engels to create a contemporary, interdisciplinary theoretical approach 
to understanding the ecological and social causes and consequences of capitalist 
development. Among other major contemporary socio-ecological issues, this approach 
has been used to explain capitalism’s effects on the oceans and fisheries, including the 
socio-ecological transformation of fishing communities (Clausen and Clark 2005; Longo 
and Clausen 2011; Longo 2012), the disruption of the carbon cycle (Clark and York 
2005) and the nitrogen cycle (Mancus 2007), ecological imperialism (Clark and Foster 
2009), the potential of urban agriculture (Clausen 2007; McClintock 2009), and agrarian 
movements (Wittman 2009).  
 In Foster, Clark, and York (2010), work completed over the previous decade 
extending Marx’s theory of metabolic rift into an account of the ecological rift, rooted in 
a historical critique of capitalism, is consolidated. One important advantage of the 
ecological rift as the foundation for a theoretical integration in the critical sociology of 
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energy is that it is based on Marx’s original analysis of ecological crises as rooted in the 
exploitation of human by human. Building on previous work illuminating crucial 
connections, the links between the theory of capitalism’s ecological rift, environmental 
justice perspectives, and broader work on inequalities with relevance to energy studies, is 
made clear.  
 Ecological rift theorists have pointed out the primacy of social relations for 
understanding ecological degradation:   
This ecological rift is, at bottom, the product of a social rift: 
the domination of human being by human being. The 
driving force is a society based on class, inequality and 
acquisition without end. At the global level it is represented 
by what L.S. Stavrianos in Global Rift—a history of the 
third world—described as the imperialist division between 
center and periphery, North and South, rich and poor 
countries. This larger world of unequal exchange is as 
much a part of capitalism as the search for profits and 
accumulation. (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 47) 
 
While these authors have focused on class inequality and inequalities between the global 
North and South, as yet there is not an explicit framing of the social rift in terms of race 
and gender. Developing analyses of the relationship between the ecological rift and 
environmental racism and sexism is central to energy studies concerned with issues of 
justice. Such work contributes to a more complete understanding of the causes, 
consequences, and persistence of the ecological rift. For example, studies on racism help 
explain, among other things, patterns of ecological unequal exchange within and between 
nations. Racism and imperialism are intertwined, and the comprador relationships 
between the ruling elites in the global South and the global North, both of which often 
represent whiteness in their countries and cultural contexts, shape politics and policies 
within and between countries. Whether robbing indigenous lands for export to rich 
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countries, or rich areas within nations, extractive activities tend to exacerbate racial 
inequalities, destroying the land and subsistence basis of entire communities and even 
cultures. In turn, these activities often are rationalized by various historical versions of 
the mythological “white man’s burden.”  In this historical justification for domination 
and exploitation, both white and man are at least equally operative terms.  
 Along with race, gender also must become a central focal point for understanding 
the persistence of the ecological rift, and the difficulty of transcending current crises. The 
way masculinity, for example, is marshaled to win support for resource wars, energy 
intensive technology, and complicity in the unequal exploitation of women’s energy at 
home and in the society in general—all of which facilitate accumulation at the top, must 
be acknowledged more widely and further studied (Connell 2005). Also, the top one 
percent, which dominates and organizes the omnicidal accumulation process worldwide 
must be understood in gender terms when “women still own just one percent of assets 
worldwide” and “make up 70 percent of the world’s poor and 67 percent of the illiterate” 
(WILPF quoted in Salleh 2009, 20).3 There is a reason women are more likely than men 
to participate in environmental struggles, forge cross-difference alliances, and express 
ecologically-oriented political views. Women in general of all social classes obviously 
benefit less than men from their own class from ecological destruction. However, poor 
                                                
3 WILPF is the acronym for the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Jane Addams, a 
pioneering sociologist, was the first president when the organization was founded in 1915. WILPF efforts 
are directed toward:  
• the equality of all people in a world free of sexism, racism, classism, and homophobia, 
• the guarantee of fundamental human rights including the right to sustainable development, 
• an end to all forms of violence: rape, battering, exploitation, intervention and war, 
• the transfer of world resources from military to human needs, leading to economic justice within 
and among nations, and 
• world disarmament and peaceful resolution of international conflicts via the United Nations 
http://www.wilpf.org/.http://www.wilpf.org/. 
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women and women in the global south, as a result of their role in reproductive 
provisioning, and their social location, “are hurt most by floods, droughts, resource wars, 
pestilence, and extreme weather events.” In other words, they have more to lose as a 
result of environmental destruction (Brownhill and Turner 2009, 232). 
 With energy resources in particular you can see today the lengths to which the 
capable countries will go to maintain supply—encouraging racism, xenophobia, hyper-
masculinity, and preying on class-based fears of unemployment and inflation, to win 
public support. Wars in the Middle East, attacks on Latin American governments 
nationalizing oil companies, the “scramble for Africa,” and the siting of nuclear waste 
dumps on indigenous land, show that the incessant growth of energy demand will plague 
the earth for the foreseeable future. Women, historically oppressed racial and ethnic 
groups, and poor people will continue to pay the greatest costs. Alternatives are possible, 
as social movements and left governments seek to reverse these trends. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether we will transcend the divisions based on nation, race, class, 
gender, sexual orientation, age, ability, etc… that continue to limit our understanding of 
current problems, and thus our vision in the solutions we propose, and what these imply 
about who we expect to bear the burdens of change. If the relationship between the 
ecological and social rift is not understood, in all its complexity and layers, we miss out 
on more than just a complex analysis, we miss out on the possibility of forging an 
alternate future to the dystopic reality in which too many live today. Specifying the links 
between the ecological and social rift, extending ecological rift theory to integrate the 
insights of environmental justice literature and feminist ecology, is the goal of the 
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remainder of this chapter. These links establish the conceptual basis for an energy justice 
framework as the heart of a critical approach to the sociology of energy.  
The ecological rift and environmental racism 
 The iniquities of ecological and social degradation have led throughout 
capitalism’s history to all kinds of movements for better living and working conditions, 
including revolutionary and anti-colonial revolts. However, abuses persist, and in relation 
to energy regimes, the consequences are bloody and globally ecologically destructive. 
The extension of the analysis of capitalism’s oppressive and degradative effects, 
articulated early on by Marx and Engels, found written in the very bodies of the 
exploited, has been taken up in the environmental justice literature. This literature, 
emerging from environmental justice struggles, has shown the long-term effects of 
environmental racism, a major component of energy injustice, which is defined by the 
interface of social inequalities, such as those based on race, and the depredations of the 
current and historical energy regime of capital. As Angela Park (2009) wrote, reporting 
on the immediate need for the climate movement to become a more inclusive movement 
for everybody if it is to succeed, “poor people and people of color, who already live in 
the most polluted communities, are…first in line for the negative effects of climate 
change” (7). Worldwide, as a result of systemic processes, poor people and people of 
color experience climate change most dramatically as they “disproportionately suffer 
from mortality rates from extreme heat waves, dirty air, water scarcity, and the ‘heat 
island’ effect of urban areas. They will also be disproportionately impacted by higher 
costs for food and electricity and by potential job losses and economic shifts” (15). 
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 To understand this interface between energy problems, like climate change, and 
persistent social inequalities, it is important to review the history of the 
institutionalization of racism that accompanied the colonial and genocidal patterns of 
capitalist development. The co-development of the ecological and social rift, in which 
race is a defining feature and energy imperialism is central to the growth necessary for 
the survival of capital, are clear if seen in terms of their conjoined history.   
 Building on previous work in race theory, as well as Marxian analyses of 
capitalism, scholars today recognize that,  
Contemporary racism by global North nations builds on a 
rich tradition of conquest, slavery, and colonization. 
Racism has been an organizing principle of the modern 
world system since the rise of European states centuries 
ago. The rise of capitalism and European nation-states was 
facilitated through intersections between the ideological 
and structural domination of nature and non-European 
peoples. (Pellow 2007, 37)  
 
Just as capitalism “depends on the destruction of nature while relying on its wealth to fuel 
production” it also “depends on the labor of poor people and various ethnic groups, while 
systematically disempowering and subjugating those populations….In other words, the 
ideological, cultural, psychological, and physical harm visited on people of color was 
supported and made possible by a system that did the same to nature” (38).  
 Pellow (2007) notes the equation in capitalism’s, and newly formed European 
states’, domination-justifying ideological apparatus of nature and of non-European 
peoples. Feminist ecologists have also noted this connection in relation to the exploitation 
of women (Salleh 2010).  In other words, a similar ideology justified the super-
exploitation of people occupying certain social locations and the planet, which has 
consistently accompanied the exploitation, for surplus extraction, of waged labor. As 
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ideological categories developed in the centrifugal process of differentiation for the sake 
of exploitation, what became known as “man,” “white,” “nature,” and “civilization,” are 
combined the “artificial product of modern history” (Marx [1867] 1990, 925) as much as, 
for example, any other of the socially constructed categories based on biological sex, skin 
pigmentation, ethnicity, human exemptionalism, or nationality. However, while serving 
as justifications for exploitation, racism and sexism remain “primarily…structural and 
material relationship[s]”, and are therefore literal problems, with real effects on people’s 
lives and the planet, rather than simply problematic literary or discursive developments 
(Pellow 2007, 42; Salleh, ed. 2009). Modern gender and race relationships were forged in 
the crucible of capitalist development based in Europe and England, and imposed on the 
world through capitalist globalization, bound inherently to the worldwide expansion of 
the ecological rift (Pellow 2007, 42-43; Lugones 2008; Foster, Clark, and York 2010).   
 As a constantly expanding, hierarchical system of exploitation, capitalism is 
inherently imperialistic (Foster 2002, 36). Infinite growth, theorized as the promise of 
capitalism, in finite borders, is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, the competitive nature 
of capitalism sends capital scouring the globe to secure markets, cheap or free labor, and 
resources ahead of competitors. While for the majority of the world’s population and the 
environment this means a diminishing basis for life on this planet, for the capitalist, this 
is survival and the point of all meaningful endeavor: “The mandate to accumulate capital 
has created the assumption that natural phenomena [and entire communities and peoples] 
are there for the taking on something of a first come first serve basis. If he were to 
survive, the capitalist had to move forcefully against nature in order to exploit as rapidly 
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and cheaply as possible its ‘free’ supply of raw materials before someone else did” 
(Anderson 1976, 120-21).  
 Modern racism and the ecological rift were born of the expansionary nature of the 
capitalist system, which was both justified by and spread the law of limpieza de sangre, 
or “cleanliness of blood.” Traced to the “Christian crusades into Muslim-controlled 
territories, and to the Calvinist Protestant colonization of Ireland,” this law “created the 
seed ideology and institutions for modern colonialism with its necessary tools––racist 
ideology and justification for genocide” (Dunbar-Ortiz 2003, 84). From this historical 
perspective, it is clear that “environmental racism is an extension of the institutional 
racism which touches every aspect of our society” (Bullard 1992). Indeed, without 
understanding racism and capitalist development in terms of one another, it is difficult to 
understand either, or the persistence and difficulty of overcoming environmental 
injustices in general, including energy injustice:  
 A good example of limiting the domain of racism can be 
seen in conceptions of the market. Instead of viewing the 
market as both constituted by racism and an active force in 
(re)producing racism, scholars have treated it as somehow 
outside the bounds of race…This is troubling given the 
extent to which discrimination and racism have been 
proven in the “free market”…Such a limited conception of 
racism prevents us from either grasping the power and 
spatiality of racism or identifying its underlying effectivity 
in perpetuating environmental injustice. (Pulido 2001, 19) 
 
 Because racism is such a fundamental aspect of the organization of capitalism, 
and serves as a powerful legitimizing ideology, (e.g. the “White Man’s Burden”), the 
scouring of the globe to feed capitalism’s incessant need for human and ecological inputs, 
as well as a sink for wastes, has always shoved the consequences of these practices onto, 
and resulted in the ecological robbery of, the third world and communities of color 
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(Odum and Arding 1991; Shiva 1997, 2002, 2005; Cole and Foster 2001; Foster 2002; 
Pellow 2007; Salleh, ed. 2009; Magdoff and Foster 2011). Sometimes this occurs through 
more subtle (and not so subtle) “development” deals, supposedly intended to bring jobs to 
communities, or raise the GDP of “under-performing” countries, or through the generally 
degradative and polluted living conditions of many people of color (Park 2009). But 
environmental racism also takes the form of outright dumping of toxic wastes, murder, 
colonization, and warfare (Magdoff 1978, 165-221; 2003; Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 
345-72). Thus the social and ecological rifts develop as one and the same process, with 
oppression and ecological degradation two sides of the same coin. Marx wrote, after 
discussing the role of colonialism, public debt, regressive taxation, the capitalist press, 
slavery, child-stealing for factories, and commercial wars, in capitalism’s development, 
that “‘if money…comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek,’ 
capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt” (Marx 
[1867] 1990, 925-26).  
 The social and ecological dynamics described above “are widely documented in 
the energy sector, which is at the core of the global economy, making possible its very 
existence” (Pellow 2007, 40). The histories of the Ogoni in the Niger Delta, and the 
communities of the Ecuadorean Amazon, who have fought with their lives against the 
degradation of their lands and the state-supported terrorism of Big Oil, are just two 
examples (Perkins 2004; Osha 2006). Two more are the longest wars in U.S. history 
currently being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan—both energy related. In the build up to 
the war started by the U.S. in Iraq, and throughout the year following the invasion, there 
was a major resurrection and celebration of a contemporary “White Man’s Burden” as a 
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racialized justification for the U.S. invasion and occupation of both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
For example, Max Boot’s The Savage Wars of Peace, the title of which is taken directly 
from a line in Kipling’s poem, received “the Best Book of 2002 Award from the 
Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, and the Los Angeles Times and won the 
2003 General Wallace M. Greene Jr. Award for the best nonfiction book pertaining to 
Marine Corps history” (Foster 2006, 129). In his book Boot lauds U.S. involvement in the 
Philippines and argues in favor of the U.S. deposing the Iraqi leadership and occupying 
the country even if, as Kipling argued, “colonists everywhere receive scant thanks 
afterward” (128). Racism also helps explain in part why drilling in national parks can be 
put on hold by activists in the U.S., whereas the same public can’t muster a sustained 
movement to make it politically unfeasible for the government and profiting businesses to 
shed the blood of hundreds of thousands of people in the Middle East and wreak the 
ecological havoc of war all in order to, in the end, conduct basically the same 
ecologically insane business.  
 These racialized struggles for energy resources cannot be understood merely as a 
product of the oil-based economy, the problem is the incessant demand for energy, no 
matter the form, to fuel capitalist accumulation. You see in the development of so-called 
“alternative energies” the repetition of every single pattern associated with the oil 
economy. Take the example of biofuel, the alternative energy receiving some of the 
highest levels of funding for research and development around the globe. Native lands are 
stolen and communities destroyed, especially in the global South, to develop this energy 
sector (Rogers 2010; Holleman 2012). There is an ongoing neo-colonial “scramble for 
Africa” associated with securing farmlands for this purpose (Allen 2010).  Because of the 
 50 
major role corn plays in food production globally (in animal feed, sweeteners, starch, 
masa harina, etc.), as with soy, price increases for these staple crops, which serve as the 
feedstock of biofuels affect the global food chain, decreasing the affordability of basic 
foods. This especially has affected the third world and poor communities everywhere, 
which are disproportionately populated by people of color. Increased food prices 
resulting from biofuel production led in the past five years in particular to food riots and 
the exacerbation of impoverishment. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right 
of food, one of the world’s leading experts on food insecurity, referred to U.S. and E.U. 
biofuel policy as a “crime against humanity.” The U.N.’s Committee on the Elimination 
of Racism also issued consternation over biofuel developments in southeast Asia (MRG, 
n.d.).  Despite calls for changes to the renewable fuel mandates and agricultural policy in 
the U.S. and E.U., these policies remain in place and production of corn-based ethanol 
and soy-based biodiesel will increase as a result, even if advanced biofuels eventually 
come online (Ferrett 2007; United Nations 2008; Ziegler 2011). 
 The environmental racism of the current energy regime is one of the starkest 
features of the social rift of capitalism, accompanying at every turn the deepening 
ecological rift. Because racism is embedded in the historical and current system of energy 
extraction and use, it also features in the attitudes of publics to solving problems like 
climate change and the, and is a factor in the effectiveness of movements, which remain 
divided along race, gender, and class lines (Taylor 2000, 2002; Foster 2002; Park 2009). 
This contributes to the difficulties of forging an adequate political opposition to the status 
quo in order to address environmental threats like climate change.  
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 White voters in the U.S., for example, are the least likely of all to see climate 
change as a serious threat. As Park (2009) found by reviewing polls and political studies, 
voters of color often are more likely to support policies addressing climate change and 
environmental policies generally, and, perhaps most significant, more willing to pay the 
costs (7-8). Park makes the crucial point that a climate movement, to be successful, must 
be everybody’s movement, overcoming historical divisions. She writes, “while many 
people of color and low-income communities regard climate change and the environment 
as priorities, the climate change movement remains highly homogeneous by race and 
class and significantly by gender in its leadership” (8). This affects the climate 
movement’s internal democracy, priorities, participation by broader publics, and hence 
overall effectiveness.  
 Along with overcoming these issues in the movements, energy scholars wishing 
to center energy justice in their work, must take account of the historical roots of our 
energy predicament, the connection between the ecological and social rift. For 
environmental sociologists tasked with studying these connections it is difficult to do so 
without adopting the environmental justice perspective that sees “climate change and 
environmental injustice as indicators of a larger systemic problem: a fossil fuel economy 
that externalizes negative economic and environmental impacts, leading to decisions that 
don’t fully account for the human and natural costs of modern industrial society” (Park 
2009, 14).  
 Our energy practices today are indeed one way to see why “racism remains 
primarily a structural and material relationship” (Pellow 2007, 42). Pellow notes that with 
the civil rights and anti-colonial struggles, one of the main things that “may have changed 
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most in recent years is the nature of the discourse and rhetoric around difference and 
(in)equality” (42). Unjust practices, however, persist because they are built into the 
system. Equally destructive is the gendered nature of these developments.  
The gendered ecological rift 
 While the origins of patriarchy are not entirely clear, the origins of capitalism as a 
patriarchal system, with its own particular gender order, are well-documented. Lorde 
(1984) put it thus, “institutionalized rejection of difference is an absolute necessity in a 
profit economy which needs outsiders as surplus people” (115). “Within this society, that 
group is made is made up of Black and Third World people, working-class people, older 
people, and women” (114). This institutionalized devaluation of women and other 
oppressed groups under capitalism means that the worst effects of the system 
disproportionately are visited upon them. This is clearly the case in the modern energy 
regime, where energy injustice is gendered, at the same time that it is class and race-
based. A report published by Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice, Looking Both 
Ways: Women's Lives at the Crossroads of Reproductive Justice and Climate Justice, 
finds that “women, specifically women of color, are disproportionately impacted by 
disasters and environmental degradation caused by global warming…low-income 
women, women of color, and immigrants will be most impacted by the severe weather 
events, heat waves, and increases in disease rates that will characterize the Earth’s 
changing climate” (quoted in Park 2009).  
 Explanations for the gendered nature of energy injustice and the broader 
ecological rift cannot be found in biological differences between the sexes. The 
globalization of ecological destruction associated with the burning of fossil fuels and the 
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near global oppression of women today, which interface in the form of energy injustice, 
are the product of a historically specific growth-oriented economic system.  
 The expansionary nature of capitalism meant, just as the law of limpieza de 
sangre constituted a portion of the “most important cargo on the 1492 voyage of 
Christopher Columbus” (Dunbar-Ortiz 2003) so too was the European conception of 
gender globalized starting in the colonial era (Leacock 1981; Lugones 2008). Lugones 
(2008) writes that “it is important to consider the changes that colonization brought to 
understand the scope of the organization of sex and gender under colonialism and in 
eurocentered global capitalism” (195).  Indeed, it is difficult to understand the 
relationship between the exploitation of women and the environment that has been 
discussed by feminist ecologists without studying gender as a historically specific 
construct, bound up with the racism and class divisions at the heart of capitalism as a 
particular social metabolic order (Waring 1999; Salleh 2009, ed.).  
 The “myths of male dominance” used to justify capitalism’s gender order invoke 
the European imposition of European style gender oppression back onto the whole of 
history, across cultures. In this way, male dominance is justified as a biological and 
historical inevitability. However, the historical evidence shows that while patriarchy 
predates capitalism, and is linked to the rise of class society itself, “one of the most 
consistent and widely documented changes brought about during the [capitalist] colonial 
period was a decline in the status of women relative to men” (Leacock 1981, 18). With 
the rise of manufacturing in Europe, privatizing men’s domestic work that was once part 
of the household labor shared with women, “the ideology of womanhood began to raise 
the wife and mother as ideals. As workers, women had at least enjoyed economic 
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equality, but as wives, they were destined to become appendages to their men, servants to 
their husbands. As mothers, they would be become passive vehicles for the replenishment 
of human life” (Davis 1983, 32). Thus “white women came to be seen as inhabitants of a 
sphere totally severed from the realm of productive work,” as the ideology of femininity 
marked them as “inferior,” along with their reproductive work as mothers and 
housewives (Davis 1983, 12).  
 The gendered division of labor was institutionalized in the political sphere where 
property laws, and laws regulating political participation, excluded the possibility of 
women’s self-determination, even for women working outside the home (Deere and Doss 
2008). The diminution of the work now deemed “women’s work” made it possible for 
capitalist employers to justify paying less, or not paying at all, for reproductive and 
regenerative labor. It has also made the second and third shifts invisible—which women 
who cannot afford to hire out domestic work and/or who must work extra jobs, or work 
more than others in the same job, experience in their daily lives (Waring 1999; King et al. 
2002; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). The great irony, as feminist ecologists and many 
other scholars and activists have pointed out, is that the very work that makes life 
possible on earth, and the ecological processes on which life depends, became the least 
valued in the capitalist value system (Davis 1983; Odum and Arding 1991; Waring 1999; 
Anzuldúa and Keating 2002; Foster 2002; Shiva 2005; Salleh 2009). Thus the devaluing 
of women’s work accompanied the devaluing of the rest of nature, as both were treated as 
“free gifts” to capital.  The irony is greatest perhaps in the global South where 
subsistence production carried out primarily by women is deemed without value along 
with nature (the natural conditions).  
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 Early capitalist imperialism began the spread of these divisions of society and 
nature around the globe: “Under colonial conditions, the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sphere 
became divided, as had not been the case when the ‘household’ was the ‘community,’ 
and the ‘public’ sphere became invested with male power it represents in state-organized 
society” (Leacock 1981, 23). At the same time, the globalized colonial division of labor 
meant that along with the expropriation of women’s work in the global North, capitalism 
relied on the forced labor of the global South, including the incorporation of men of 
color, and other subordinated men, into the households, or otherwise under the legal foot, 
of white, mostly upper class men. Racist and sexist ideology mingled in the exportation 
of the European gender order abroad, and in the treatment of slaves and the working 
classes not yet considered “white” in Europe, England, and North America (Roediger 
1991; Lugones 2008). Whiteness and European masculinity were offered to white 
working class men as “psychological wages” to buy their complicity in the oppression of 
women and men of color, and their own, and to divide movements that would threaten 
the capitalist order (Leacock 1981, 308; Roediger 1991, 12).   
 The hegemony of sexism and racism helps recruit alienated functionaries (of all 
races, classes, and sexes, but especially white men) to ensure the social hierarchy 
necessary for capital accumulation persists. In this context, the ideologies developed to 
justify exploitation take on a life of their own.  Race, class, and gender, are thus 
incomprehensible taken apart from one another, though they also have strong 
independent effects, as in many cases of environmental racism and the near universal 
exploitation and underrepresentation, today, of women. Racism and sexism under 
capitalism facilitate environmental exploitation on a global scale. These ideologies were 
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necessary to justify the spread of capital globally, to keep white men in the factories and 
armies, alienated from subsistence work, from the land and the rest of humanity, and to 
pass the buck of the ecological rift generated by capitalism. 
 In the insidious way those in power divide and conquer, and justify oppression, 
men of color were feminized and patronized to justify their subordination, and the 
devaluing of their work, in an otherwise male supremacist culture and economic system 
(Hymer 2011). And women expected to do hard labor outside the home could not be 
idealized through the same lens of femininity as white European women whose work 
generally was now confined to the home and differentiated from white men’s industrial 
labor. Characteristic of capital’s opportunism, gender differentiation, whether religiously 
based or explained in terms of imagined biological differences arising from sex, changes 
in various contexts. Thus European women of the upper class in particular, during the 
colonial period, were to be protected from labor, mental or manual, though they were 
subject to their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers. However, just as today, working 
class and enslaved women, especially women of color and Third world women, were 
considered plenty fit for work, punishment, and sexual exploitation and assault. Davis 
(1983) describes this selective differentiation arising during the slavery/colonial era:  
Where work was concerned, strength and productivity 
under the threat of the whip outweighed considerations of 
sex. In this sense, the oppression of women was identical to 
men…But women suffered in different ways as well, for 
they were victims of sexual abuse and other barbarous 
mistreatment that could only be inflicted on women. 
Expediency governed the slaveholders’ posture toward 
female slaves: when it was profitable to exploit them as if 
they were men, they were regarded, in effect, as genderless, 
but when they could be exploited, punished and repressed 
in ways suited only for women, they were locked into their 
exclusively female roles…Since slave women were 
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classified as “breeders” as opposed to “mothers,” their 
infant children could be sold away from them like calves 
from a cow….As females, slave women were inherently 
vulnerable to all forms of sexual coercion. If the most 
violent punishment of men consisted in floggings and 
mutilation, women were flogged and mutilated, as well as 
raped. Rape, in fact, was an uncamouflaged expression of 
the slaveholder’s economic mastery and the overseer’s 
control over Black women workers….If Black women were 
hardly “women” in the accepted sense, the slave system 
also discouraged male supremacy in Black men. Because 
husbands and wives, fathers and daughters were equally 
subjected to the slavemasters’ absolute authority, the 
promotion of male supremacy among the slaves might have 
prompted a dangerous rupture in the chain of command. 
(Davis 1983, 6-8) 
 
This selective imposition of gender differentiation throughout capitalism’s history 
exposes the roots and aims of the modern gender order: profit and domination.  
 The unpaid and under-paid work of white women, of people of color, and of 
nature, thus became a subsidy to capitalist development that included the reproductive 
and regenerative services necessary for life, which the system disregards as an aim in and 
of itself. This work, and the violent oppression which makes its exploitation possible, is 
part of the unpaid costs associated with maintaining the labor and resource supply of 
capital. Viewed in this way, it is clear that surplus extraction involves the expropriation 
of the labor of the majority of the earth’s population, officially employed and 
unemployed, as well as the appropriation of nature, to serve a minority, the modern day 
robber barons—the 1%.  This continues today:  
The global majority of women–being mothers and care 
givers–are culturally positioned as labour right at the point 
where humanity and nature interact. Likewise, men 
‘outside of’ capital, such as small farmers and forest 
dwellers, undertake regenerative, or meta-industrial 
labor…It is certainly no exaggeration to say that the entire 
machinery of global capital rests on the material 
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transactions of this reproductive labour force. (Salleh 2009, 
7) 
 
 Understanding capital’s consistent appropriation of the unpaid labor of women 
and men from historically oppressed groups contributes to the recognition that energy 
injustice is a result of the unequal extraction of energy from the earth and the majority of 
human beings, for the sake of accumulation at the top. It is in this reality, as well as the 
unequally borne costs of waste, wars, and other depredations of the energy regime, that 
energy injustice is most clear.  
 In studying the current energy regime, one of the first facts is that insatiable 
energy demand is growth-driven and impossible to transcend in a growth-oriented 
economy (EIA 2008; York 2010; York, Ergas, Rosa and Dietz 2011).  This is why the 
key conflict arising in climate negotiations is that between ecological, social, and 
economic priorities (Clark and York 2005; Bazilian 2009; York 2010). Despite evidence 
to the contrary, one of the main justifications for continued energy extraction and use, no 
matter how ecologically destructive or socially disruptive, is that it fuels economic 
growth, which is necessary to raise all boats and improve general social well-being 
(Waring 1999).  
 Clearly, when you look at this predicament through the lens of the social rift, as 
the basis of the ecological rift, this position on energy development and economic growth 
is revealed for the ideological shield that it is. The growth myth hides the reality that “the 
profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne 
primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). And this process is gendered as well as 
racist, classist, and imperialistic. One need look no further than the statistics on global 
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wealth to reveal who indeed are the primary beneficiaries of growth-driven energy 
consumption.  
 Deere and Ross (2008) point out that  “it has only recently garnered attention that 
women may not share in the wealth of men, even within the same household or family” 
(353). This means that “if women systematically have less access to wealth, then the 
equity issues are similar for the distribution of wealth by gender as by race and ethnicity” 
(353). As part of a landmark study in which many researchers took part and prepared 
chapters for the World Institute of Development Economics Research of the United 
Nations University, Deere and Ross find that “women and men not only have 
significantly different access to wealth but also may use their assets and asset income 
differently, which may have consequences for household well-being as well as for the 
larger society” (353). As noted above, “women still own just one percent of assets 
worldwide” and “make up 70 percent of the world’s poor” (WILPF quoted in Salleh 
2009, 20).  This is highly consequential since,   
it is well-recognized that the ownership of assets improves 
the lives of the women and men who own and control them. 
The relationships between asset ownership and reduced 
poverty and enhanced security have been extensively 
researched, as has the relationship between asset 
accumulation and economic and political power. (Deere 
and Doss 2008, 353)  
 
For example, women’s land ownership, which in Africa and Latin America maxes out at 
25%, while for most countries it is much lower, “leads to improvements in women’s 
welfare, productivity, equality, and empowerment” (354). Moreover, this is 
environmentally significant both because the gendered wealth gap indicates that women 
benefit less than men from growth-driven energy extraction and use, especially poor 
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women throughout the world, and also because women’s empowerment is linked to better 
environmental outcomes (Ergas and York 2012).  
 While women globally benefit less from wealth production and the energy 
throughput this requires, wealth concentration at the very top of the income ladder has 
created a deeper divide between rich and poor women, especially between the women of 
the global North and South. Global inequalities have been perpetuated and exacerbated 
by the trends of the last thirty years as a result of the relationship between race, class, 
gender, and position in the world system. As the global economy has grown, the major 
beneficiaries are at the very top of the income brackets and are mostly the elites from 
wealthy countries (Milanovic 2009). The inequalities are stark:  
In 2007, the top 1 percent of wealth holders in the United 
States controlled 33.8 percent of the wealth of the country 
while the bottom 50 percent of the population owned a 
mere 2.5 percent. Indeed, the richest 400 individuals had a 
combined net worth of $1.54 trillion in 2007—approaching 
that of the bottom 150 million people (with an aggregate 
net worth of $1.6 trillion). On a global scale, the wealth of 
the world’s 793 billionaires was, in 2008, more than $3 
trillion—equivalent to about 5 percent of total world 
income ($60.3 trillion in 2008). A mere 2 percent of the 
world’s adult individuals have more than half of the global 
household wealth, with the richest 1 percent accounting for 
40 percent of total global assets; while the bottom half of 
the world’s population has barely 1 percent. (Magdoff and 
Foster 2011, 84) 
 
At this level of inequality, it is impossible to see the responsibility for climate change in 
universal terms.  
 Along with major divisions between the beneficiaries of energy use globally, the 
burdens of the modern energy regime, which is notorious for its “externalities,” fall 
unequally. Energy injustices embedded in our current regime of extraction, use, and 
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pollution, mean “that women and the poor, especially in the global South, are at the 
bottom of the social order and hurt most by floods, droughts, resource wars, pestilence, 
and extreme weather events” (Brownhill and Turner 2009, 232). The United Nations 
Women Watch has stated, “The Threats of Climate Change are Not Gender-Neutral.” 
They provide a concise summary of the relationships between class, race, world system 
position, and gender, which determine who bears the brunt of this planetary crisis:  
The effects of climate change will vary among regions, and 
between different generations, income groups and 
occupations as well as between women and men. Due, in 
part, to their lower adaptive capacities, developing 
countries and people living in poverty are likely to 
experience significant impacts…Women form a 
disproportionately large share of the poor in countries all 
over the world. Women in rural areas in developing 
countries are highly dependent on local natural resources 
for their livelihood, because of their responsibility to secure 
water, food and energy for cooking and heating. The effects 
of climate change, including drought, uncertain rainfall and 
deforestation, make it harder to secure these resources. By 
comparison with men in poor countries, women face 
historical disadvantages, which include limited access to 
decision-making and economic assets that compound the 
challenges of climate change. (UN Women Watch 2009) 
 
Moreover, gender analyses show climate change leads to “the increase in physical and 
sexual attacks on women  [that occur] during natural disasters and afterwards as mass 
displacement causes chaos and instability” (Park 2009, 16). As a result of the recognition 
that climate change is gendered and conditioned by other inequalities, scholars and 
activists are increasingly calling for more analyses on energy, climate change, and 
inequality. In other words, there is increasing concern for energy justice.  
 An energy justice perspective is crucial not only to understand energy crises but 
to work toward solutions that do not exacerbate inequalities. This means working toward 
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displacing current proposals that are expected to do just this. Today, the lack of 
representative decision-making under capitalism means “a range of currently debated and 
applied economic policy tools to mitigate climate change are likely to have regressive 
effects…[wherein] households in lower income brackets bear a (considerably) higher 
burden of the cost as a percentage of their income than those in higher brackets” (Büchs, 
Bardsley and Duwe 2011: 286). As stated above, because women and children make up 
the majority of the poor, this lack of representation has a greater affect on them.  
 The benefits of the most popular, market-based, solutions to climate change 
amongst governments and business worldwide, unsurprisingly, will accrue to the top of 
the already bloated upper income bracket. If nothing is done to make real significant 
changes, these “solutions” will divert attention from the serious ecological and social 
threats of the crisis. Market-based strategies are geared more toward economic growth 
than environmental protection, and do not at all change the unequal power relations at the 
heart of capitalism’s externalization of social and ecological costs (Waring [1999] 2004; 
Foster 2002). So-called solutions to climate change that fall into this category, and are 
cited by some as evidence of ecological modernization, have as their explicit goal the 
further facilitation of accumulation, and the revival of high growth rates in stagnant 
economies.  
 For example, carbon markets, advertised to the public by PR firms and 
government agencies as a solution to climate change, as a way to internalize externalities, 
are described by one corporate chairman as the next market “nirvana.” “Indeed, the 
anticipation of a larger, federally regulated carbon market is the biggest driver behind the 
growing popularity of green finance, and experts say emissions trading and climate 
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change-related investments stand the best chance of reviving Wall Street's fortunes” 
(Gronewold 2009). It is no wonder that, especially the upper class and male economists 
and business leaders in wealthy countries see market solutions to energy problems as the 
best way forward. As the primary beneficiaries of growth (which requires that we not 
truly cap energy consumption), as long as the economy expands they are like Midas, 
everything they touch turns to gold, even if it is the life-suffocating waste generated by a 
globally destructive energy regime (Foster, Clark, and York 2009).   
 As a result of the power relations of capitalism, the struggle for real 
environmental change, including energy justice, involves the struggle for more 
democratic decision-making based on a new system of value that does not leave out 
women and nature, as well as other vulnerable groups of people. As Ergas and York 
(2012) point out “despite their recognized vulnerability, women are practically excluded 
from climate policy decision-making bodies” (10). Moreover, “women’s contributions to 
resource management and indigenous knowledge from their respective regions in the 
world continue to be largely ignored by scholars and policy makers (10).  
 Ergas and York echo Salleh (2009), Spitzner (2009), and Waring (1999; 2009), 
amongst others who have pointed out that work dealing with the environment and gender, 
among other inequalities, is scant, in spite of increasing calls for just such analyses. It 
obviously is difficult to include these issues in decision-making at the movement or 
policy level if they are kept invisible in major research and data collection. Waring 
([1999] 2004) has reviewed all of the excuses given for why data is not gender 
disaggregated more often, and women’s voices are not included in research and decision-
 64 
making on which they rely. She came to the conclusion that within patriarchal contexts 
like capitalism women just don’t count.  
 The work of Ergas and York shows that all of this is crucial in dealing with 
climate change because women’s empowerment actually mitigates the destructive 
process of andro-centric energy decision-making, with positive affects for the 
environment and people:   
We hypothesize that in societies with greater gender 
equality there will be relatively lower impacts on the 
environment, controlling for other factors. We test this 
hypothesis using quantitative analysis of cross-national 
data, focusing on the connection between women's political 
status and CO2 emissions per capita. We find that CO2 
emissions per capita are lower in nations where women 
have higher political status, controlling for GDP per capita, 
urbanization, industrialization, militarization, world-system 
position, foreign direct investment, the age dependency 
ratio, and level of democracy. (Ergas and York 2012) 
  
This research confirms hypotheses of feminist ecologists who have long pointed out that 
women, as a result of their social roles in the reproduction of society and nature, have 
specialized knowledge and make different environmental decisions. That women’s 
environmental concerns and activities differ from men’s has been well-documented: 
A significant body of research on environmental attitudes, 
risk perception, environmental justice organization 
membership, and activism, examining a variety of nations 
and cultures, shows that women tend to express different 
concerns about the environment than men. Women are 
more active in environmental reform projects and tend to 
perceive environmental risks as more threatening 
(Buckingham, 2010; Flynn et al., 1994; Bord and 
O’Connor, 1997; Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996; Dietz 
et al., 2002; Kalof et al., 2002; Eisler et al., 2003; 
McCright, 2010; Seager, 1996). McCright (2010) recently 
found that women in the United States demonstrate greater 
scientific knowledge of climate change, approach the issue 
of climate change differently, and express different 
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concerns and potential solutions to problems. In addition, 
although they are not as active as men in mainstream 
environmental organizations, women are estimated to make 
up 60% to 80% of grassroots environmental organization 
membership (Bell and Braun, 2010; Seager, 1996; Stoddart 
and Tindall, 2010). Further, research shows that women 
often cite their roles as caregivers as the primary reason 
they are active in grassroots environmental movements 
(Bell and Braun, 2010). (Ergas and York 2012) 
 
Combined, this research highlights why “integrating women into climate change policy 
and decision-making may be vital for creating the necessary changes for reducing 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions” (10).   
 Along with the ecological improvements that result from women’s empowerment, 
the empowerment of women is, of course, also key to any democratic movement that 
seeks to break down inequalities based on gender, race, class, and nation.  It is therefore 
an inherent part of the struggle for energy justice.   
Energy and the ecological debt  
 This chapter so far has highlighted environmental injustice, and more specifically 
energy injustice, as the product of the alienation and domination of human being by 
human that is inextricably bound with the alienation of capitalist society from the earth. 
In other words, energy injustice is the interface between social inequality and 
environmental depredation associated with the modern energy regime, and is therefore an 
essential sociological reality of the ecological rift. The entire infrastructure and 
development patterns of capitalism are energy intensive and thus require concentrated 
energy resources that can only be extracted at great ecological and social cost (Odum 
2007). Whether we dig deeper into the bowels of the earth for fossil fuels, displace food 
crops and plant every inch of vulnerable land with feedstock for biofuels, or endure 
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another wave of atomic enthusiasm, the insatiable appetite for energy to power the 
growth economy means there inevitably will be environmental dislocation on grander and 
grander scales barring revolutionary change. There is, as we know, no free lunch with 
energy, which always involves entropy and often the using up of low entropy fuels, along 
with climate change and other sink-related problems. There is no technological change 
that will alter the social relations at the heart of capitalism as an exploitative system 
(Foster 2002, 22-24; York 2010).  
 The externalities of energy production, or unpaid costs, have accumulated today 
in the form of unpaid debts to nature and the oppressed in society (Kapp 1950, 13; 
Anderson 1976, 140-47; Foster 2002, 101; Foster 2009, 242-47). The concept “ecological 
debt” appears to have first been introduced by the Marxist sociologist Charles Anderson 
(1976, 143).  He wrote of the ecological crises,  
The unpaid costs to the environment underlie the ecological 
challenge to survival…In truth, however, these costs are 
already being borne by the earth and its entire 
population…Aside from the day to day economic, social, 
and physical costs borne by the natural and human victims 
of growth for quick gain, an unpaid debt is being recorded 
with the environment which will soon come due. The 
magnitude of the debt is unknown, although we know it is 
already of extensive proportions….A rationally ordered 
economic system could put science and technology to use 
in a constructive manner and reduce the ecological debt 
while simultaneously raising life quality. (Anderson 1976, 
141) 
 
Anderson thus recognized the links between the social and ecological crises, drawing on 
Marx and Kapp.  
 Today, the ecological debt is a central concept in the global environmental justice 
movement. Martinez-Alier traces the “ecological debt” in the movement to the early 
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1990s, when the “Debt Treaty” of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit called for the cancellation 
of third world external debt on the grounds that it was already paid many times over. This 
payment was made in the form of colonial and neocolonial ecological extraction and the 
cost of pollution imposed on the global South by the global North through ecological 
imperialism, or ecologically unequal exchange (Martinez-Alier 2002, 213). With climate 
change and energy imperialism, two of the largest ecological and social threats in history, 
you can see the extent of the energy regime’s historical imposition of unpaid costs 
throughout the world. It is difficult to imagine the scale of the truly astronomical and 
unquantifiable costs of energy resource wars for targeted populations and global 
ecosystems, but the carbon debt, the contribution of wealthy nations to one of the largest 
crises facing humanity, has been calculated. On this basis, an argument centering energy 
justice would require the acknowledgement that what little amount of carbon we may still 
afford to burn, in ecological terms, is rightfully owed the poorest in the world. The rich 
have already done their share of soiling the biosphere.  
 Feminist ecologists have extended the notion of debt to include the interrelated 
environmental inequalities described earlier in this chapter as the basis of the ecological 
rift. Salleh (2009) writes, building on cumulative work of feminist ecologists and other 
environmental justice activists and scholars, that we need models for understanding and 
change that integrate three kinds of subsumptions: 
the social debt owed by capitalist employers for surplus 
value extracted from the labouring bodies and minds of 
industrial, service, and enslaved workers, (the focus of 
socialism); 
 
the ecological debt owed by the global North to the South 
for direct extraction of the natural means of production or 
 68 
livelihood of non-industrial peoples (the focus of 
postcolonial and of ecological politics); 
 
the embodied debt owed North and South to unpaid 
reproductive workers who provide use values and 
regenerate the conditions of production, including the 
future labor force of capitalism (the focus on feminism). 
(Salleh 2009, 4-5) 
 
 The struggle to redress the grievances of capitalism’s history with regard to 
energy exploitation, and alleviate the burden of contemporary inequalities resulting from 
energy imperialism, require a confrontation with elites over the issue of debt. Naomi 
Klein calls the concept of ecological debt the most important “social justice issue of our 
time” because it marries climate, or broader environmental, and economic justice. It is the 
only way, really, to conceptualize environmental inequality in historical terms and 
environmental justice in restorative and restitutive terms. Therefore, the ecological debt is 
the actionable framework for conceptualizing energy justice in terms of the historical 
relationship between the ecological and social rift described above in race, class, and 
gender terms.   
Energy justice: Externalizing the internalities   
 The insights of global environmental justice scholars and activist, feminist 
ecologists, and ecological rift theorists in environmental sociology complement one 
another and provide a basis for a broader understanding and conceptualization of energy 
injustice, rooted in the history of capitalism and imperialism. Energy injustice within this 
framework connects the denial of self-determination and the unequal oppression of 
people with the ecological destruction inherent in the modern energy regime. The 
struggle for energy justice thus is part of a larger struggle for the democratic control of 
natural resources, the end of oppression in all its layers, and the ecologically necessary 
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end to energy intensive development, regardless of the discovery of alternative energy 
sources.  
 One of the essential calls of feminist ecologists has been the recognition of the 
leadership of women and men whose labor has been off the accounting sheets of capital, 
even while necessary to the its functioning. As a result of their experiences with 
reproductive and regenerative efforts, these women and men carry knowledge that has 
been suppressed by capital, because it undermines the ideology claiming the market as 
the best source for all your needs and desires. This is the knowledge of social and 
ecological provisioning, which are one and the same thing, and are independent of the 
market. The market must use all of its might to promote the idea that “there is no 
alternative” to hide the fact that capital is dependent on the reproductive and regenerative 
sphere of activity that is not accounted for in its accounting schemes, but the reverse is 
not true (Shiva 2005; Salleh 2010). Humanity can provision for itself, and in much less 
destructive ways, autonomously from capital.   
 A movement toward energy justice is a movement toward social and ecological 
autonomy from capital, toward a system of decision-making that is democratic and 
ecologically sound, rather than based on the “ability to pay” of the pricing system. 
Therefore, unlike those environmental economists and some feminist thinkers who seek 
to internalize nature and women’s work within the capitalist value system (internalizing 
the externalities), a movement toward energy justice is part of a larger process of socio-
ecological change intended to “externalize the internalities” (Odum and Odum 2000, 21; 
Foster 2002). The goal of such a transformation is the realization of a society 
democratically organized on the basis of provisioning for social and ecological 
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reproduction. Under such circumstances, energy justice is the basis for energy decision-
making.  
A global perspective 
 Bullard (2002) writes that environmental justice “is not meant to shift risks among 
populations” (43). This shifting around of externalities is a tactic of capital to avoid 
systemic change. Under this system, when the social struggle or complete ecological 
degradation places limits on exploitation and degradation in one place, capital simply 
moves on, globalizing destruction (Clark and York 2008). Anderson (1976) noted, “there 
is good reason to fear that, given the growth society’s need for social inequality, it might 
attempt to divert attention toward isolated environmental clean-up programs”(139). 
Indeed this has been the case. While ecological modernizationists in Europe celebrated 
supposed ecological change in the North, their own data forced them to admit that 
“production is supermaterializing in the South, even if arguably dematerializing in the 
North” (Mol, Sonnenfield, and Spaargaren 2009, 387). Therefore, a movement toward 
energy justice aimed toward truly healing the ecological and social rift is necessarily a 
global environmental justice movement.  
A new system of value 
 Scholars from nearly every critical ecological perspective have pointed out the 
need for a decision-making framework that transcends the focus in capitalism on market 
prices and represents a new system of value (Waring 1999; Spitzner 2009; Salleh 2010).  
Ariel Salleh (2010) highlighted that we remain in need of developing an integrated 
ecosocial analysis that recognizes the primary importance of “reproductive activities and 
regenerative provisioning” and includes “inputs by class, race, and sex-gendered others” 
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(213, 215). She proposes the concept of metabolic value, which refers to the regenerative 
labor done off capitalism’s accounting books especially by women, peasants, etc. “in 
supporting ecological integrity and the social metabolism” (212), as a tool of analysis to 
this end. She distinguishes metabolic value from the anthropocentric notion of “use-
values” which does not necessarily incorporate ecological provisioning. She writes, 
“metabolic value is not the same as humanly produced use value, though it is certainly 
involved when humans make use values…Both forms of labor and value will be central 
to any mode of production; whereas capitalist exchange value is a historically relative 
form” (213). 
 Such a form of valuation would provide a method of assessing social energy 
choices in terms of social and environmental justice. This way of seeing energy choices, 
making visible regenerative and reproductive efforts, as well as degenerative and 
destructive processes, can facilitate a movement toward energy justice, and the larger 
societal transformation of which this must be part. The following chapter proposes 
systems ecologist Howard T. Odum’s emergy analysis framework as a method of 
accounting that puts social and environmental valuation on just such a footing as Salleh 
proposes. This method transcends the focus on prices, and the definition of efficiency in 
terms of profit maximization. Transcending the capitalist valuation system is necessary 
because it is clear that “the old definitions have not served us, nor the earth that supports 
us. The old patterns, no matter how cleverly rearranged to imitate progress, still condemn 
us to cosmetically altered repetitions of the same old exchanges…The master’s tools will 
never dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde 1984, 123).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
ECOLOGICAL UNEQUAL EXCHANGE 
 
The resource curse, an ahistorical analysis 
 Rick van der Ploeg (2011), Oxford economist and co-director of OxCarre, the 
Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, recently published a review 
of the leading debates in contemporary economics about causes of the “resource curse” 
plaguing what Stephen Bunker termed “extractive export economies” (1984, 1018). 
Social scientists have long recognized the “‘resource curse,’ whereby countries rich in 
natural resources are often unable to dig or drill their way to broad-based prosperity” 
(Kraft 2009). Orthodox economists have attempted to explain this phenomena, under 
some circumstances called the “Dutch disease.” The various interpretations they offer 
include:   
that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, deindustrialization, and bad growth 
prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in 
volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of 
law, corruption, presidential democracies, and 
underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is 
that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil 
conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption 
especially in nondemocratic countries, and keeps in place 
bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies 
seem unable to successfully convert their depleting 
exhaustible resources into other productive assets. (Van der 
Ploeg 2011, 366) 
 
However, there is ongoing difficulty in the economics literature establishing why some 
countries (Norway and the United States are cited) do seem to benefit from their natural 
resource wealth whereas other countries (like those in Latin America dependent on oil 
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exports) experience increased conflict and corruption, negative economic development, 
and decreased social welfare once they are economically dependent on natural resource 
exports. Most analysts don’t look at the root of these problems in historical terms. The 
solutions proposed by many economists to this problem tend to involve, or put at the 
center, building better institutions, fostering further economic openness, and learning 
from “U.S. history and adopt[ing] an optimist, forward-looking approach to technological 
innovation in resource exploration and the search for new reserves” (Van der Ploeg 2011, 
407).  
 Missing from the dominant “resource curse” discussion are the wider insights of 
sociologists and political economists who study the historical relationship between 
economic development in the first world and so-called underdevelopment in the third 
world. Orthodox economists typically fail to explore the implications of the historical 
transfer of natural wealth from poor to already wealthy countries, or ecological 
imperialism. 
 In this chapter I use the case study of Ecuador, considered the “poster child for the 
paradox known as the ‘resource curse,’” (Kraft 2009), to illustrate the explanatory power 
of a synthesis of systems ecology (in particular Howard T. Odum’s work), and historical 
materialism for understanding ecological unequal exchange and the relationships 
governing today’s global energy system. “Ecuador is a typical example of the resource 
curse” because its “overreliance on oil since the early 1970s has seriously eroded the 
country’s social and cultural foundations and weakened government accountability. 
Previous governments’ access to a wealth of natural resources has fostered political and 
social pathologies” (Van de Ven 2010). Within environmental sociology, the historical 
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materialism of ecological rift theory provides a link between natural and social history, 
and ecology and social science, which allows us to develop a more robust understanding 
of the causes and effects of ecological unequal exchange, a central feature of ecological 
imperialism afflicting countries like Ecuador. Via the ecological rift framework for 
understanding ecological unequal exchange, Odum’s emergy analysis of the economic 
and ecological impact of trade is brought into social science. This work answers Bunker’s 
call for measuring the transfer of natural wealth in ecological terms, rather than focusing 
primarily on labor and economic exchange values, and in doing so develops a richer 
understanding of current circumstances than is commonly found in the resource curse 
literature of mainstream economics.  
 The approach outlined here contributes insights relevant to the critical sociology 
of energy that puts questions of historical and contemporary inequalities, and hence 
energy justice, at the heart of energy analyses. This focus also makes possible a 
contribution to current debates over ecological debt, which figure prominently in global 
climate change negotiations and protests of third world external debt. The findings of 
systems ecologists combined with historical analyses of unequal exchange help paint a 
picture of the cumulative impact of ecological unequal exchange and hence the potential 
scale of ecological debt owed by the global North to the South. In relation to energy 
analyses and the “resource curse,” this analysis illustrates why the assertion of 
environmental sovereignty by countries heretofore serving as supply depots for the North, 
and the redress of historical inequalities, are both necessary components of a movement 
toward energy justice.  
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Ecological unequal exchange: An historical analysis 
 In the American Journal of Sociology in 1984, Stephen Bunker illustrated the 
need for detailed historical analysis of events conditioning the economic malaise and 
inequality then affecting the Brazilian Amazon (see also Torras 2003). Bunker showed 
that “the relative underdevelopment of regions from which matter and energy are 
extracted is best explained as a consequence of the internal dynamics and external trade 
relations of their economies” (Bunker 1984, 1018). Unequal trade dynamics leading to 
the extraction and transfer of natural wealth from one ecosystem and region, to be 
consumed in another, constitute “the socioeconomic and ecological linkages to the 
extracted commodity [that] tend to a loss of value in the region of origin and accretion of 
value in the region of consumption or transformation” (1019). This reinforces inequality 
while setting the stage for its intensification at greater and greater scales. “Focusing on 
the necessary relations between extractive and productive economies permits a solution 
to [the] ultimately fruitless debate,” over whether the sources of underdevelopment are 
found externally in the world economy or are determined internally by specific regions 
(1019).  
 Analyses such as Bunker’s, along with earlier work on uneven development and 
unequal exchange, opened the door for contemporary studies: 
Recent scholarship on ‘ecologically unequal exchange’ has 
drawn on Bunker’s seminal work, as well as the theory of 
unequal ecological exchange, to demonstrate the 
disproportionate (and undercompensated) transfer of matter 
and energy from the periphery to the core, and the 
exploitation of environmental space within the periphery 
for intensive production and waste disposal. The 
environmental footprint of economically advanced nations 
involves appropriation of land, resources, and labor in 
lesser-developed countries, increasing the environmental 
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degradation in the latter for the benefit of the former. 
(Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 347) 
 
Rice succinctly defines ecological unequal exchange as “the environmentally damaging 
withdrawal of energy and other natural resources and the addition or externalization of 
environmentally damaging production and disposal activities within the periphery of the 
world-system as a consequence of exchange relations with more industrialized countries” 
(2009, 215).            
 The over-use and draw down of the world’s energy supplies, and the competition 
between food and fuel caused by the number of hectares of crop-lands devoted to agrifuel 
feedstock production, would not be possible without a global network of ecological 
unequal exchange. This network is the product of five hundred years of colonial 
domination and ongoing imperialistic relationships between the world’s rich and poor 
countries. The persistent exploitation of the world’s poor, by the wealthy both within and 
between countries, to maintain energy supplies is enforced by the largest and most lethal 
militaries in history, bringing death and destruction to countless humans, continuously 
threatening entire communities and cultures, and the environment (Bagchi 2005, 292-
303; Rogers 2010, 97-115; Clark, Jorgenson, and Kentor 2010). Building upon extant 
research on energy flows within the world systems approach, Lawrence (2009) explains, 
“In world-systems, energy flow has been, and continues to be, a basis for intersocietal 
conflict and competition, including unequal exchange that generates inequality in levels 
of development and ecological degradation across societies” (335). Not only does 
unequal exchange condition the extraction of resources, but also the final use and 
pollution associated with energy consumption. The results of Lawrence’s statistical and 
historical analyses show that “the core countries are using more energy, emitting more 
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CO2, and attaining more GDP per capita relative to the semiperiphery, with the periphery 
lagging well behind both” (335).  
 Without looking at the relationship between wealth accumulation in core 
countries and the wealth depletion in extractive economies, mainstream economics 
suffers a major setback in understanding the resource curse plaguing countries like 
Ecuador. Without specifying the connection between under- and over-development, and 
the relationship between subjective and objective forces affecting exploited countries, 
economists use examples, such as the rapid economic growth of the United States, as 
evidence that all countries could make similar use of their resource wealth. In this view, 
under the right circumstances, which are primarily internal and self-determined, “the 
curse, where it exists, is self-fulfilling” (Wright and Czelusta 2004, 36; see also David 
and Wright 1997).   
Ecological rift approach to ecological unequal exchange 
 Ecological rift theorists’ treatment of ecological unequal exchange is rooted in 
analysis of the historical development of capitalism. The depth of this analysis is due to 
cumulative Marxist theory of economic expansion, imperialism and ecological 
degradation. Indeed, theories of unequal exchange first emerged from within the Marxist 
tradition (Preobrazhensky [1926] 1965, 227; Emmanuel 1972; on unequal development 
and exchange, see Amin 1976). While most studies of imperialism, and earlier studies of 
unequal exchange, focused on flows of the economic surplus, ecological unequal 
exchange illustrates how, through primitive accumulation, and ongoing exploitation 
“[d]istant lands and ecosystems became mere appendages to the growth requirements of 
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the advanced capitalist center” (Clark and Foster 2009, 314; Foster, Clark, and York 
2010, 345-72).  
 Within environmental sociology, the historical materialism of ecological theory 
provides a link between natural and social history, which allows us to develop a more 
robust understanding of the causes and effects of ecological unequal exchange on 
societies, the economy, and ecological systems. Unlike previous theories of the 
economy/environment nexus, in which “nature is often in the background,” ecological rift 
theory considers how the social system “confronts natural systems and affects their 
ability to sustain life” (Clark and York 2005, 395-96).  Important for analyses of the 
current era, this approach allows for the conceptualization of the relationship between the 
accumulation of environmental degradation and the accumulation of capital, which is the 
driving force organizing productive relations across the globe. In a critical sociology of 
energy, which does not abstract away our ability to observe the relationships between 
oppression, exploitation and the political economy of energy, as well as the ecological 
impact of energy choices, this theoretical space is crucial. The analysis of the global 
carbon cycle within this framework is an essential starting point for understanding our 
contemporary energy regime and the impact of this regime on particular countries.   
Carbon metabolism: Global capitalism, climate change, and the biospheric rift  
 Clark and York (2005) cite research showing that “over the past 400,000 years, 
the carbon cycle and climate system have operated in a relatively stable manner, 
sustaining the temperature of the earth and maintaining the balance of gases in the 
atmosphere” (402). However, the advent of capitalism, an inherently expansionary 
system, brought about a rift in the global carbon cycle resulting from the historic 
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accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, a waste product of industrial activities. “The 
drive to accumulate capital fueled the development of industrial productive forces, which 
at the same time, created a growing need for raw materials mined from the earth to power 
the machines…Thus, capital, as Foster explains, was pushed to ‘structure the energy 
economy around fossil fuels (a reality that is now deeply entrenched)’” (405-06). 
Increased technological development and efficiency gains make possible the exploitation 
of fossil fuels on an ever-greater scale, and the drive toward ceaseless economic growth 
means that the quest for fuel to feed production only expands in absolute terms. “As the 
economic system grows under capitalism, the throughputs of materials and energy 
increase and capital incorporates ever-larger amounts of natural resources into its 
operations” (407):  
Capitalism, organizing social relations of commodity 
production, effectively plunders the historic stock of 
concentrated energy that has been removed from the 
biosphere only to transform and transfer this stored energy 
(coal, oil, and natural gas) from the recesses of the earth to 
the atmosphere in the form of CO2. In this, capitalism is 
disrupting the carbon cycle by adding CO2 to the 
atmosphere at an accelerating rate. At the same time, 
capital’s constant demand for energy necessitates the 
continual plundering of the earth for new reserves of fossil 
fuel. With over 23 billion metric tons of CO2 released into 
the atmosphere per year, capitalist production is creating 
‘waste emissions faster than natural systems can absorb 
them.’ As a result, CO2  is accumulating—as atmospheric 
waste—at alarming rates, warming the earth, and 
potentially causing dramatic climate change. (Clark and 
York 2005, 409) 
 
To propel the growing market, energy companies backed by national governments scour 
the globe for new fossil fuel resources, while also introducing and promoting alternative 
fuels with their own destructive logic and consequences, such as biofuel. It bears 
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reiterating that efficiency gains and technological development facilitate this 
expansionary process, rather than slowing down or reversing these trends. 
The ecological rift, global inequality, and the sociology of energy 
 The costs and benefits of the energy-fueled economic expansion of the capitalist 
system have not been born equally by communities around the world. In fact, inequality 
is worsening between poor and rich countries. World Bank economist Branko Milanovic 
published a 2009 paper comparing global inequality within and between countries in the 
1800s with global inequality today. The combined results of his current study “with the 
earlier finding that the composition of global inequality has shifted from being ‘caused’ 
by internal factors, like domestic income distribution, to ‘external’ factors like 
differences in mean country incomes,” make clear there is growing inequality between 
poor and rich states (with of course some exceptions) (Milanovic 2009, 19; 2011).4 
Rather than an economic miracle, many countries in the world, like Ecuador, which 
followed all traditional economic prescriptions, playing up its comparative advantage 
(e.g. oil), implementing austerity measures in times of crisis, and fostering economic 
openness, have experienced a social and ecological nightmare. With the exception of a 
few elite families—as in other countries plagued by the so-called resource curse and 
other manifestations of neocolonialism—Ecuadorans have benefitted relatively little from 
their trade with the U.S. and other wealthy nations. They have been unable to develop an 
autocentric economy, or to control their own economic surplus. Rather, upon entry into 
the global market as exporters to wealthy countries, Ecuador followed the well-worn path 
                                                
4 Milanovic writes, “we can conclude that the main ‘inequality extractors’ today are not (within)-national 
elites, but an elite which is basically composed of the citizens of rich countries” (2009, 19).   
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of resource-export dependent nations leading to increased depravation and ecological 
degradation. In a recent cross-national analysis, Jorgenson found that it is common that   
less developed countries with relatively higher levels of 
exports sent to more developed countries exhibit 
suppressed domestic levels of consumption, well below 
globally sustainable levels for many nations. More 
importantly, further results indicate that structural 
relationships between more developed countries and less 
developed countries have become more ecologically 
unequal through recent decades. In other words, the vertical 
flow of exports has contributed to a widening gap between 
the resource consumption levels of ‘the haves’ in the global 
North and the ‘have nots’ in the global South. Overall, this 
growing body of research helps to explain the disparities 
between consumption-based environmental demand (i.e. 
per capita footprints) and actual forms of environmental 
degradation (i.e. deforestation)…These disparities are 
partly a function of ecologically unequal exchange 
relationships via the vertical flow of exports, which help 
more developed countries treat less developed countries as 
supply depots. (Jorgenson 2010, 459)  
 
 In the resource curse literature, the curse is identified primarily as the crisis of 
negative economic growth. Ecological rift theorists, like other critical scholars, see the 
exploitation of humans and the environment as part of our current energy regime as the 
real, underlying material contradiction, and the source of ecological crises, which exist 
independently of (those sometimes overlapping with) economic crises. These divergent 
diagnoses lead to opposite prescriptions for change. 
 The critical sociology of energy, taking into account historical realities, must find 
its way through myriad arguments that recognize many consequences of the “curse of 
resources” while at the same time promoting the system which gives rise to such a 
paradox. A central aspect of energy-fueled economic expansion is the inherently unequal 
exchange involved in a world economy structured hierarchically with those at the top 
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able to appropriate world resources for their own development, even when the cost to 
majority is very high. Recognizing our current “energy predicament” as an ecological, 
economic and social justice crisis, rather than a technical economic or engineering 
problem (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988), allows a more meaningful exploration of the 
future of energy in human society, and a true assessment of global ecological debts and 
the inequalities that must be redressed if we are to move toward a system founded on 
energy justice as a component of environmental justice and equality in general. 
Ecological rift theory focuses on global inequality and ecological destruction and 
the relationship between “capitalism and the accumulation of catastrophe.” This 
framework helps us better understand the history of ecological imperialism, which made 
possible “the environmental overdraft that contributed to European prosperity while 
hiding the extent of ecological degradation of industrial capitalism” (Foster 2011; Foster, 
Clark, and York 2010, 352). Ecological rift theorists’ have employed “the Lauderdale 
Paradox” as a way of referring to the recognition in classical political economy to the 
amassing of private riches through decreases in both the common good and public wealth 
(Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 54-72). Classical political economists like the Earl of 
Lauderdale questioned distribution of the benefits of economic growth—before the 
completion of the bourgeois revolution “sounded the knell of scientific” economics, and 
prize-fighters for capital replaced disinterested inquirers (Marx [1867] 1990, 97).  
The paradox of a decline in public wealth accompanying an increase in private 
riches helps explain why the majority can be worse off, as in the case of Ecuador, even as 
private wealth grows as a result of the overexploitation of Ecuador’s natural resources. 
With the ecological rift theory providing the historical context and connection to broader 
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sociological theory, systems ecology (which also distinguishes between the accumulation 
of exchange value as private wealth and the public wealth found in countries’ natural 
endowments) may be brought into studies of ecological unequal exchange to provide a 
further empirical basis for this area of research. This answers Bunker’s call for analysis 
of exchange in ecological terms.  
Systems ecologist Howard T. Odum developed a method for measuring the total 
work of ecosystems embodied in commodities resulting from economic and ecosystem 
processes, and hence a way to measure the extent of natural wealth exchanged between 
countries, or the loss of a country’s natural endowment through commodity trade. He 
called this embodied ecosystem work—which may be measured in terms of the embodied 
energy required to produce or sustain a commodity, natural resource, or an entire national 
economic system or ecosystem—emergy. Like the Earl of Lauderdale, Marx, and today’s 
ecological rift theorists, Odum argues for a distinction between measures of economic 
wealth or value, on the one hand, and real public wealth viewed in ecological terms, on 
the other. Economic valuations or prices, he argued, are not good indicators of the natural 
wealth embedded in commodities. Often the cheapest commodities are the result of the 
most environmentally destructive, or unsustainable practices. He also developed a basis 
on which to analyze the compensation received by countries per loss of ecological value, 
creating a means to compare the relative benefit of terms of trade for different countries. 
Given exchange inequalities, according to Odum, it is impossible for countries to foster 
long-term development that is both ecologically sustainable and benefits export regions 
so long as unequal trade relationships persist.  
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It is my intention to illustrate the utility of Odum’s emergy analysis for studies of 
ecological unequal exchange, where its importance has not yet been recognized.  
Odum and ecological unequal exchange 
 Systems ecologist Howard T. Odum’s introduction and refinement of emergy 
analysis for measuring the embodied ecological work in economic processes, including 
the human labor component, informed the development of multiple disciplines. His work 
influenced fields ranging from ecological economics, ecology, and biology to 
engineering, biogeochemistry and environmental policy. As one of the twentieth 
centuries greatest ecological theorists, who dealt with the economy/society/environment 
nexus, his work offers one of the most important links to ecology for social scientists. 
Indeed, one is not likely to find a more sophisticated and ecologically grounded guide to 
understanding ecological unequal exchange than that offered by Odum. Most ecological 
theorists have failed to “understand the linkages among various components of the 
world—for example, among economies, environments and energy. Although there 
certainly have been a number of attempts previously to integrate these ideas, one great 
thinker stands head and shoulders above the rest: Howard Thomas Odum…Clearly H.T. 
Odum is one of the most innovative and important thinkers of our times” (Hall 1995, ix).  
 Although Odum’s work is occasionally referred to, his emergy analysis, which 
brings economy, society and ecology under common study, and highlights issues of trade 
inequality, has yet to be successfully integrated within the methodological toolbox of 
ecological unequal exchange theory within social science.5 Incorporating Odum’s 
                                                
5 Hornborg (2009) writes that “by combining the world-system perspective of Frank and Wallerstein with 
Emmanuel’s notion of unequal exchange and Odum’s notion of energy value, Stephen Bunker (1985) 
assembled the first formulation of a concept of ecologically unequal exchange” (249). However, there is no 
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ecologically grounded calculations into an analysis of Ecuador’s current position vis-à-
vis wealthier countries in the global North will highlight useful aspects of emergy 
indicators for studies of ecological unequal exchange. In what follows I will introduce 
Odum and the significance of his work, explain the concepts and use of emergy analysis, 
and address criticisms of Odum’s framework, before turning to the specific case of 
Ecuador. 
Odum and the emergy concepts 
 Briefly defined, emergy analysis is “a method for calculating the value of a 
resource or product by summing the [ecological] investment made in each step of its 
production process” (Olsen in preface to Odum and Arding [1991]). Expressed in solar 
“emjoules,” as the common unit, emergy analyses provide quantitative measures of the 
natural forces of production. This allows assessment of the emergy (embodied energy) 
required to replenish resources, or a measure of sustainability in terms of actual 
ecosystems processes.   
 The main emergy theorist, Howard T. Odum, is one of the founders of 
contemporary ecosystem ecology, ecological economics, and ecological engineering. 
Odum’s contributions, (along with those of his elder brother, Eugene P. Odum), to 
moving ecosystem studies forward and developing a measure of wealth in ecological, 
rather than economic, terms (emergy) are recognized around the world. In 1987 the 
Odum brothers were awarded the Crafoord Prize, akin to a Nobel Prize for ecology and 
one of the largest international science prizes, “for their pioneering contributions within 
the field of ecosystem ecology. Their fundamental findings have strongly promoted our 
                                                
direct reference to Odum in Bunker (1985).  
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understanding of the dynamics of natural systems and formed a scientific base for the 
long-term exploitation of the natural resources including pollution abatement” (RSAS 
1987). This is only one of the many instances in which the Odums were recognized for 
their path-breaking work. H.T. Odum, “alone or with his brother, Eugene, has received 
essentially all of the most prestigious awards available to an ecologist” (Hall 1995, x). 
 Earlier scientists (e.g. Lindeman, Hutchinson, Deevey, Juday, and Lotka) 
developed energy flow approaches and applied thermodynamic principles in ecosystem 
studies, thus anticipating and influencing the Odum brothers’ work. However, the Odums 
were the first to use “the principles and concepts” of energy analyses of ecosystems as 
the basis of a theory of ecology (Golley 1993, 80-81). As a result of the Odums’ early 
work,  
the energy flow approach that entered ecology as a way for 
comparing diverse biological processes was transformed 
into a theoretical foundation for ecosystem function. 
Although most ecologists were inadequately prepared in 
the physical sciences to take advantage of the energy 
concepts and language—except in a general way—adoption 
of the energy approach provided two useful tools to 
ecological analysis. First, by following the first law of 
thermodynamics, ecologists studying energy flows in a 
defined system could expect that all energy entering the 
system would equal all energy leaving the system, plus that 
stored within it…Second, according to the second law, at 
each transfer of energy in the food cycle, energy is lost to a 
heat sink and is no longer available to do further work. 
Therefore, efficiencies of energy transfer must be less than 
100 percent. (Golley 1993, 81)  
 
 It was through Howard T. Odum’s work in particular that “Lotka’s ideas on 
energy flow…had a pervasive influence upon the way later ecologists thought about 
ecosystems” (Hagen 1992, 125). Odum was uniquely positioned to make such advances. 
“Given his background in the physical sciences, particularly his training in meteorology 
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and physical chemistry, it is perhaps not surprising Odum should have been so attracted 
to Lotka’s book…More than any almost any other ecologist, he has approached the study 
of ecosystems as a physical scientist might” (126). He was thus able to propose a unified 
approach to ecosystem science, which represented a new synthesis of lasting significance. 
As a result, “more than any other ecologist, Howard Odum has shaped the way biologists 
think about energy” (142).  
 Along with his other advances, Howard T. Odum also pioneered “a method of 
studying system dynamics by measuring the chemistry of the input and output of water. 
The difference between input and output, under steady state conditions, was a measure of 
the metabolism of the whole system. [Howard] Tom Odum (1957, 56) was motivated to 
study the whole system as a unit” (Golley 1993, 70). The Odum brothers were the first 
ecologists in history to investigate “a complete ecosystem with the intent to measure its 
overall metabolism” (Hagen 1992, 103). The energy and systems approach to ecology, 
and other areas in which the Odums were innovators, helped set the stage for H.T. 
Odum’s development of emergy analysis, which represents a culmination of his vast and 
lasting contributions. “One reflection of the importance of [H.T.] Odum’s earlier work is 
that there are now at least six scientific journals, generally representing their own 
scientific societies, in areas in which Odum published either the first, the first significant, 
or the first systems-oriented paper (Hall 1995, x). 
 The Odums were not only responsible for major advances in ecological science, 
they also brought the ecosystem concept out of ecological science and into wider use: 
“The ecosystem concept became known outside of the limited literature of ecological 
science and its specialists when Eugene Odum…made it a central concept in his textbook 
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Fundamentals of Ecology in 1953” (Golley 1993, 62). Howard T. (Tom) Odum, Eugene’s 
younger brother,  
played an important role in the development of the book. 
Tom Odum was a doctoral student studying under 
Hutchinson at the time. Eugene Odum credits Hutchinson’s 
ideas, transmitted as copies of class notes by Tom Odum, 
as being a key inspiration in his using the ecosystem as a 
central organizing theme for Fundamentals of 
Ecology…Not only did Tom Odum contribute his own 
interpretations of these modern ecological concepts to 
Eugene Odum, he also read and commented on the 
manuscript of Fundamentals and wrote the chapter on 
energy in ecological systems. (Golley 1993, 67) 
 
 The text that resulted from the Odum brothers’ early collaboration “created a 
generation of ecosystem ecologists—as distinct from plant ecologists and animal 
ecologists—who were prepared mentally and technically to contribute to the 
environmental decades.” The “book was reprinted several times, revised twice, and 
translated into numerous foreign languages” (Golley 1993, 69). Hayden (1992) notes that 
“what might have remained a rather narrow, technical literature was brought into the 
mainstream of biological thought” with the publication of Fundamentals and “one can 
trace much of the evolution of the ecosystem concept through subsequent editions of the 
textbook” (126).  
 Both Odums understood the social implications of their theoretical developments 
and saw systemic change as necessary regarding human society’s relationship to the 
larger ecosystem of which we are part (Craige 2001, xiii).  “Because in an ecosystem the 
constituent parts are interdependent and subordinate to the whole, ecosystem ecology 
offers a philosophical challenge to individualism and a political challenge to capitalism 
and free enterprise” (xvii). Their study of ecology and environmental problems led 
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Howard T. Odum, and his brother, to realize the confrontation between capitalist 
production geared toward endless economic growth and the well-being of the larger 
biospheric system and human communities, which are a part of it. H.T. Odum also used 
emergy analyses to trace the transfer of natural wealth from the periphery to core and 
found that poor countries and regions were under-compensated for their natural resource 
exports and wealthy countries’ economies and living standards benefitted most from 
environmentally damaging international trade.  
 Because orthodox economic theory could not account for environmental 
degradation, or issues of trade inequality, especially in ecological terms, Howard Odum 
saw the need for alternative methods of measurement for decision-making, outside of 
traditional economic calculus. Developing an alternative to economics for making policy-
decisions was urgent for Odum because “after two centuries of [capitalist economic] 
expansion, the economic development of the diminishing resources of the earth has 
reached a new stage. Enterprises for private profit are consuming the environmental 
systems that are the basis of public welfare. The conflict between those intent on 
protecting the environment and those intent on further economic development are 
becoming increasingly important in public policy discussions and political elections” 
(1996, 1). He saw his ecological science-based system of placing environmental and 
economic accounting on a common basis, through emergy analysis, as a solution to the 
adversarial nature of environmental debates. (He underestimated the power differential 
that renders science no match for capital, in the absence of external pressure, in policy-
making at the national level). By implementing policies promoting the maximization of 
emergy production, real wealth grows and the public benefits. Rather than internalizing 
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externalities, Odum saw the task as to “externalize the internalities,” valuing the market 
in ecological terms rather than bringing nature into the economic calculus (Odum and 
Odum 2000, 21).  
 Emergy analysis is Odum’s method for measuring the ecosystem work, in energy 
terms, embodied in productive processes (found in human or non-human environmental 
systems). The term “emergy” is meant to connote “energy memory.” Odum and others 
utilized his embodied energy concept “since 1967…. [For example, it] was used in 
Environment, Power and Society [1971 version].” However, “emergy units were defined 
in 1983 [the term was suggested by David Scienceman, Odum’s collaborator] to clarify 
the confusion that arose from the use of the same units for both embodied energy and 
energy…Emergy records the available energy previously used up, expressed in units of 
one kind but carried as a property of the available energy of continuing outputs” (Odum 
2007, 100).  
 Odum traces the methodological prerequisites for the development of emergy 
analysis to his earlier work and to other studies of energy in ecosystems in the 1950s. To 
Odum, by the 1960s, “it became apparent that environmental and economic systems 
could be evaluated on a common basis” (1996, vii).  What he refers to as “preliminary 
efforts” toward developing a methodology for such an evaluation were published in 
Environment, Power and Society (1971) and Energy Basis for Man and Nature (1976). 
Environmental Accounting: EMERGY and Environmental Decision Making (1996) is an 
important methodological text, a sort of emergy accounting handbook, written after 
Odum clarified the emergy and transformity concepts through rigorous definition in 
1983, which are the essential concepts in his methodology for measuring real wealth 
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(Odum 1996, 278). Environmental Accounting “introduces the EMERGY accounting for 
evaluation of environmental and economic use” and succinctly defines “EMERGY, a 
measure of real wealth, [a]s the work previously required to generate a product or 
service” (vii).  
Transformity, one of the “two main rigorous measures” developed by Odum 
along with emergy, is defined as “the EMERGY of one type required to make a unit of 
energy of another type” (Odum and Arding 1991, 110, 114). “Because EMERGY 
evaluation traces what was required for a product back to a common form of energy, it is 
a way of showing how the requirements for different products compare” (100). It is in the 
emergy and transformity concepts that Odum sets his method of environmental 
accounting apart from previous efforts.  
Emergy accounting as a distinct method 
Emergy is a donor value, a measure opposite to the receiver-oriented “human 
willingness to pay” expressed in prices (Odum and Arding 1991, 108).6 Like Marx, 
whose labor theory of value included assessment of dated inputs of labor time, Odum’s 
emergy analysis looks at past energy inputs required for production (in human society or 
nature’s processes). Indeed Odum suggests that emergy analysis could be seen as putting 
Marx’s labor theory of value on a more scientific footing (Odum and Arding 1991, 109; 
Odum 1996, 260-61). As Odum himself states, “Many economists were taught that early 
efforts to find an absolute basis for value failed, often citing Marx’s labor theory. As 
several authors have pointed out, Marx’s labor value concept was also a donor-value 
                                                
6 Donor value: “A value of a product determined by the production process and not by what a person is 
willing to pay (examples, mass & energy of wood)” (Odum and Arding 1991, 113).  
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concept, using hours of labor as the measure of labor power. But what labor can 
accomplish depends on the EMERGY inputs of the education, the machinery used, and 
other aspects of labor. EMERGY measures put labor value on a more scientific basis” 
(Odum and Arding 1991, 109).7 Odum here is raising issues that have less to do with 
economic value in the narrow sense, and that relate to the wider material foundations of 
Marx’s value theory, encompassing use value as well as exchange value. Indeed Marx 
himself recognized the limitations of the labor theory of value (the value form under 
capitalism) since it didn’t incorporate nature’s role in the creation of wealth.8  
Odum’s emergy concept especially is indebted to Lotka’s proposal of the 
maximizing power principle as a fourth law of thermodynamics. However, because Lotka 
did not specify systems principles based on qualities of energy, Odum modified Lotka’s 
statement of this principle by placing “energy of each level on a common basis using the 
concept ‘empower’” to say: “Prevailing systems are those whose designs maximize 
empower by reinforcing resource intake at the optimum efficiency” (Odum 1996, 26). 
Systems must operate according to principles dictated by “the universal energy 
hierarchy” which “provides transformities for quantitatively relating energy on one scale 
to that of another” (34). In this way, energy quality is expressed in quantitative terms, 
with energies at different levels in the hierarchy put on equal footing for analysis. Solar 
emjoules were chosen as the common unit for emergy analysis as a matter of convention 
(coal emjoules could also have been used, for example). This means that inputs to 
                                                
7 It is important here to reiterate that Odum does not see emergy analysis as a study of pricing nor does he 
propose emergy as an alternative method of determining prices.  
8 On Marx’s value theory and nature see Paul Burkett’s Marx and Nature (1999) and Marxism and 
Ecological Economics (2006); John Bellamy Foster’s “Marx’s Ecological Value Analysis” in Monthly 
Review (2000) and Marx’s Ecology (2000, 9); and Paul Sweezy’s “Marxian Value Theory and Crises” in 
The Faltering Economy (Foster and Szlajfer [1984] 2009, 236-50).  
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productive systems of quantities of energy of various qualities are converted to the 
amount of solar energy required to make the type of energy under consideration, with the 
final quantity expressed in solar emjoules. This allows all the energy inputs in a process, 
now expressed in a common unit, to be summed. Solar emergy, expressed in solar 
emjoules, is thus defined as “the available solar energy used up directly or indirectly to 
make a service or product” (8). “Solar transformity measures position in the energy 
hierarchy and indicates the appropriate range of effective action” (36). 
The formal relationship between emergy and transformity may be expressed as 
follows:  
Emergy (solar emjoules, sej) =Available Energy (J) x Transformity (sej/J) 
Odum writes that “the failure to convert each kind of energy into each other kind before 
adding or comparing energy flows may be the main reason that energy theories of value 
have been initiated and dropped so many times. We can improve the previous attempts to 
use energy by multiplying energy-flow data by transformities, thus converting them into 
EMERGY flows” (Odum 1996, 34). Transformities provide the quantities necessary to 
express various qualities of energy in common units and sum the total emergy. They also 
provide the relationship between energy and emergy, which have different algebras (271).  
 The process for calculating emergy begins with drawing an energy system 
diagram for the system under study. Odum suggests that experts on a process gather 
round a table and list all the elements contributing to the system. For example, if you 
wanted to calculate the emergy of corn, you would draw an energy system diagram 
illustrating the inputs required to grow corn under the particular conditions. Their relation 
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to one another via energy pathways is also indicated via energy systems diagramming 
notation. 
 Once the system diagram is completed, each input becomes a line item in an 
emergy evaluation table. In this table the raw energy data for each line item (found in 
already existing literature) is multiplied by its previously published or currently 
calculated transformity (according to method laid out in Odum [1996]), to arrive at the 
solar emergy of each item. In this way the items may be summed and other indices may 
be calculated to look at the quantities in relation to one another and to compare systems. 
Calculations are included in the table according to the needs of the particular study. 
Emergy per dollar calculations, which are explained with some detail below, are common 
to relate economic and ecological indicators. The Center for Environmental Policy 
published emergy calculations for the natural resource base of 134 national economies. 
This database illustrates a range of useful emergy calculations.9  
In emergy analysis the issue of the dispersion and degradation of energy are taken 
into account in both the diagrams used to map energy systems, and via the integration of 
the notion of energy hierarchy to recognize the qualitative differences between items 
under analysis. Odum and Arding write that, “the definition often used in elementary 
physics and engineering courses that energy is the ability to do work is incorrect. 
Degraded energy can’t do any work. The work that potential energy can do depends on 
its position in the energy hierarchy” (Odum and Arding 1991, 97). Available energy 
(exergy) is “the potential energy capable of doing work and being degraded in the 
                                                
9 http://www.cep.ees.ufl.edu/nead.asp 
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process” (Odum 1996, 16). Emergy sums all the previous potential energy inputs to the 
series of energy transformations required to produce any given output of currently 
available (potential) energy.  Exergy, or availability, analyses, which measure available 
energy (methodology often called process analysis), are thus not as comprehensive as 
emergy. However, data measuring exergy can be converted to emergy data by 
multiplying by the correct transformities (268). Higher transformities represent higher 
levels of previous work required to concentrate the resultant available energy in the 
system under analysis. The higher the transformity, the lower the efficiency of the system 
in ecological terms because increasing amounts of nature’s work goes into the final 
product. Emergy is seen as an important improvement on resource accounting currently 
in use, including ecological footprint and exergy analyses: 
System boundaries in a cradle-to-gate LCA [life-cycle 
assessment] typically begin with an initial unit process in 
which a raw material is acquired (e.g., extraction) and 
include raw materials entering into that process but do not 
include any information on the environmental processes 
creating those raw materials. Emergy traces energy inputs 
back further into the life cycle than any other 
thermodynamic method, summing life cycle energy inputs 
using the common denominator of the solar energy that 
directly and indirectly drives all biosphere processes…This 
energy could also be conceived as the energy requirements 
underlying at least some of the ecosystems services used in 
a process (Zhang et al)…Other thermodynamic models, 
including exergy, do not include energy requirements 
underlying environmental processes (Ukidwe and Bakshi). 
(Ingwersen 2011, 551) 
 
  In a festschrift dedicated to Odum’s work, Hall (1995) identifies the difference 
between Odum’s analysis and that found in ecological economics (in spite of Odum’s 
initial influence). Ecological economics asks “How can we measure the contributions of 
nature to the human economy in terms relevant to humans?” while emergy analysis asks 
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the more comprehensive question, “How can we fit the activities of humans into the 
grand energy schemes of the world around us, which sooner or later will determine what 
we do anyway?” (205). In other words, as stated above, emergy analysis seeks to 
“externalize the internalities”—a task opposite that of much ecological economics. 
Indeed, the difference between Odum’s work, grounded in ecology, and ecological 
economics as it has developed since Odum’s original contributions, which as a whole 
distanced itself from ecology in favor of economistic approaches, can be seen the 
treatment of efficiency in the journal, Ecological Economics, since its founding issue 
published in 1989.  
  A 2006 article published in Ecological Economics, analyzed the application of the 
core concept of “efficiency” in the entire body of work by ecological economists 
published in the same journal, from volumes 1 to 42. The author of the study found this 
literature was dominated by economic efficiency concepts and much was “essentially 
indistinguishable from neoclassical economic analyses” (Jollands 2006, 363). Only 10% 
of all articles in Ecological Economics drew on an ecological theory of efficiency. 
Moreover:  
Thermodynamic-related efficiency concepts (energy 
efficiency and recycling efficiency categories in above) 
were applied in approximately 20% of the articles. 
However, most of these articles addressed issues of energy 
efficiency from a thermal- efficiency perspective. Only 
three articles actually attempted to draw energy quality 
considerations into the ecological economic 
literature…Few articles (10%) drew on the ecological 
theory of efficiency. This is surprising given ecological 
economics’ putative attempt to integrate ecological and 
economic theory. (Jollands 2006, 363) 
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The utility of “EMERGY evaluations and designs based on unchanging physical 
measures” is that they “may provide an efficient and predictable means for achieving 
public wealth and sustainable economic patterns” (Odum and Arding 1991, 89). Emergy 
allows us to assess sustainability and measure efficiency in truly ecological terms. In 
relating economic and ecological processes, it does not subsume the environment in the 
economy:  
Emergy approximates the work of the environment to 
replace what is used…The emergy of a resource is the 
energy required to make it, including work of the 
environment, and assuming equivalent conditions; this is 
the energy that it takes to replenish the resource. 
Sustainability ultimately requires that inputs and outputs to 
the biosphere or its subsystems balance out…As the only 
measure that related products to energy inputs into the 
biosphere required to create them, emergy relates 
consumption to ultimate limits in the biosphere by 
quantifying the additional work it would require from 
nature to replace the consumed resources. (Ingwersen 2011, 
551) 
 
Emergy, money and sustainability 
Because prices do not capture the environmental impact of production, or reflect 
the ecosystem processes that form raw materials, another indicator is necessary to 
measure the natural wealth consumed in various economic processes. Cleveland saw “the 
counter-current flow of energy and money” as “one of Odum’s two most important 
contributions to biophysical economics, the other being energy quality”: 
He [Odum] pointed out that wherever a dollar flow existed 
in the economy, there was a requirement for an energy flow 
in the opposite direction. Money is used to buy goods and 
services, of necessity derived from energy. Each purchase 
operates through the economy as a feedback, stimulating 
more energy to [be] drawn from the ground and into the 
economy to produce additional goods and services. Money 
circulates in a closed loop, whereas low-entropy energy 
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moves in from the outside, is used for economic tasks, and 
then leaves the economic system as degraded heat. Odum 
also observed that the large natural energy flows of solar 
radiation, water, wind, etc. that are essential for life, have 
no associated dollar flows. The cost of using these energy 
flows do not, therefore, enter into economic transactions 
directly, often leading to their misuse or the 
mismanagement of life-sustaining environmental services. 
(Cleveland quoted in Brolin [2006], 254) 
 
 Odum highlighted the tension between the market valuation of goods and the 
valuation of goods in ecological terms in his definition of sustainability:  
Sustainability of a development is possible when its 
EMERGY yield is higher than alternatives AND when 
EMERGY feedback from the economy goes to the 
environmental work processes (not to humans) so as to 
reinforce their ability to compete with alternative 
ecosystems that tend to displace the ones under 
environmental loading. When ecosystems, like fisheries, 
get no feedback or reinforcement, they crash. 
Environmental use systems are displaced when demand for 
one species in that system is sustained through a critical 
juncture, ignoring the entire ecosystem and the 
environmental system is overloaded. Policy should focus 
on incentives and regulations for feedback EMERGY 
reinforcement. Policy should consider EMERGY ratios. 
(Odum and Arding 1991, 22) 
 
 While not proposing emergy as a price/exchange value determinant, Odum did 
relate emergy to money via several indicators that are used to assess the long-term 
viability, equity and sustainability of economic processes (like production, extraction and 
trade). Having a working knowledge of these concepts is essential to understand Odum’s 
analysis of ecological unequal exchange and his study of Ecuador: 
• The emergy/Money($) ratio, or total emergy a nation exports per the money 
received, illustrates how much purchasing power a country has relative to others. 
A high relative emergy/money ratio means that countries are exporting high levels 
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of their natural wealth, or emergy, for the money received, and have lower 
relative purchasing power. “Rural countries have a higher Emergy/dollar ratio 
because more of their economy involves direct environmental resource inputs not 
paid for” (Odum and Arding 1991, 18).   
• The emergy exchange ratio is the ratio of emergy received for emergy delivered 
in a trade or sales transaction (Odum provides the of example of a trade of grain 
for oil). “The area receiving the larger EMERGY receives the larger value and has 
its economy stimulated more. Raw products such as minerals, rural products, from 
agriculture, fisheries, and forestry, all tend to have high EMERGY exchange 
ratios when sold at market price. This is a result of money being paid for human 
services and not for the extensive work of nature that went into these products” 
(Odum and Arding 1991, 18). To assess trade between countries or local sales, 
“the relative benefit is determined from the exchange ratio…A local economy is 
hurt when the new development takes more EMERGY than it returns in buying 
power. Keeping the product for home use raises the standard of living of those 
living at home” (Odum and Arding 1991, 22).  
• The emergy/investment ratio is the “ratio of the EMERGY fed back from the 
economy to the EMERGY inputs from the free environment…This ratio indicates 
if the process is economical as a utilizer of the economy’s investments.” To be 
economical, a process should have a similar ratio to competitors, and the regional 
investment ratio. “The ratio for an area is set by the state of development of the 
economy using non-renewable resources” (Odum and Arding 1991, 16). This 
ratio is used to evaluate foreign direct investment, as well as more localized 
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investment, and the ratio for projects should not exceed the local ratio if it is to be 
a net benefit to the local economy:  
Often in the development of environmental resources, early 
success is followed by over-development, which puts too 
much purchased EMERGY for the matching environmental 
input. This wastes economic potential and overloads the 
environmental resource. The EMERGY investment 
ratio…is the index for determining the development 
intensity and the environmental loading. The ratio should 
not exceed the regional investment ratio if the development 
is to be part of that economy. (Odum and Arding 1991, 22) 
 
Emergy and ecological unequal exchange 
 Brolin (2006) writes that “the most advanced modern ecological descendent of 
Petty’s or Cantillon’s attempted unidimensional measure of value—in the ‘real’ as 
distinct from the ‘price’ sense—is certainly the ‘emergy’ concept of Howard T. 
Odum…which arguably is also the most comprehensive and inclusive estimation tool of 
ecological unequal exchange” (243). Odum utilized the ratios and indicators described 
above to assess the benefit of exchange between wealthy and poorer countries. He looked 
at the net benefit to poor countries of their natural wealth exports and why inequalities 
persist in international trade. In focusing on the relationship between the U.S. and 
Ecuador, Odum illustrated that U.S. currency has much higher buying power in Ecuador 
than in the U.S. This is shown by comparing the emergy/$ ratios of these countries. If the 
emergy/$ ratios differ greatly between countries, unequal exchange is inevitable because 
the countries are not equally compensated for the amount of natural wealth they export. 
The financial relations wherein poor countries borrow money from the wealthy to finance 
their imports further exacerbate inequalities. For example, because of the difference in 
the purchasing power of their currencies, expressed in terms of emergy, if Ecuador 
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borrows money from the U.S. to buy U.S. goods, “3.6 times more buying power is paid 
back. This is equivalent to an interest rate of 360%. Little wonder,” Odum says, “that 
investments by developed countries in underdeveloped countries have caused financial 
depression in underdeveloped countries” (Odum and Arding 1991, 37).  
 Trade also is considered apart from the financial elements. Given the ecological 
loss involved, and that labor is much cheaper in poor countries, the price paid by the rich 
countries for what they get in terms of embodied natural wealth and labor is too low to be 
a benefit to poor countries. Poor countries would be better off using their own resources 
to benefit the local population rather than selling them off at prices that leave nothing for 
re-investment at home. Along with the loss to the local population, poor countries are not 
compensated enough under the current terms of trade to do restorative work ensuring 
long-term ecosystem survival in areas degraded to supply the export market (Odum and 
Arding 1991, 37).  
 While Odum’s work is not cast in terms of contemporary sociological analyses of 
unequal exchange, he does express concern with imperialism and shows the impact of the 
transfer of wealth, in ecological terms, from poor to wealthy countries. He shows why 
countries are further impoverished as long as they remain supply depots for the wealthy, 
and argues that countries should focus on internal development independent of external 
markets for resources. In doing this, he succeeds in providing evidence for Bunker’s 
point that to better understand how earlier modes of extraction condition current 
inequalities, and social and economic problems, one must look at the transfer of natural 
wealth in its own terms, and focus on the relationship between extractive and productive 
economies. Bunker writes,   
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I believe that the unbalanced flows of energy and matter 
from extractive peripheries to the productive core provide 
better measures of unequal exchange in a world economic 
system than do flows of commodities measured in labor or 
prices. I also believe that the partiality and distortion which 
an excessive concern with labor creates in development 
theories underlie the increasingly sterile debate about 
whether the causes of underdevelopment occur in a world 
system external to any particular regional economy…or 
within regionally specific modes of production…. Focusing 
on the necessary relations between extractive and 
productive economies permits a solution to this ultimately 
fruitless debate. (Bunker 1984, 1019) 
 
The method Odum developed makes clear the environment’s role in wealth 
creation, the inequalities and changes over time in trade relationships, as well as the 
consequences of modern production and trade for the environment. Odum’s work has 
been and can be used to look at issues of urbanization, inequalities between regions, and 
ecological imperialism. Looking at emergy exports over time, and the inadequate 
compensation received for this wealth transfer, Devincenzo King (2006), analyzed the 
ecological debt owed Sub Saharan Africa as a result of cumulative emergy exports that 
have enriched wealthier countries. According to this analysis, Sub Saharan countries paid 
off all international debt in emergy terms by the 1970s and should now be allowed to use 
their resources to develop internally. In emergy terms, the countries are shown to be net 
creditors, rather than debtors.  
Bringing Odum in, answering criticism 
 Disciplinary boundaries may help explain the lack of application of Odum’s work 
to questions of ecological unequal exchange. It also is possible that criticism and 
misinterpretation of Odum by scholars have discouraged the adoption of his work in this 
line of study. Hornborg, a scholar who has explored the question of ecological unequal 
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exchange, erroneously criticized Odum’s work on thermodynamic grounds. (Hornborg 
expressed preference for exergy analysis over emergy, while claiming Odum didn’t deal 
with the dissipation of energy.) Odum’s work, he claimed, was potentially and 
problematically “normative” whereas neoclassical economics and exergy anayses are 
“descriptive” (Hornborg 2001, 40-43).  
 Hornborg declares that the emergy concept “is obviously a metaphysical one” and 
that “it remains unclear…whether an emergy theory of value proposes to be (1) 
descriptive, or (2) normative, or (3) both? In other words, does it propose to explain how 
people actually do evaluate things (as reflected in prices) or how they ought to evaluate 
things?” (Hornborg 2001, 41). Hornborg mistakenly and repeatedly suggests, even in 
more recent work, that Odum attempted an energetic theory of value to explain market 
valuation/pricing. He does this while at the same time citing Odum’s papers where Odum 
explains in detail, for those who don’t understand his conceptual framework, or its 
thermodynamic basis, that he is not attempting to analyze market valuation, or replace it 
with emergy. Odum writes, “some confuse EMERGY concepts with the technocrat 
movement of the 1930’s, which used energy as the basis of value and proposed to pay 
people with energy certificates in place of money…Technocrats wanted to substitute 
energy value for money, whereas EMERGY value is not meant to be used for market 
value, but for larger scale evaluation of the economy” (Odum and Arding 1991, 109).  
 Even so, Hornborg charges:  
Odum (1971) was influenced by the so-called Technocrat 
movement led by the above- mentioned M. King Hubbert. 
He offered an energy theory of value similar to that of the 
Technocrats, suggesting that emergy (‘energy memory’) – 
that is, the amount of solar energy spent to produce a given 
commodity or organism – is an adequate measure of 
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economic utility (Odum, 1988). In a paper co-authored with 
J.E. Arding, Odum used this notion of ‘emergy’ to argue 
that trade between nations at different levels of 
technological development tended to be unequal in terms of 
net flows of energy (Odum and Arding, 1991). Odum’s 
concepts of ‘emergy’ and ‘embodied energy’ are clearly 
similar to Marx’s concept of embodied labor, and both 
shared the problematic conviction that such past 
investments (of energy or labor) should be a measure of 
value.  
 
Odum’s attempts to ground economic increases in 
(exchange) value in thermodynamics can be criticized from 
the perspective of both economics and thermodynamics 
(Hornborg, 1998). In physical terms, as Georgescu-Roegen 
showed, increases in value in a production process 
correspond to a decrease in total energy quality 
(negentropy, or ‘negative entropy’, closely related to 
exergy). Accumulation of ‘emergy’ or ‘energy memory’ 
thus represents a dissipation of exergy. The concepts of 
emergy and exergy, in other words, suggest inverse ways of 
describing processes of energy transformation. Although a 
common pitfall, ever since the days of Podolinsky, has 
been to seek a thermodynamic foundation for an objective 
measure of value, more ‘real’ than price (see Hornborg, 
1992), such arguments should be abandoned. The driving 
forces of consumption are cultural, both in general terms 
and in specifics (Sahlins, 1976). ‘Value’ must pertain to 
what human beings perceive, rather than to physics. In fact, 
it is only by keeping human valuation and physical 
properties analytically separate that we can reveal the 
destructive logic of capitalist processes: the more people 
are willing to pay for a particular product, the faster will be 
the dissipation of resources required to produce it. 
(Hornborg 2009, 248) 
 
 It is difficult to sort out what is correct from incorrect in this passage. Neither 
Marx nor Odum believed that labor or energy should be measures of value (or determine 
prices)--Marx saw labor value as a restricted calculus of economic value under capitalism 
(which ignored the role of nature); Odum was not concerned with economic value but 
rather emergy (or embodied energy), analyzing processes in ecological terms. The 
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implication of the above passage that Odum (or Marx for that matter) failed to appreciate 
the second law of thermodynamics is preposterous. (For a discussion of Marx’s treatment 
of thermodynamics see Burkett and Foster [2006]). The notion that exergy and emergy 
are “inverse ways” of describing energy effects reflects a gross misunderstanding of these 
concepts, each of which exist within the same systematic theory.  
 Hornborg’s goal is to “try to show that the relation between energy and value, 
although of great significance, is better stated in terms diametrically opposite to those of 
Odum”— although what precisely he means by this is left obscure (Hornborg 2003, 6). 
This again reveals Hornborg’s incorrect assumption that Odum proposes an energetic 
theory of market value (prices). Because of this faulty conclusion Hornborg sees Odum 
attempting value analysis that is both descriptive and normative, which means for 
Hornborg emergy analysis “would seem to amount to nothing less than a way to 
legitimate, by and large, world market prices as they are” (Hornborg 2001, 40-42). 
Odum, however, has made it amply clear, even in early work, that “EMERGY value is 
not meant to be used for market value” (Odum and Arding 1991, 109). This particular 
issue (whether Odum’s work is descriptive or normative), and the solution Hornborg 
suggests (using exergy analysis rather than emergy), is repeated by Joan Martínez-Alier 
(2002), who accepts Hornborg’s definition of ‘the problem’ with Odum’s work (217-18).   
Hornborg’s criticism follows a complete misinterpretation of Odum’s work and a 
lack of understanding of the thermodynamic basis of Odum’s ecological framework. In 
fact, Odum’s work is not even analyzed in its own words, on its own terms, in these 
analyses. As indicated in the description of emergy analysis in the previous sections, 
Odum was not proposing an energy theory of exchange (market) value/prices. Neither 
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was this great ecologist ignorant of thermodynamic principles. Rather, his entire 
methodology represents the most comprehensive method of environmental accounting 
based in ecological principles, including, obviously, the laws of thermodynamics. Odum 
was one of the leading figures to apply thermodynamics to ecosystem analysis (see 
Hagen 1992; Golley 1993; Hall 1995; Craige 2001). To point to a failure to recognize the 
second law of thermodynamics as a shortcoming of his analysis indicates serious lack of 
knowledge of his thought and method.   
This is not a minor issue. While most approaches to ecological unequal exchange 
have so far come up short in a concrete sense, the argument here is that Odum offers a 
clear path.  
Emergy and Ecuador 
  Ecuador was chosen as a case-study for analysis given its status as a paradox of a 
country rich in natural resources with a history of lagging social gains. The following 
section will interpret EMERGY calculations in terms of an historical analysis of 
ecological unequal exchange involving Ecuador. Whereas “most ecological ‘theories’ of 
unequal exchange have been concerned with environmental accounting rather than 
theoretical or historical explanation” (Brolin 2006, 6) this work hopes to bring 
environmental accounting into the ecological rift theoretical framework to offer an 
alternative and historically specific explanation of Ecuador’s “resource curse.”  
 While Odum’s report commissioned by the Coastal Resources Center of the 
University of Rhode Island focused on shrimp mariculture and export from Ecuador to 
wealthy countries like the U.S., Odum’s study also contained emergy analysis of 
petroleum exports. For Ecuador, he calculated that 74% of Ecuador’s annual emergy 
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exports were oil, and that Ecuador exported fives times as much emergy as it received via 
imports or payments for exports (Odum and Arding 1991, 24, 32, Table 4, line 9). 
Without petroleum exports, the total emergy trade deficit would be reduced 92 percent 
(compare emergy exports in oil on page 24—(+)231.0e20sej/yr— to emergy trade deficit 
on page 32, Table 4, line 8—(-)252.0e20sej/yr). Major geographical regions supporting 
Ecuador’s economy are the “tropical rain forests of the Amazon Basin, the high Andes 
with their populations and agriculture and the coastal systems and fisheries. Oil from the 
Amazon is pumped over the mountains and down to a shipping terminal on the Pacific 
Ocean for export” (Odum and Arding 1991, 23). This means the Amazon region suffers 
most as a result of the export of oil.  
 The enormous emergy trade deficit has to do with the ecological work embodied 
in petroleum products, the concentration of carbon over millions of years, and the poor 
compensation received for the export of oil. “The EMERGY/$ ratio of Ecuador in 1986 
was 3.6 times that of the U.S. in that year,” meaning that one U.S. dollar could purchase 
several times more oil in Ecuador than in the U.S. Moreover, foreign loans in U.S. dollars 
create a constant siphon of wealth from the Ecuadorean economy (Odum and Arding 
1991, 37). Odum argues that the natural wealth of Ecuador is drained through the 
mechanisms of international trade and debt to benefit the importing countries: “Energy, 
minerals, and information are the real wealth. It takes energy to concentrate the minerals 
needed by an economy. It takes energy to maintain and process information. When 
resources are abundant and cheap, there can be abundant wealth and a high standard of 
living. If resources and basic products are imported cheaply, abundant wealth is 
imported….Countries that sell their energy give away their EMERGY 6 for 1 or worse. 
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The benefits to countries that buy their fuels depend on the EMERGY ratio of their trade 
transaction” (89-90, 104). As seen above, the emergy ratio between Ecuador and the U.S. 
represents a high level of inequality.  
 As a result of this analysis, Odum concluded “the export of oil and shrimp is very 
bad for the economy of Ecuador compared to the development that would occur if these 
products were used internally. Consider the inequality in real wealth of the 
exchange…and the reasons” (Odum and Arding 1991, 37):  
Because of the export sale of raw fuels, shrimp, and other 
environmental products, much more EMERGY goes 
abroad than is received in payment…Five times more 
EMERGY was sent abroad than received. Ecuador was 
contributing to the largesse of developed countries, 
stripping its wealth from its own people, 75% form its non-
renewable soils and oil, i.e., its future. Equity might be 
arranged by balancing the higher EMERGY in the exported 
shrimp with feedbacks to the shrimp-producing economy in 
some other products, services, or information. (Odum and 
Arding 1991, 39) 
 
Ecuador and unequal exchange: A historical problem 
 Odum’s work provides a quantitative and empirical basis for measuring the 
impact on the Ecuadorean economy of the export of its energy resources and other natural 
resources, goods and services. He also provides suggestions on how to remedy these 
imbalances. He advocated emergy analysis be used, rather than traditional economic 
indicators such as exchange rates and prices, to set economic policy. The tone of the 
work suggests that politicians, like economists, suffer from an ignorance of the true cost 
of current policy, and if they just knew, they could adjust the terms of trade to be more 
beneficial to poor countries. While providing a materialist analysis of trade relations, 
Odum winds up with an idealist interpretation of how we can reverse these inequities. 
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 The ecological rift theory provides a framework and approach to ecological 
unequal exchange that puts the situation faced by Ecuador, which Odum studies, into 
historical context and thus offers a more realist interpretation of why these inequities 
persist and the real obstacles to overcoming them. Foster, Clark and York (2010) write 
that “transfers of economic value are shadowed in complex ways by real material-
ecological flows that transform ecological relations between town and country, and 
between nations, especially the core and periphery. Control of such economic and 
material flows is central to the forces of competition and accumulation of capital, and 
generates social and environmental inequalities throughout the global economy” (346). 
They refer to Bunker’s earlier work that showed unequal trade relations “negatively 
affected and undermined the socio-ecological conditions in extractive countries” (347). 
They also discuss how this influenced contemporary analyses of ecological unequal 
exchange, which empirically demonstrate that “the environmental footprint of 
economically advanced nations involves appropriation of land, resources, and labor in 
lesser-developed countries, increasing environmental degradation in the latter for the 
benefit of the former” (347). Ecological rift theorists see these trade relations as part of a 
history of ecological imperialism, “which entails control over natural resources [and] 
creates asymmetries in the exploitation of the environment and unequal exchange” (347).  
 Understood in these terms, ecological rift theorists provide a framework 
connected to broader social theoretical developments looking at the historically specific 
context of capitalism. This hierarchical and ever-expanding system, which requires 
natural resource throughput to create products and services for market, recognizes no 
natural barriers to accumulation. If resources are exhausted in one country, then sights are 
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set on others. Through early colonial exploits to facilitate capitalist development in 
Europe and England, “a new division of labor and nature took shape with the 
development of capitalism as a world system…The process of primitive accumulation 
established divisions between core and periphery nations, as wealth of distant lands was 
appropriate through various mechanisms.” Today, with a more thorough globalization of 
the system, “distant lands and ecosystems” more than ever serve as “mere appendages to 
the growth requirements of the advanced capitalist center” (from the perspective of 
capital) (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 349). Ecuador’s current economic, ecological and 
social problems are explained best in the context of this historical division of the world 
system and current neocolonial relations which make the inequalities analyzed by Odum 
possible and persistent.   
 Ancient culture in Ecuador dates back as far back as 10,000 B.C. In the modern 
era, the Inca ruled over much of Ecuador (since the late 15th century) until the arrival of 
Francisco Pizarro, Diego de Almargo and their conquistador entourage in 1532. The 
trickery, hypocrisy, slaughter and disease characterizing European civilization was 
brought to bear on the indigenous population, and despite consistent resistance, the 
Spanish declared what is now Ecuador and beyond the property of the Spanish crown. 
They were searching for gold and other resources, but finding less mineral wealth in 
Ecuador, land became the crucial commodity, and the encomienda system was 
introduced. Spanish elites controlled large tracts of land and initiated the long history of 
unidirectional net wealth export, from Ecuador to Europe and England, as well as their 
white settler colonies. The impact of the racialized class system imposed by the Spanish, 
and related patterns of land ownership, persist today in spite of land reform starting in the 
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1960s and subsequent reforms, including those of the current president, Rafael Correa. 
Ecuador has experienced several revolutionary periods, replacing one elite with another, 
while retaining essential features of the race, class and gender system of the colonial 
period.  
 Without this hierarchical social development, the discovery of oil in the 1960s in 
Ecuador, and the intensified neocolonialism that ensued, could not have occurred because 
western companies would not have had the same access as that which resulted from their 
deals with Ecuadorean elites, the local comprador class. The U.S., more than any other 
country in the 20th century, benefitted from the colonial legacy of domination that made 
the oil-fueled expansion of capitalism possible (Klare 2011): “America’s rise to 
economic and military supremacy was fueled in no small measure by its control over the 
world’s supply of oil.” Rather than rest on the laurels of previous colonial powers, “as 
they became ever more dependent on the extraction of oil in distant lands, American 
foreign policy began to be reorganized around acquiring and protecting U.S. oil 
concessions in major producing areas” (Klare 2011).  
 The role of oil as the main concentrated energy source in the era of capitalist 
expansion overseen by the U.S. means the discovery of oil in any country almost 
guarantees U.S. intervention in the form of corrupted local politics, odious debt, and 
when necessary for the U.S. to have its desired outcome, war and other forms of military 
intervention or assassination. Ecuador is no exception to this pattern and the discovery of 
oil sounded the death knell for many indigenous peoples and aspects of Ecuador’s diverse 
ecosystems. As Galeano observed, “The more a product is desired by the world market, 
the greater the misery it brings to the…peoples whose sacrifice creates it” (quoted in 
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Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 354). Since oil companies first entered Ecuador, “Vast 
areas of rainforest have fallen, macaws and jaguars have all but vanished, three 
Ecuadorian indigenous cultures have been driven to the verge of collapse, and pristine 
rivers have been transformed into flaming cesspools” (Perkins 2004, xviii). This 
devastation continues to plague Ecuador, whose area encompasses several regions with 
some of the greatest biodiversity and cultural diversity in the world. While “Ecuador is 
only the size of Nevada, it has more than thirty active volcanoes, over 15 percent of the 
world’s birds species, and thousands of as-yet-unclassified plants, and…it is a land of 
diverse cultures where nearly as many people speak ancient indigenous languages as 
speak Spanish” (Perkins 2004, xvii).  
 Branko Milanovic (2005) has shown that Ecuador, which seemed to have 
economic prospects in the 1960s from the perspective of this world bank economist, has 
been in economic decline ever since. Oil revenues did not bring wealth to the country, 
and the people of Ecuador are worse off today, as is their environment.  As Perkins 
writes,  “Ecuador is in far worse shape today than she was before we introduced her to 
the miracle of modern economics, banking, and engineering” (Perkins 2004, xviii, 203).  
Since the Oil Boom in the 1970s, poverty and public debt have increased exponentially, 
while the share of resources going to the poor has decline by more than half.   
 Illustrating the transfer of economic wealth that accompanies the transfer of 
ecological wealth measured by Odum, Perkins explains in monetary terms what happens 
to oil profits: 
For every $100 of crude taken out of the Ecuadorian rain 
forests, the oil companies receive $75. Of the remaining 
$25, three-quarters must go to paying off the foreign debt. 
Most of the remainder covers military and other 
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government expenses—which leaves about $2.50 for 
health, education, and programs aimed at helping the poor. 
Thus, out of every $100 worth of oil torn from the Amazon, 
less than $3 goes to the people who need the money the 
most, those whose lives have been so adversely impacted 
by the dams, the drilling, and the pipelines, and who are 
dying from lack of edible food and potable water. (2004, 
xx) 
 
 Perhaps most insidious has been the role of finance capital in the baiting and 
hooking of local elites to play comprador roles in the energy extraction and export game. 
Favors are provided to local elites so they buy into the plans of U.S. oil companies 
operating in Ecuador by taking out loans from U.S. banks to hire other U.S. companies to 
conduct massive works projects in Ecuador, which facilitate oil extraction by building 
infrastructure free of charge for oil companies. At the same time, these projects represent 
massive sources of income for U.S. contractors and the banks loaning the money.  “In 
essence, most of the money never leaves the United States; it is simply transferred from 
banking offices in Washington to engineering offices in New York, Houston, or San 
Francisco” (Perkins 2004, xvii). Moreover, if successful, “the loans are so large that the 
debtor is forced to default on its payment after a few years…When this happens, then like 
the Mafia we demand our pound of flesh” (Perkins 2004, xvii). The countries, like 
Ecuador, defaulting on these types of odious debts, are pressured to avoid greater 
economic repercussions by conceding to U.S. demands, for example, for military bases 
on their land, U.N. votes, or further access to resources.  
 To enforce control and maintain the ecological and monetary wealth transfer from 
Ecuador, what Samir Amin ([1978] 2010, 110-11) refers to as the system of imperial rent 
extraction, the U.S. has intervened in local politics on a regular basis. As a result, 
Ecuador “suffered under a long line of dictators and right-wing oligarchies manipulated 
 114 
by U.S. political and commercial interests. In a way, the country was the quintessential 
banana republic” (Perkins 2004, 141). Shortly after Jamie Roldós–the first democratically 
elected leader after a long line of dictators—proposed in his inaugral address on August 
10, 1979 to assert sovereignty over decision-making regarding natural resource 
exploitation, he was killed, following his vilification via red-baiting by the media and 
U.S. officials. The U.S. also has used missionaries and stoked conflict between 
indigenous groups in Ecuador to make it easier to gain access to lands with oil beneath 
the surface. No option is off the table when it comes to terrorizing local peoples, 
destroying communities and the land for the profit of western oil companies.  
La encrucijada  
 The presumed assassination of Roldós remains etched in the minds of social 
scientists in Latin America analyzing the predicaments and contradictions of the current 
Ecuadorean presidency of Rafael Correa. Protests in Ecuador, many related to the 
persistent demands of the population that domestic resources be used to benefit local 
communities who suffer as a result of Ecuador’s extractive political economy, ousted 
several presidents before the left-leaning economist, Correa, was elected in 2006. Recent 
articles in Íconos (Ortiz T. 2010; Ortiz 2010), a social science journal based in Ecuador, 
have focused on the encrucijada, or crossroads, confronting the Correa presidency and 
the anti-neoliberal movement which brought him into power.  
 Correa has not broken with the hydrocarbon economy and this has put him at odds 
with the largest indigenous confederation in the region, CONAIE (Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador). He also has not broken with neoliberal policies—
inspiring protests several times as he attempted to institute austerity measures during 
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times of crisis. All of these issues highlight the challenges faced by countries like 
Ecuador, who have local populations demanding sovereignty while the economy remains 
a captive of the colonial model based on ecological degradation, resource export, and 
“apartheid on a world scale” (Amin  [1978] 2010, 110).  
 Odum’s work provides further evidence in support of indigenous demands for 
environmental sovereignty and suggests that Correa gambles Ecuador’s ecological, 
economic and social future by continuing to base plans for social development on oil 
revenues. However, Correa, like the social scientists in the region, remembers Jamie 
Roldós, and understands the economic embargo against Cuba and other punishments 
meted out to those seeking to break away from this exploitative system. He also looks to 
Venezuela, which has used oil revenues to support social programs. Nevertheless, social 
movements in Ecuador suggest that breaking away from the old model can be done, and 
they raise the issue of ecological debt as one way forward and away from the false 
choices of continued exploitation of indigenous lands for oil export or dire poverty.  
 In focusing on the ecological debt, movements raise the issues of global 
ecological imperialism, the reconfiguration of global power relations, environmental 
sovereignty, and redistribution of the blood money represented by oil profits, among 
others. For the people of Ecuador, this is an existential struggle. For capital, it is the 
same. Oil companies backed by governments will work against any barriers to access to 
energy resources, no matter the cost to local people, because economic growth requires 
ever-greater quantities of fuel. The question is, what power is strong enough to overcome 
capital?—a necessary step toward healing the ecological rift and redressing the burdens 
of the long history of oppression. And which side will we all be on? The movements are 
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waiting to see which direction Correa will turn. Like other social struggles, the outcome 
of Ecuador’s internal and external conflicts will be determined by the “relative power of 
the combatants.” Will oil companies and U.S. diplomats threaten Correa into submission? 
Will Correa buy into the Venezuelan model, which remains subject to international 
energy markets? Or will the internal political pressure of peoples who see no net benefit 
from oil exploitation bring a political shift in the Correa administration? Will the 
presidency throw its weight behind the struggle for an economy that meets local needs, as 
determined by local peoples, without mortgaging Ecuador’s ecological heritage for short-
term gains?  
Energy justice: Redressing ecological debt, repairing the rift 
 Restoring the ecological and social rift requires transcending the system that 
requires fundamental power imbalances to serve the capital accumulation process. These 
imbalances manifest themselves in similar, but specific ways around the world because 
countries have particular histories, geographies and positions in the world system (Amin 
1976). The struggle to redress the grievances of this history, and alleviate the burden of 
contemporary inequalities resulting from energy imperialism, require a confrontation 
with elites over the issue of debt, especially ecological debt, which Naomi Klein calls the 
most important “social justice issue of our time” because it marries climate, or broader 
environmental, and economic justice.  
 It is no surprise that the debate over ecological debt started in oil-exporting 
Ecuador. The peoples of Ecuador’s Amazon region, which is the subject of the biggest 
environmental lawsuit in history, are demanding that they be paid to keep oil in the 
ground in the Yasuní national park and the Amazon region in general. While Correa’s 
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plans seek to retain more oil profits for Ecuadorean development, assuming the anti-
imperialist posture Amin proposes as necessary for internal development (Amin [1978] 
2010, 110), the ecological debt movement puts forth a much more radical program—
challenging the oil-export and exploitation model—forcing attention to ecological and 
internal indigenous issues, including the persistent racialized class divisions. They also 
assert that they owe no external debts, and hence do not need oil revenue to service 
international loans.  
 As Odum argued, measured in terms of the extraction and export of natural 
wealth, Ecuador is a net creditor, rather than debtor. Ecuador should be paid to keep oil in 
the ground for environmental reasons, but also because they are due. Moreover, poor 
countries in the global South are bearing the brunt of climate change. They are doubly 
assaulted by the energy regimes of the wealthy, first through the dislocations resulting 
from extraction, and second through the effects of climate change, which 
disproportionately affect the poor. The wealthy countries continue to develop at the 
expense of third world economies, environments and peoples, and a reversal of this trend 
is necessary to achieve any kind of social or environmental justice. The repayment of 
ecological debts is one mechanism in the movement toward energy justice, and justice in 
general.  
Escaping the resource curse (as an analysis and as the paradox of development) 
 A critical sociology of energy must address the issue of energy justice. Systems 
ecologists’ analyses of the inequalities in exchange in terms of natural wealth, brought 
into the ecological rift framework for understanding the political economic drivers and 
historical context in which these inequalities developed, provide powerful tools for 
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understanding current problems and thinking through solutions. The issue of ecological 
debt may be understood in this context as a mechanism for repairing the global ecological 
and social rifts. When taking account of the history and context in which energy 
extraction takes place in Ecuador, the confusion in the mainstream economics literature 
over the “resource curse” can only be explained by the fact that orthodox economists’ 
training requires they wear blinders to inequalities, history and the relationship between 
first world growth and third world struggles. They become apologists rather than critics, 
and hence cannot explain crucial aspects of reality. A critical sociology of energy 
developed to service the struggle for energy justice may help the movement toward 
transcending the “resource curse,” both as an a-historical mode of analysis, and as a real 
affliction of regions bearing the brunt of the consequences of the ecological and social rift 
of capitalism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY JUSTICE IN CUBA 
 
 The literature review on Cuba in the following chapter is partially co-authored 
with Christina Ergas as part of a manuscript we hope to publish later. I am responsible for 
all of the writing and the research in the rest of the chapter.  
 
 The preceding two chapters have attempted to illustrate how a focus on energy 
justice in sociological and ecological terms provides insight into energy issues. Energy 
justice necessarily requires that social energy choices reflect a commitment to social 
equality and inter-generational ecological provisioning. A sociology of energy concerned 
with energy justice requires attention to the role of energy in social processes that 
generate inequalities and ecological depredations accumulating as social and ecological 
debts. Attention also is required to the ways in which ecological change 
disproportionately burdens the historically oppressed. The research summarized in 
chapters two and three of this thesis, building on previous critical scholarship, makes 
clear that both the consequences of business as usual, as well as so-called solutions to 
energy problems like climate change presented under the current system, are borne 
unequally. Moreover, rather than work toward truly healing the ecological rift, the system 
tends to shift the burdens of crises from one ecosystem to another, from region to region, 
and from one community or nation to the next (Clark and York 2008). The same social 
groups and regions historically burdened under capitalism are expected to go on paying 
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the costs of fossil fuel extraction and use as well as those of emerging “alternatives” such 
as biofuel.  
 The failure to recognize these social and ecological costs is related to the value 
system of capital, which conveniently treats the reproductive work of humans and nature 
as value-less, though it is in the end dependent upon these labors. Moreover, social 
scientists, especially orthodox economists, retain the assumption of quid pro quo in their 
models of economic exchange with the result that the coercion and plunder of humans 
and nature remain invisible (Baran and Sweezy 1966, 336). Therefore, social scientists 
working within this value system have little to offer in the way of explaining our current 
energy problems, or finding ways out that do not reproduce current energy injustices.  
 The preceding chapter illustrated the advantages of an energy justice perspective 
integrating the study of ecological unequal exchange, over more common models for 
understanding the “resource curse” plaguing Ecuador. Neoclassical economists have 
treated the case of Ecuador and other resource rich countries that struggle economically 
and socially as a conundrum given their natural wealth and adherence to the dominant 
economic model (Collier and Goderis 2007). Adopting such assumptions as “all is for the 
best in the best of all possible worlds” and “there is no alternative” to the current system, 
it is difficult for many social scientists today to transcend the dominant model even when 
empirical reality presents counterfactual data (Baran and Sweezy 1966, 1; Fukuyama 
2006). This affects the way countries like Ecuador, whose social welfare has decreased 
even as it increased its adherence to the dominant model, are understood. But it also leads 
to the complete inability to explain the opposite phenomena, which is the fact that 
countries breaking away from the dominant model may have improved social welfare and 
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equality, even if resource poor. Cuba represents this phenomena in the world today and is 
explored here as a case study providing rich theoretical insight.  
 The following chapter explores the way in which the energy justice framework 
developed previously in this thesis provides insight into the Cuban experience. Lessons 
are also identified in the history and future of Cuba’s energy regime, which allow further 
theoretical refinement. I first explain Cuba’s ongoing significance as an exception to the 
dominant capitalist model, in social and ecological terms, and as a common referent in 
the environmental literature. Then I present historical analysis based on my own research 
and materials gathered in Cuba, the existing scholarship, as well as information drawn 
from Cubaenergía and the Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, Cuba’s main national energy 
information and statistics sources. Through this analysis I explain the importance of, and 
conditions that made possible, Cuba’s response to the almost immediate 70% reduction in 
energy resources forced on the country in the 1990s at the onset of the larger economic 
depression of the special period. Then I explore the implications of the energy debates 
and challenges facing Cuba today for understanding the global limitations placed on 
efforts toward achieving energy justice within the current system.  
 Cuba’s efforts and challenges are significant today for social scientists from 
wealthy countries mired in orthodox models. Sociologists in this context are confronted 
primarily with proposals to deal with the dislocations of the current energy regime that 
reflect the limited experience and imagination of capitalist countries. An alternative 
vision is necessary and urgent because, as scientists have warned us, business cannot 
continue as usual. The research is clear that we must reduce energy consumption globally 
and immediately to avoid irreversible and radical alterations in natural conditions (see 
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Clark and York 2008 and Magdoff and Foster 2011). But how do we accomplish this at 
all, or without incurring the ecological and social disaster that a contraction in energy 
availability (whether externally or internally imposed) implies within this system? These 
questions require sociologists to engage in the confrontation of “reality with reason to 
draw the necessary conclusions for conscious action designed to bring about desirable 
change. And this confrontation inevitably involve[s] comparisons of what [is] with what 
would be reasonable” (Baran and Sweezy 1966, 134). This is the task of the following 
pages and provides further grounding for the continuous development of the sociology of 
energy with energy justice at its core.  
Cuba: An exception in the era of austerity and growing inequality worldwide 
 Scholars and activists interested in the links between ecological and social change 
study the unprecedented social gains Cuba made since the 1959 revolution as well as 
Cuba’s environmental achievements of the past twenty years. In 2006 Cuba was 
designated in the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Report the only sustainable 
country in the entire world  (WWF 2006). In the year 2000 the United Nations set eight 
Millennium Development Goals aimed at achieving high levels of human development in 
areas ranging from health and education to gender equality and environmental 
sustainability. As a result of attention given to these U.N. targets, and the earlier 
achievements of the Cuban revolution, Cuba has repeatedly been recognized for its long-
running high levels of human development, rivaling wealthy countries in many areas, 
though achieved with a much lower GDP per capita (see, for example, discussions in 
Cooper, Kennelly, and Orduñez-Garcia 2006; U.N. 2005; UNESCO 2005). Starting in the 
earliest years of the revolution, the commitment to an egalitarian society made Cuba’s 
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achievements possible and inequalities based on race, gender, and class were greatly 
reduced (Fleites-Lear 2000; Fuente 2008; Pagés 2008; Argüelles 2010; Prieto and Ruiz 
2010).  From an energy justice perspective, these social gains indicate greater 
commitment of resources, including energy, to meet social needs. It also means energy 
demand for the society as a whole has not been driven by the same factors as found in 
wealthier countries. Development in general in Cuba has been geared toward other ends.  
 Many social gains and substantial reductions in inequality were accomplished in 
the period from the start of the revolution in 1959 up until the economic collapse of the 
early 1990s associated with the fall of the Soviet Union. While the special period 
resulting from the Soviet disintegration had catastrophic social implications, Cuba’s 
commitment to social spending even in times of crisis (going against what is prescribed 
in capitalist countries experiencing crises) meant that all was not lost.  
 In the most recent regional U.N. Human Development report, Cuba ranks in the 
top five of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean—the only five considered to 
have achieved a high level of human development (UNDP 2010). Cuba has the lowest 
GDP per capita in this category, but rivals much wealthier countries in terms of the 
welfare of its population and ecological protections. Cuba also ranks 7th globally in the 
Happy Planet report, which indicates that Cubans report a high life satisfaction and life 
expectancy per ecological footprint relative to other nations (NEF 2009). This is in 
contrast to the United States, which ranks 114th and Ecuador, which ranks 25th.  
 This doesn’t mean there haven’t also been new problems in Cuba the past twenty 
years, including increasing inequalities associated with reforms intended to spur the 
economy and provide access to foreign exchange. However, the path Cuba took during 
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the crisis is unthinkable in almost every other country in the world, where economic 
crises result in further cuts to social spending, skyrocketing inequality, increased 
suffering, and an abandonment of ecological change and previous social gains for the 
poor and disenfranchised. In other words, Cuba put efforts toward protecting people and 
the environment first, spending its reduced national income on ensuring the welfare of the 
population through more ecological means. This is unimaginable from the vantage point 
of the U.S. or Europe today.  
 As detailed in previous chapters, the dominant economic model is understood as 
the main driver of ecological depredations associated with energy extraction and use, 
such as climate change, and the structural determinant of the way the costs and benefits 
of energy exploitation are distributed. Cuba offers the possibility of exploring the energy 
regime of a society freed from the sole dominance of capitalist logic internally, though it 
remains subject to global pressures. Cuba’s environmental and social achievements have 
taken place even while the country has been subject to the longest running economic 
blockade in world history and repeated military attacks on Cuban soil, both inflicted by 
the United States (U.S. Department of State 1961-63; Lamrani 2005; U.N. General 
Assembly 2011). The U.S. imposed the economic embargo beginning in the early 1960s, 
which is now in effect a multi-lateral blockade. The blockade was a response to Cuba’s 
anti-imperialist policies, including the nationalization of U.S. properties, aimed at ending 
U.S. domination of Cuba, which was ongoing since the Spanish-American war of 1898. 
As a result of the embargo, Cuba’s relationship with its heretofore largest trading partner 
ended and new political and trade agreements were negotiated between the Soviet Union 
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and Cuba to replace the loss of the U.S. market and forestall U.S. attacks on the island 
nation.   
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a Cuban economic catastrophe in 
the early 1990s as a result of the almost immediate cutoff from food, fuel, and health care 
supplies, among other necessities. At the height of the crisis, the situation was made 
worse by a simultaneous tightening of U.S. restrictions on aid and supplies to Cuba under 
the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Act signed by president Clinton 
in 1996. This led to Cuba declaring the 1990s the special period in time of peace, because 
shortages and hardships were similar to the special conditions experienced by populations 
during times of war, and indeed, the actions of the U.S. are seen by many as war by other 
means.  
 As a result of these events, Cuba has experienced a prolonged economic crisis, 
which is the intent of U.S. policy. The U.S. blockade against Cuba is seen by nearly 
every country in the world as illegal (Israel is in fact the only country that sides with the 
U.S. over the Cuba “embargo”). For twenty years the United Nations General Assembly 
has called for its end. In October of 2011, the Assembly voted 186 to 2 to pass a 
resolution calling for an end to the U.S. blockade against Cuba (only the U.S. and Israel 
were pro-embargo and only three countries abstained: Palau, Federated States of 
Micronesia, and Marshall Island). The blockade is estimated to have cost Cuba over $975 
billion dollars and, because humanitarian aid was restricted, caused unnecessary suffering 
to the Cuban people (U.N. General Assembly 2011).  
 Under these conditions, Cuba’s work toward social and environmental goals is 
even more remarkable, though the society also has experienced significant losses and 
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social problems as a result of externally imposed conditions and lingering internal 
problems. With little national income, and under constant threat, this small country has 
managed feats that defy the trickle down neoliberal ideology promoted by elites, avoiding 
the fate of many other poor countries that followed all the traditional economic rules and 
came out worse for it the past fifty years (Milanovic 2005, 2009, 2011). Economic 
excuses are always made by wealthy countries to explain why we can’t address major 
humanitarian and ecological issues like climate change and global poverty (see, for 
example, the behavior of the wealthy countries at the 2011 UN climate conference in 
Durban). While not claiming it as an energy justice utopia, Cuba, by virtue of its survival 
alone and moreover as a result of its accomplishments, is an exception to the rules. 
Therefore, energy developments in Cuba are worth studying in terms of what they tell us 
about energy developments in a dramatically different socioeconomic context.  
Energy justice lessons of the Cuban experience 
  Seen from the perspective of the ecological rift framework presented earlier in 
this thesis, the healing of which requires the realization of energy justice, the experiences 
of Cuba offer several key lessons. The first two are more developed in the existing 
literature than the last, which I see as my contribution, building on the work of others, 
toward exploring the lessons of the Cuban experience for efforts to realize energy justice. 
Energy choices are a limiting factor in social development and also in efforts toward 
ecological change. Viewing societies through the commitments represented in their 
energy regime provides keys to understanding the distinct social metabolic order of the 
society and the extent to which it has transcended the current ecohistorical period 
characterized by the globalized ecological and social rift. 
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 There is a lesson in energy justice represented in the social and ecological 
developments Cuba made possible by the re-orientation of its entire economic, broader 
environmental, and energy regime starting in 1959 to meet human needs more evenly 
throughout society. This reorientation led to more efficient use of energy resources, and a 
reduction in energy demand relative to other developing countries in Latin America. It 
also led to the achievements described above under difficult conditions. 
 There is also a lesson in how this re-orientation allowed Cuba socially to survive 
its own version of peak oil and introduce so quickly reforms and educational programs to 
transform Cuba’s food system by applying agro-ecological principles (Altieri 2002; 
McKibben 2005; Morgan, Murphy, Quinn, and Corner 2006; Wright 2009). This 
approach allowed Cuba to close energy flows in the agricultural system, reducing the 
necessity for external, energy-intensive inputs. It also made Cuba more self-sufficient and 
food secure, which reduced the high-energy demands of long-distance shipping for food 
and supplies and contributed to the social safety net.  
 Finally, there are energy justice lessons in the lingering external and internal 
challenges facing Cuba today. Cuba’s energy developments and increased imports from 
Venezuela are part of the reason Cuba is no longer considered sustainable by the WWF. 
It lingers around the edges of the ‘sustainability sweet spot,’ but appears headed further 
afield. In fact, it is now about even with Ecuador in terms of ecological footprint, even 
with Ecuador’s ongoing petroleum development and export, though of course for the 
same footprint Cuba still has better social outcomes. Internally, Cuba’s energy scientists 
and environmental activists struggle to assert ecological concerns amid the focus by 
policy-makers on market reforms and conventional energy developments.  
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 In agriculture, though agroecological principles still dominate, as energy 
resources are more available and cheaper, there are farmers that look forward to a more 
energy-intensive model. This is not to say that it is heading in the direction of a country 
like the U.S., but that the environmental movement there will not necessarily dictate 
policy in an energy-rich environment. Debates were occurring when I was in Cuba over 
the introduction of genetically modified crops as well. 
        Also, inequalities exacerbated by the Soviet collapse, as well as several reforms 
implemented by the Cuban government in response, have led to the increasingly unequal 
distribution of wealth and privilege. Cuba made great strides toward equality up until the 
1990s, however, lingering inequalities meant the energy crisis burdened some in society 
much more than others. While the decline in energy resources in itself led to Cuba having 
a lower ecological footprint, and Cuba’s response in the form especially of 
agroecological transformation meant greater environmental outcomes, this period also 
revealed energy injustices in the form of these unequally distributed burdens. This is 
relevant for societies around the world contemplating the need for great reductions in 
energy use to curb global warming, among other ecological crises associated with the 
modern energy regime. Also, without a great reduction in energy demand worldwide, 
resource wars are expected to continue that might impose reduced energy availability in 
specific countries at different times and further destroy regions afflicted by the energy 
resource curse. Who will bear the costs of growing energy demand, or the either 
internally or externally imposed reductions in energy use in our society, which does not 
even have the social safety net, previous gains in social equality, or relatively strong 
social solidarity found in Cuba? 
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            As a result of growing inequalities and increased energy availability in Cuba 
today, some Cubans enjoy more recent energy-intensive developments, such as resorts 
and the increased import of automobiles and gasoline consumption, while others do not.  
One person I interviewed was very worried by the fact that there is now smog in Havana 
and large new cars for wealthier Cubans and tourists bringing with them the diversion of 
resources to more roads and road maintenance. Health-related illnesses caused by smog 
are expected to go up, which will further burden the social safety net. These are just a 
couple of examples of the problems some Cubans identify with the current development 
plan, which is more energy intensive than before. 
            In sum, these lessons may be seen in relation to three distinct periods in Cuba’s 
revolutionary energy regime, coinciding with what one scientist called Cuba’s three 
energy revolutions: 1) The revolutionary break with U.S.-dominated oil interests, and the 
introduction of Soviet energy resources that were part of the complete transformation of 
Cuba’s political economy and society. This period also is characterized by the 
introduction of the U.S. embargo against Cuba. 2) The introduction of energy, food, and 
supply shortages with the collapse of the Soviet block in 1991, and the further tightening 
of what by now was truly a U.S. blockade against the Cuban people. The policies and 
developments of this period are far and away the most studied in the environmental 
literature because of the remarkable agroecological achievements during the crisis. 3) The 
period from the late 1990s and early 2000s to today is characterized by the re-
introduction of greater availability of non-renewable energy resources, but also new 
alternative energy technologies. This is also the period comprising major internal 
transformations, which will be described below, of which the outcomes are yet unclear. 
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There are ongoing debates over the future of what I call here, energy justice in Cuba.  We 
can learn from current policy and debates about the possible directions of the Cuban 
revolution. 
            The energy regimes of each of the three periods are the result of rapid changes in 
the availability and sources of energy, and correspond to social changes. The rest of this 
paper will address these periods and the lessons for sociologists today concerned with 
better understanding the role of energy justice in broader socio-economic and ecological 
change. In doing so, following Lewontin and Levins (2007, 344), I don’t attempt to 
simply list achievements and failures, but to answer the question about how Cuba has 
accomplished what it has, but also, how is it changing?  
 I went to Cuba because I have lingering and innumberable questions about the 
relationship between ecological and social transformation, and the role of energy in each 
of these. It also is difficult to sustain an exchange between Cuba and the U.S. as a result 
of the U.S. embargo and the politics between the countries, which has seriously hindered 
academic exchange and made communications very difficult by e-mail, mail, and other 
means. My original questions were regarding what the (at the time) only sustainable 
country in the world did about energy. In other words, how does energy fit into the 
ecological changes in Cuba beyond the impetus for change in the energy supply crisis of 
the 1990s?  
 Other questions for which I sought insight in Cuba were: How can energy be used 
to address issues of inequality and the historical burdens of oppression without destroying 
the environment? What do recent changes in Cuba’s economy and political framework 
mean for the energy sector and social equality in the country? What can we learn from 
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the case of Cuba about the complexities of promoting energy justice in an international 
context? All of these concerns are motivated by the strong conviction that people, and the 
rest of the biosphere on which we depend, suffer enormously and unnecessarily as things 
stand. Understanding what it takes to effect conscious change is the goal of the sociology 
of energy as presented here. My work on Cuba represents the desire for this knowledge 
and my respect of the Cubans and others throughout the world who have tried to find a 
better way and have in any way lit the long, winding, and arduous path out of this 
omnicidal world system.  
Data and methods  
 I worked toward answering the questions listed above by visiting Cuba twice, in 
the summers of 2009 and 2010, and through further study conducted while home in the 
U.S. using available scholarship and materials brought from Cuba. My second trip, which 
was a four-week visit in the summer of 2010, was made possible by the significant 
assistance of contacts made during my first visit in the summer of 2009. In sum I spent 
5.5 weeks in the country. My trips consisted of gathering as much information as possible 
in my limited time there and seeing as many projects and developments as possible 
(rather than ethnographic research). These were invaluable as it is notoriously difficult to 
obtain information about Cuba from the U.S. in particular, as academic and press ties, as 
well as communications, are mostly severed. 
 My analysis is based on information gathered through a variety of means. I 
engaged in participant observation in a major environmental conference in Havana in 
July of 2011, where delegates from all over Cuba who work on environmental issues 
presented papers and engaged in discussion and debate. Along with Cubans, there were 
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many representatives from Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as countries 
around the world. My second trip was scheduled so that I could attend this conference, 
the eighth Convención Internacional sobre Medioambiente y Desarollo (International 
Convention on the Environment and Development) with this year’s theme being: Por el 
Respeto y los Derechos de Nuestra Tierra (For the Respect and Rights of Our Earth). The 
conference, organized primarily by Cuba’s Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Environment was also supported by other internal Cuban organizations and international 
organizations like the United Nations and the World Wildlife Fund. The meetings were 
the sight of the UN’s initiation of the decade on biodiversity in the Caribbean with a 
speech delivered by the UN secretary of the convention on biodiversity (which the U.S. 
has not signed).  
 At the conference I went to meetings primarily focused on climate change, Cuba’s 
energy and general environmental policies and projects, and international cooperation 
and environmental justice. It was an opportunity to hear from Cubans who live and work 
all over the country about the environmental projects in which they are engaged. I also 
learned how environmental concerns are woven into other activities, such as into the 
educational curriculum, rural medical programs, in housing projects, etc. This was a 
chance to hear about energy developments in Bolívia, Mexico, Haiti, Brazil, Peru, 
Ecuador, and other countries. I learned so much in such a short amount of time as a result 
of listening to the dialogue and the debates between representatives within and between 
countries, as well as information about their cooperative environmental projects across 
national borders. Many meetings were also real planning meetings and it was interesting 
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to hear the priorities and interests people had in working out goals and practical steps for 
environmental work in the future.  
 My participation in this context was primarily in asking follow-up questions after 
the most relevant of the twelve meetings I attended in the five days of the conference and 
near constant informal conversations with other participants between meetings. Some of 
these conversations led to new contacts for ongoing exchange of information, ideas, 
friendship and perhaps future visits between countries. I also obtained materials provided 
by presenters and environmental organizations in Cuba that had booths at the conference. 
These materials are a wealth of information on their own. 
 Outside of this conference, during the remainder of my trip, I attended the 
presentations of workers, ministers, scholars, and activists involved in efforts focused on 
energy, agriculture, conservation, and the economy and trade at locations around the city 
of Havana and in smaller towns and environmental projects in the rural Pinar del Río 
Province. These events were organized separately from the main conference. I was 
invited to attend thanks to the help of contacts in Cuba and the U.S. During the remainder 
of my trip I attended the primary televised forum for intellectual debate organized by 
Temas, a Cuban scholarly journal. I also visited for the second time the Fundación 
Antonio Núñez Jiménez de la Naturaleza y el Hombre (the Antonio Núñez Jiménez 
Foundation for Nature and Humanity) and Cubaenergía (an important governmental 
organization employing energy scientists, involved in public education regarding energy 
and advising the government on energy policy).  
 Through these presentations and visits, and through contacts made on my 
previous trip in 2009, I was able to interview with special depth five people who basically 
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gave me all the time I could possibly need. I focused on securing longer interviews with 
these people in particular because they had years of experience working within the 
energy sector in Cuba, or were otherwise environmental activists or working in relevant 
sectors. With these key interviews I was able to ask all of the questions that I had left 
after over two dozen less formal conversations with Cubans attending and presenting at 
the large environmental conference and working in various projects in the city and in the 
rural Pinar del Río Province. These interviewees and the less formal conversations that I 
had shed further light on recent and upcoming changes that will affect the energy sector 
and socioeconomic developments in Cuba. They also taught me a lot about the 
environmental movement in Cuba. The findings of these interviews are presented 
primarily in the section below on Cuba’s third energy revolution. They also informed my 
understanding of Cuba’s first and second energy revolutions, though my sections below 
covering these periods are based on other data, academic work, and other sources on 
Cuba.  
 In preparation for my work in Cuba, I studied Spanish formally for five quarters 
in classes at the University of Oregon. While this is obviously an insufficient amount of 
time to master the language, the skills I acquired allow me to read materials in Spanish at 
a fair level and get by in conversation in Cuba. When this was insufficient, I utilized the 
services of translators. I also applied for and won funds through my home department and 
the University of Oregon College of Arts and Sciences, which allowed me to complete 
my research in Cuba, in particular the second trip. Global Exchange also supported my 
trips financially and logistically. Finally, I applied for and received permission from the 
 135 
Research Compliance Services office, which includes oversight of the protection of 
human subjects, to conduct my research in Cuba.  
 What I learned about Cuba’s energy and social developments are, in my view, 
best told through historical narrative, drawing from all my studies and research trips. 
Told in this way, the co-evolution of Cuban social, energy, and environmental practices 
within the evolving revolutionary process, and the energy justice lessons, are most clear. 
Cuba’s first energy revolution, social equality, and the environment 
 One of Cuba’s foremost energy scientists and environmental activists explained to 
me that Cuba has had three energy revolutions since the 1959 ousting of Batista. This 
periodization of socioeconomic and energy development reflects pivotal events in Cuba’s 
history. In all societies, entire patterns of social development are shaped by the 
availability and final uses of energy (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988). In Cuba, 
transformations in energy use are connected to dramatic social changes. The following 
pages will explain these three energy revolutions in social, economic, and ecological 
terms, putting current changes and debates in Cuba in historical context.  
  The pre-revolutionary Cuban economy was dominated by the United States 
starting in 1898, when the Treaty of Paris ceded Cuba, formerly a Spanish possession, to 
the U.S. From this time on, the island nation suffered under a model neocolonial 
relationship with the U.S., with major sectors of the economy and the political machinery 
controlled by foreign direct investment and management. Cuba, from the first landing of 
Columbus to the invasion of U.S. entrepreneurs and multi-national conglomerates, was 
the sight of extraordinary excesses and offshore corruption. As one Cuban writer put it, 
whose letter was published in C. Wright Mills’s Listen, Yankee (1960), “if we Cubans 
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have ‘gone to extremes,’ know this: so have you Yankees…Our country, our Cuba, it was 
simply an economic colony of the U.S. monopolies until our revolution” (25). U.S. 
developments on the island led to a colonial-style Las Vegas, where everything went, as 
long as you were white. Money could buy anything in Cuba during this period and hotels 
and casinos were built alongside brothels and abortion mills primarily for the benefit of 
wealthy U.S. and European tourists, along with Cuban elites. The country was so racially 
segregated that even the U.S.-backed dictator, Batista, because he was not white enough 
(though he was light-skinned), was not allowed to join Havana’s yacht club.  
 U.S. banks, oil and mining companies, and sugar and fruit companies made 
millions during the pre-revolutionary period. Economic development was highly 
successful (from the perspective of elites). It was so successful, in fact, that Cuba became 
one of the very richest countries in Latin America. Havana was the fourth most expensive 
city in the entire world by the 1950s. Needless to say, this wealth was highly 
concentrated at the top, and the kind of development promoted by U.S. interests was 
export-oriented, dependent, and led to the suppression of wages of local workers, high 
unemployment, and high inflation. The spending habits of the rich, and the trade 
agreements made with U.S. companies to supply basic commodities at prices too high for 
the local market, contributed to these developments. By the 1950s Cuban per capita 
income for workers was one third of that found in Mississippi, the poorest state in the 
U.S. at the time, but Cubans were expected to pay U.S. prices to meet basic needs (Wolfe 
2010).  
 During this period, oil was imported primarily from Venezuela and also the U.S. 
to meet development demands. Refineries on the island controlled by U.S. oil companies, 
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such as Esso, Standard Oil, and Texaco, and the Dutch Shell, were major sources of 
revenue. After the revolution, all of this changed. Revolutionary reforms in the country 
starting immediately in 1959, including nationalization of key industries, were geared 
toward re-orienting the Cuban economy to end U.S. control and benefit all Cubans. An 
important early reform of the Cuban government was the agrarian reform law, aspects of 
which the U.S. agreed upon initially, that redistributed all holdings over one thousand 
acres to peasants and workers and prohibited foreign ownership of Cuban land (which 
previously covered seventy-five percent of Cuba’s most fertile soil). Cuba came to 
purchase agreements of foreign owned lands with other countries but not the United 
States. Cuba also nationalized the main telephone company, and immediately lowered 
rates as they also did for rents. The response, especially to land reform, in the U.S. was 
the reduction in the sugar quotas setting the amount of sugar imported from Cuba. Covert 
operations against Cuba and to assassinate Castro commence during this period (summer 
of 1959).  
 In January 1960 Cuba expropriated lands held by United Fruit Company, which 
refused to sell to the Cuban government. U.S. attacks began on sugarcane fields and the 
oil refineries owned by the Cuban government, among other key sites. Cuba establishes 
relations with the Soviet Union in the spring of that year as U.S. covert military and more 
open economic attacks from the U.S. begin in force. Embargoes are placed by the United 
States on oil, guns, and sugar and the U.S. begins issuing propaganda against the new 
government. The Cuban government then entered a trade agreement with the Soviet led 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), receiving crude oil in exchange for 
sugar, among other barter and preferential trade arrangements. The importation of oil 
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from the Soviet Union, in particular, meant “‘the position of strength’ from which the oil 
companies have traditionally operated… completely crumbled” (Huberman and Sweezy 
1961, 168). A private oil embargo imposed by U.S. oil companies could no longer cripple 
the Cuban economy as it had in other countries in the past. Their last foothold was their 
refineries.  
 “Early in June 1960, the three big oil companies which had long dominated the 
Cuban oil market (Jersey Standard, Texaco, and Shell) flatly refused to refine the Soviet 
oil which was about to be imported by the government with the terms of the Soviet-
Cuban trade agreement of the preceding February” (Huberman and Sweezy 1961, 179). 
This “was a direct challenge to the authority of the [Cuban] government: failure to meet it 
head on would have meant the end of the Cuban revolution then and there” (179). Within 
a month Cuba responded by nationalizing the refineries and the properties of U.S. 
monopolies and other “big businesses” in rubber, cigars and cigarettes, banks, etc. 
(Núñez Jiménez 1961, 419; Huberman and Sweezy 1961, 181). The U.S. eliminated all 
remaining sugar quotas and initiated a broader embargo against Cuba (and covertly began 
plans for invasion). “The Cubans had enough ammunition left for one more big counter 
blow: on the 25th of October, 166 American-owned companies were nationalized” 
(Huberman and Sweezy 1961, 181). “This act, said the New York Times the next day, 
‘virtually eliminated major investments of Unites States citizens in Cuba” (181). And 
Cuba now had external support to counter U.S. attacks. “A round of sharp blows and 
counter blows thus ended with Cuba the clear winner” (179).  
 During this period Cuba’s revolution was radicalized and went from assuming 
that private enterprise “would remain quantitatively dominant” to the realization that to 
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actually have the economy work for the Cuban people it had to be controlled by the 
Cuban people (Huberman and Sweezy 1961, 184). Covert and overt attacks on the Cuban 
economy, cities, and land, also indicated that the U.S. was determined to maintain neo-
colonial relations with Cuba. It was during the Bay of Pigs in 1961, a failed but bloody 
attempt of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to reinstate the exiled Cuban 
elites, known in Cuba as the Playa Girón invasion, that the Cuban revolution declared 
itself officially socialist.  
 These events are referred to as constituting the first Cuban energy revolution. It 
was a revolution in the terms under which Cuba was supplied oil, and a revolution in the 
ends toward which energy exploitation were directed. Soviet support was crucial as Cuba 
asserted sovereignty in the face of U.S. attack, but also resulted in a modified form of 
dependency. However, this did not result in Cuba’s loss of sovereignty to the USSR, as 
had the former relationship with the U.S. where economic dependency and political 
domination were intertwined. The relationship with the Soviet Union allowed the 
continuation of energy-intensive and environmentally unfriendly development, but the 
new drivers of energy demand mitigated the level of energy consumption. Because social 
programs and reforms took center-stage over flashy development and conspicuous 
consumption, energy demand grew at a slower rate in Cuba than almost any other Latin 
American country.  
 Post-WWII economic exuberance led to the intensified growth of electricity and 
fuel consumption in wealthy and developing countries. This followed the usual pattern 
wherein economic growth leads to increased energy consumption (Pérez-López 1981, 
122-23). However, studies conducted on planned economies in the 1950s and 60s showed 
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no statistical relationship between economic output and growth in energy consumption 
(123). In contrast to most of the hemisphere, in Cuba the rate of growth of energy 
demand immediately slowed after the revolution. Per capita growth in energy 
consumption during the first two decades of the revolution were the second lowest in all 
of Latin America next to Chile (120-22). This is even with lowered utility rates, rural 
electrification programs, and the growth in public housing projects (128). Early initiatives 
took place to curb household energy consumption and change the mix of energy 
resources used in the home (127). The government sent out educators to teach residents 
how to curb wasteful energy use in homes. Energy efficiency and conservation efforts in 
industry were also started in the early 1970s (130). 
 These efforts were intertwined with a growing ecological consciousness in Cuba 
amongst a minority of scientists, educators, students, farmers, and community activists. 
The unity of ecological and social concerns are reflected in some of the energy policies 
described above, but also in a series of environmental reforms and practices that occurred 
starting in the 1960s. The experiments in agroecology and significant overhaul of the 
environmental regulatory system, which paved the way for Cuba’s famous agroecologcial 
reforms in the 1990s, actually began in the early years of the revolution. Cuban scientists 
in the 1970s started advocating shifts away from input-intensive farming. In the 1980s the 
Cuban Academy of Sciences was commissioned to make a plan for “the organization, 
structure, and operation of a new environmental regulatory system,” which was 
implemented in 1990 (Whittle and Rey Santos 2006, 78). An overview of this history is 
provided in Lewontin and Levins (2007, 355-56).  
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 This style of development did not make Cubans rich, but all the dynamics of 
inequality were transformed during this period, though there were environmental costs 
even if they were less than in other development cases. From the earliest period of the 
revolution, Cuba made great strides towards getting rid of most forms of institutional 
inequality, equalizing access to resources, and increasing political participation by 
traditionally oppressed sectors of Cuban society. This was an all out attack on the social 
rift and relations of capitalism. The revolutionary government established rights to health 
care, education, food, housing, etc. Thus, the first energy revolution was tied to a focus 
on efficiency in the energy regime as part of overall efforts to direct resources toward 
social development, and avoid the wanton resource wastefulness of the previous 
neocolonial period. In this way, the energy regime of the new revolution was marshaled 
in efforts break down societal divisions, especially improving the lives of the poor, 
women, and people of color in Cuba. Two significant areas of social change are described 
below.  
 The Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, or Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), was 
founded in 1960 to implement changes necessary to meet women’s needs and work 
toward gender equality. In 1961, the FMC began literacy campaigns that led to an almost 
100% literacy rate. New laws in Cuba included the 1975 Family Code that mandates that 
men share equally in household responsibilities and guarantees women and men rights to 
their respective properties before and after marriage. The 1976 Constitution intended to 
ensure that “women enjoy the same rights as men.” Practical needs that were emphasized 
included women’s access to safe health care, contraception, and free abortion, free and 
subsidized childcare, education, jobs, maternity leave, divorce, literacy campaigns, 
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reeducation programs for sex-workers and domestic servants, and help from men in 
household chores. The Federation of Cuban Women has worked to ensure advances in 
women’s employment, inclusion in leadership positions, and the extension of women’s 
legal and political rights.  
 For Afro-Cubans the gains were similar. By 1981, life expectancy was virtually 
the same amongst white, black, and multiracial populations. There was only a year 
difference between the white and black populations compared to the over six years gap 
found at the same time between whites and blacks in the U.S. and Brazil, for example 
(De la Fuente 2008, 316). Illiteracy was eliminated on the island right away following the 
revolution and by the 1980s “inequality in education had disappeared all the way up to 
the university level (316). The proportion of black and multiracial students graduating 
from highschool was even higher than whites. These educational gains were reflected in 
the occupational structure. While there were some areas of the economy where Cubans of 
color were underrepresented, “the index of dissimilarity (a summary measure of 
inequality) in the Cuban labor market was in the early 1980s three to four times lower 
than in the United States or Brazil” (317). The main areas where black and multiracial 
Cubans remained underrepresented were in managerial positions and in political 
leadership, which is “an area in which the Cuban government is frequently criticized,” 
though these inequalities declined in the first three decades of the revolution as well 
(317).  
 Given the real material gains, unimaginable in the divided-and-conquered 
capitalist world, and the ideology of the revolution, which deemed racism and sexism as 
problems solved or divisive topics, inequality disappeared in public debate (Prieto and 
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Ruiz 2010, 164). However, in 1985, the Third Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba 
discussed the fact that women and Afro-Cubans remained underrepresented in leadership 
positions. The Congress established affirmative action like policies to remedy this 
problem (164).  Upon further review, the state acknowledged that even further measures 
were needed to achieve equality. However, soon after this public re-orientation toward 
race and gender specific policies, the Soviet Union and CMEA collapsed, putting the 
Cuban economy in jeopardy almost overnight, initiating a shocking energy crisis. 
Projects to increase equality in Cuba, like building homes for people in dilapidated 
housing and daycare centers so women could work more easily, came to a halt.  
 While the special period resulted in the initiation of a process of ecological 
restoration in response to the collapse of the energy supply and other imports, it also 
revealed the lingering social divisions described above. These conditioned the 
distribution of burdens during the energy crisis. The exacerbation of inequality during the 
special period represents ongoing challenges for Cuban activists and others around the 
world seeking to heal the metabolic and social rift of modern society.   
The special period and the greening of the revolution 
 As noted previously, the fall of the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), resulted in a sharp and immediate loss of crucial supplies 
and Cuba’s export market. Eighty percent of Cuba’s trade was conducted within this 
trading bloc and therefore its dissolution initiated a profound depression for the entire 
Cuban economy (Pérez, López, and Berdellans 2005, 298). One of the most significant 
changes for the economy, society, and environment, was the loss of energy imports 
amounting to nearly three-fourths of Cuba’s energy supply for fuel and electricity. This 
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initiated the second energy revolution in Cuba, characterized primarily by major shifts 
resulting from the decline in oil imports, including Cuba’s return to animal traction and 
human labor as primary sources of energy, and other forms of adaptation.  
 Along with everything else, Cuba was cut off from access to many of the essential 
ingredients of input-intensive industrial agriculture and its export market. These events 
led to the collapse of Cuba’s sugar industry, which was one of Cuba’s economic 
mainstays since the introduction of monocrop agriculture for export with the colonial 
latifundia system. Because agriculture remained geared toward export after the revolution 
and Cuba was dependent on the CMEA for food imports and agricultural inputs, the crisis 
exposed Cuba’s persistent dependence. Coupled with the effects of the U.S. embargo, 
which cruelly was tightened during the special period in 1992 and again in 1996 
(McKibben 2005), the consequences for the Cuban people were by all accounts 
traumatizing: “Daily per-capita intake fell from 2,908 in 1989 to 1,863 calories in 
1995…and protein intake dropped by 40 percent. Some estimated that the average Cuban 
lost 20 pounds by 1994” (Sinclair and Thompson 2008, 156). Nearly everyone I spoke 
with in Cuba that is old enough remembers a repetitive menu of sugar water for breakfast, 
if not other meals as well, and black bean soup made only with beans, water, and some 
salt.  
 This crisis provided environmentally oriented scientists and activists in Cuba a 
new opening in the early 1990s, allowing “ecologists by conviction to recruit ecologists 
by necessity” (Lewontin and Levins 2007, 367). This is the period when agrarian reforms 
and urban agriculture really took off. These reforms helped prevent complete destitution 
in Cuban society, building a more sustainable safety net based on increased food security 
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and providing jobs working the land. They were possible, in part, because of the previous 
level of development of Cuban’s environmental knowledge and environmental reforms, 
and the general level of education, oriented toward social goals, throughout Cuba’s 
population. Because of this orientation, the entire educational and scientific apparatus 
could be reorganized under the circumstances to train Cubans in new farming methods, 
non-conventional energy development, and ecology. Energy scientists were already 
concerned with efficiency and self-sufficiency to divert more resources to social 
programs and reduce dependency. Many also were wary of nuclear developments, which 
started with the U.S. and continued with the Soviet Union, but were halted during the 
crisis. The crisis thus helped what we might now call Cuba’s environmental movement 
make the case that ecological, economic, and social priorities could and should be 
considered as one and the same thing. It also produced an immediate incentive for change 
because the survival of the revolution was at stake.  
 One of Cuba’s most remarkable responses to the energy crisis was their move 
toward the transformation and decentralization of the food and agricultural system 
according to less energy intensive agroecological principles. This allowed the 
development of a sustainable relation to the soil on which Cuba was now much more 
dependent for survival. As a result of these changes, which enhanced food security and 
self-sufficiency, Cuba is now considered a world leader in organic agriculture and 
permaculture. Accordingly, social scientists and activists have focused more papers on 
the virtues of Cuban agriculture than almost any other aspect of the “greening of the 
revolution” (Rosset and Benjamin, 1994; Rosset and Cunningham 1994; Rosset 1999, 
2000; Altieri 2002; Funes and Pasture Forage Institute 2002; Morgan et al. 2006; Clausen 
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2007; Raby 2009; Stricker 2010; Koont 2009, 2011; Bell 2012; Altieri and Funes-
Monzote 2012). Rather than give in to U.S. demands for the liberalization of the Cuban 
economy, and the restoration to power of Cuba’s former plutocrats, Cuba survived it’s 
own version of peak oil by focusing on the social safety net and ecological change. The 
major agroecological changes that were implemented allowed Cuba to close energy flows 
in the agricultural system, reducing the necessity for external, energy-intensive inputs. 
(Altieri 2002; McKibben 2005; Morgan et al. 2006; Wright 2009). Because the energy 
regime and agricultural system of any society are inevitably linked, understanding 
changes in Cuban agriculture is an important starting place for a discussion of the role of 
energy in Cuba’s social metabolic order. Their development of de-centralized, more self-
sufficient, and less energy intensive farming methods are important to consider in an era 
where climate change and unaffordable food are linked in the nexus between the global 
energy and agricultural markets (Ho 2008; Holleman 2012).  
 Cuba’s efforts toward developing organic urban agriculture are especially well 
documented. These efforts are bound with social changes of the era, some of which 
decentralized control of land and made possible new patterns of ownership and incentives 
for people to engage in agricultural labor. Urban agriculture in the form of urban gardens, 
reforestation projects, and animal husbandry utilizes about 87,000 acres within and 
around Havana (Koont 2009; Raby 2009). Today these urban gardens, or organopónicos, 
“supply 70 percent or more of all the fresh vegetables consumed in cities such as Havana 
and Villa Clara” (Altieri and Funes-Monzote 2012). Many scholars have noted the 
significance of this achievement for the human health and environmental well being of 
Cuban city dwellers, as well as the major reduction in energy use and wastes associated 
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with the total dependence on long-distance transportation of food typically required for 
cities (Companioni et al 2002; Levins 2005; Premat 2005; Clausen 2007).  
 The urban farms are the product of the state’s formalization of the right of urban 
residents to claim abandoned lots and sell produce. “All urban residents can claim up to 
one-third of an acre of vacant land, as long as they abide by the rules of all organic 
farming methods” (Clausen 2007, 49). 
 Rural reforms beginning in the 1990s complemented the development of urban 
agriculture and initiated a new social relation, a reconnection of labor, to the land as more 
people who had worked in cities or other jobs now saw agriculture as a more attractive 
option (Clausen 2007, 48). In 1993 the Cuban government passed reform allowing 
campesinos to own and manage cooperatives that replaced large-scale, state-owned 
industrial farms. Three times as many of these former plantations were devoted to 
sugarcane than food crops prior to these special period reforms (47). “The new programs 
transformed 41.2 percent of state farm land into 2,007 new cooperatives, with members 
totaling 122,000 people” (48). Additionally, “the Cuban government has turned over 
approximately 170,000 hectares of land to private farmers. The government retains title 
to the land [which is worked under principles of usufruct], however the private farmers 
receive free rent indefinitely, as well as subsidized equipment” (48). Today “the new 
farmers tend to be adults with young families (many with college education), early 
retirees, or workers with a farming background” (48).  
 Farmers are aided by teams of agronomists who are stationed around the country 
to answer questions and help solve problems as they arise, using ecological principles 
geared toward long-term sustainability of the soil. Rural farms in Cuba employ a 
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combination of organic, permaculture, and conventional farming methods, which mainly 
are represented in the selective use of pesticides and fertilizers. Animal traction is 
frequently relied upon for plowing and new plows were invented to prevent topsoil 
erosion. As a result of the education of farmers and the replacement of heavy machinery 
with oxen, soil compaction in Cuba has given way to fertile, loamy soil (McKibben 
2005). All of this is made possible because the agricultural revolution was backed by a 
complete reorientation of science and education. In Cuba, where production is geared 
toward meeting needs as efficiently as possible, education, science, and technology have 
developed with the same goals. Unlike the U.S., where chemistry dominates over ecology 
in agricultural studies, during the special period Cuba’s agronomists focused on how to 
transition away from the fossil-fuel and chemical intensive mono-cropping of its past. 
 Along with the environmental and social benefits of Cuba’s response to the crisis 
through agricultural reform, these changes led to Cuba outpacing all other Latin 
American countries in increases in agricultural productivity. Cubans now have the 
highest average daily supply of calories in all of Latin America. “No other country in the 
world has achieved this level of success with a form of agriculture that uses the 
ecological services of biodiversity and reduces food miles, energy use, and effectively 
closes local production and consumption cycles” (Altieri and Funes-Monzote 2012). 
Urban agriculture, combined with the transformation of Cuba’s countryside, has 
demonstrated possibilities in modern society for restoring “the spatial relations of 
physical processes regulating nutrient cycling” (43) and closing the energy cycle of the 
food system. This is a key component of transcending the ecological rift, which disrupted 
the soil nutrient and carbon cycle by separating “humans, livestock, and crops,” 
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generating the enormous wastes of fossil-fuel dependence in agricultural systems, 
through the now globalized spatial divide between town and country (43). With Cuba’s 
efforts in the countryside and cities Cuba has made great strides towards food security, 
food sovereignty, and a more sustainable social metabolism (Clausen 2007; Haranandani 
2010; Koont 2011).10 While today Cuba is still more dependent on food imports than it 
would like, it “may be the world's largest working model of a semi-sustainable 
agriculture, one that doesn't rely nearly as heavily as the rest of the world does on oil, on 
chemicals, on shipping vast quantities of food back and forth” (McKibben 2005). 
 Scholars trace Cuba’s ability to undergo such transformations in a time of crisis to 
“roots in a complex history of colonial science, anti-imperialism, the emergence of a self-
conscious community of ecologists, and the transformations of Cuban society since 
1959” (Lewontin and Levins 2007, 343). Moreover, social scientists (e.g. Rosset 2000; 
Koont 2011) recognize that this makes the Cuban response to crisis unfortunately unique 
in the world today:  
In policy debates worldwide, economic development and 
environmental protection are often pitted against each other 
and miscast as incompatible goals; it is particularly rare for 
governments anywhere to propose, adopt, or enforce 
                                                
10 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (1996), “food security 
exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”  Food sovereignty 
means: 
The right of each people to define their own policies concerning 
agriculture, to protect and regulate their national agricultural production 
and markets with the aim of sustainable development, to decide to what 
extent they want to be self-sufficient in food, and to prevent their 
domestic markets from being inundated with subsidized products from 
other countries.  The emphasis is on local, ecologically sustainable 
production of culturally appropriate, wholesome, and nutritive foods.  
Thus conceived, food sovereignty incorporates the concept of food 
security (adequate food supplies to meet the population’s needs) and 
even overlaps with national security. (Koont 2011, 187) 
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stricter environmental requirements during a time of 
economic crisis. (Whittle and Rey Santos 2006, 77) 
 
This is not to say Cuba’s response to the twin crises of the blockade and collapse of trade 
has been perfect, or there are no contradictions or challenges. While in Cuba, I never met 
one Cuban that made this claim, or who saw the current state of affairs as satisfactory. 
But Cuba is unique and provides lessons for the entire world that now is experiencing 
global economic and ecological crises and being told that we cannot afford to deal with 
either in humane or ecological terms.  
 Along with ecologically oriented reforms that occurred in Cuba during the special 
period, economic reforms were passed to spur the economy. These did not bring equally 
distributed benefits. Like crises everywhere, the special period really put Cuba to the test 
and the country survived, though not unscathed. While there were enormous 
environmental benefits to imposed energy scarcity and agrarian reform, contradictions 
remaining in the revolution were brought to the surface, especially remaining social 
inequalities, external dependence, and an unsustainable development model.  
 The previous gains of the revolution were the necessary groundwork for survival 
and solidarity during Cuba’s experience with peak oil. This is an important lesson, but it 
is also an important lesson that a consequence peak oil in Cuba was growing inequality, 
which in some instances has been exacerbated by reforms. Moreover, two acts by the 
U.S. congress, in 1992 and 1996, stiffened the embargo, making it nearly impossible for 
Cuba to receive food aid, medicine, and other necessities. This further challenged Cuba’s 
survival of peak oil, especially in social terms.  
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 In the 1990s social inequalities based on gender, race, and class, widened. In 
1953, Cuba’s Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, was .56.11 By 1986 it had 
decreased to .22 (with 0 indicating a completely egalitarian society). But between 1996-
1998, the coefficient increased to .38, though Cuba was still ranked lowest in Latin 
America (Argüelles 2010, 114). Before the 1990s, poverty was believed eradicated. But 
commencing with the Soviet collapse in 1991 “the issue of poverty has reemerged” 
(IAEA 2008, 53). While poverty is different in Cuba than that found in other countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 20% of the Cuban population was considered “at risk,” 
without sufficient access to food and necessities still in 1999. “A major share of this 
population also had no access to electricity and used non-commercial energy to meet 
their minimum energy requirements” (53). This is in spite of the economic recovery that 
began in the late 1990s and the increase in available energy resources. 
 Just as there are persistent debates over energy policy in Cuba, socioeconomic 
reforms are also contested. For policy-makers, liberalization of the economy has been the 
key to overcoming the crisis that started in the 1990s. During the special period Cuba 
opened up the economy to foreign tourism, allowed circulation of the dollar, and 
instituted a dual currency system. Additional market mechanisms, such as legalizing 
small private businesses, were also established. Many of the reforms that began in the 
special period, and the crisis itself, which is dramatically shaped by the U.S. blockade, 
have led to a stratified Cuba.   
                                                
11 “The Gini coefficient is an indicator employed traditionally to measure income inequality for a group of 
people. It ranges from zero (reflecting perfect equality in which everyone has the same income) and one (a 
value that describes the extreme hypothetical case in which just one person possesses all the income). In 
other words, the higher the Gini value, the greater the prevailing income inequality…The Gini index is the 
same Gini coefficient but expressed as a percentage” (UNDP 2010). 
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 Increased inequalities in Cuba fall along lines of race and gender, as well as class. 
For example, Afro-Cubans are most likely to occupy dilapidated housing. The Ethnology 
Department at the Anthropology Center in the Cuban Ministry of Science, Technology, 
and the Environment found that present day racial inequalities in Cuba manifest 
themselves through remnants of historical structures and interpersonal discrimination. In 
urban areas, blacks and multiracial Cubans inhabit the more depressed neighborhoods 
while white Cubans inhabit the more desirable residential neighborhoods (Prieto and 
Ruiz 2010). In one case, the Carraguao neighborhood of Havana, 50% of tenement 
residents are black or multiracial and live in poor quality dwellings. This suggests that 
people of color disproportionately experience class-based economic difficulty and worse 
living conditions (165).  
 The legalization of small businesses during the special period operated out of 
houses, like paladares (restaurants) and casas particulares (bed and breakfasts), was one 
reform that spurred the economy, but exacerbated inequality as a result of the differential 
access to housing. The possibility of earning income through opening a small business is 
restricted by the kind of housing you have and what that makes possible. Other changes 
have had a similar effect, such as allowing remittances from Cubans’ U.S. relatives. 
Because it was mostly white, upper and middle class Cubans that went to the U.S. after 
the revolution, it is mostly white Cubans that receive remittances from U.S. relatives. 
Eighty-five percent of Cuban-Americans identify as white (United States Census 2011). 
These remittances made a big difference in how well families survived the economic 
crisis and today generate major inequalities in lifestyles, including energy use. 
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 In addition, persistent discrimination means a smaller proportion of black and 
multiracial Cubans work in the emerging tourist sector, one of the biggest reasons for 
increased energy demand in Cuba today, and other sectors associated with foreign 
investment. These are two of the only ways, aside from remittances, for Cubans to earn 
convertible pesos, or more significant wages (Argüelles 2010; Bell 2011). Cuban pesos, 
or moneda nacional, which is the main wage currency, are worth much less than the 
convertible pesos that tourists receive in exchange for their national currency. Tourist 
sector employees can receive tips of up to $3 a day, which is significant when factoring 
in that the average Cuban wage is under $20 a month.  Thus, people of color have more 
limited access to some of the most lucrative employment on the island, in one of the most 
energy-intensive sectors.  
 While Cuba still is not racially segregated in the ways with which we are familiar 
in most countries in the world, it is difficult to see how the racial divide in Cuba will not 
deepen unless major strategies are adopted that mitigate the effects of reforms initiated 
during the crisis of the 1990s. The tourist sector is so segregated, that even tourists with 
darker skin have been stopped when they were mistaken for Afro-Cubans. No Cubans are 
allowed on the beautiful grounds and beaches of resorts and hotels unless they can afford 
to pay a fee at the hotels that offer admission to Cubans, or they are the pre-approved 
guest of a tourist or a prostitute. One person with whom I spoke said the way to 
understand the difference between racism in Cuba and the United States is that in Cuba 
darker skin means you get asked more often for your papers, but it doesn’t get you shot.  
 The special period also affected women’s post-revolutionary gains. “A number of 
experts from the FMC’s Women’s Studies Center indicate that women are the ones who 
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have been hardest hit by the difficulties of daily life in the Special Period” (Pagés 2008, 
313). For working women, the double-shift persisting after the revolution became a 
deeper burden during this time. While more women went to work in the 1990s out of 
necessity, many women gave up jobs they preferred or retired early. This was because of 
increased domestic demands and the loss of jobs associated with the economic 
depression. Women were more likely than men to take on the responsibilities of standing 
in line for hours to buy available household necessities, deal with shortages, improvise 
meals, and care for children, the elderly, and the disabled (Vigil 2008, 310). Energy 
shortages exacerbated structural problems after the economic collapse and led to the loss 
of adequate transportation. Many women had to move to jobs closer to home to avoid 
spending time away from domestic duties by riding a bike to work long distances, etc. 
Services that alleviate women’s domestic burdens, like daycare, also were cutback during 
the special period (Pagés 2008). With the rise of tourism and general economic 
depression, Cuba saw the return of Jineterismo (prostitution), the near eradication of 
which had been a symbol of Cuba’s revolutionary emancipation (Pagés 2008).   
 These factors contributed to the costs of the energy and economic crisis being 
borne unequally. Energy injustices therefore increased. As mentioned above, those living 
in the worst poverty in Cuba were also without energy resources. Because energy is a 
way to extend human labor, the scarcity of energy resources implies greater reliance on 
human labor and beasts of burden. And because Cuba was not prepared for the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in advance, shortages and new difficulties in daily life were 
introduced. This disproportionately affected women, especially at the household level. 
Women took on much of the extra labor required to ensure household survival. Also 
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Afro-Cubans suffered disproportionately as a result of the increasing deterioration of 
housing and neighborhood infrastructure during the 1990s because they already lived in 
the housing projects in most need of renovation or replacement. Reforms that took place 
to try and alleviate the crisis also introduced inequalities. The sectors of the economy that 
were given priority for energy resources, such as tourism, benefitted the economy at large 
as a result of the state capture of revenues. However, inequalities also increased as a 
result of employment discrimination in these sectors, meaning not everyone benefitted 
the same way from the re-orientation of resources to new sectors.  
 Raising these points brings out contradictions, in terms of energy justice, of the 
second energy revolution. While inequalities grew, environmental gains made during this 
period are indisputable, and the transformation of agriculture helped Cuba maintain their 
safety net. Cuba avoided losing many major social achievements by focusing intently on 
maintaining a basic safety net to the extent possible, even in the midst of severe 
shortages. The government committed increasing resources to social services and even 
increased wages in this sector. Cubans worked together to make changes, as in the case of 
agricultural reform, and the survival of the social fabric during this period is remarkable. 
This could never happen during such an energy crisis in a capitalist country where 
civilian government spending is generally held down (even capped as a percentage of 
GDP in the U.S. case) as a result of the resistant oligarchy (Baran and Sweezy 1966, 175; 
Foster, Holleman, and McChesney 2008, note 11; Foster and McChesney 2009). Cuba’s 
efforts during the special period thus represent the strengths of the revolution and also 
remaining areas of challenge that constrain the achievement of full equality, and thus 
energy justice, in Cuba.  
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The third energy revolution, the prospects according to Cubans 
 This section primarily reports the results of interviews conducted in Cuba with 
two energy scientists, one of whom works on renewable energy and conservation, and is 
also a writer/journalist covering energy issues in Cuba for a popular audience. His writing 
is part of his engagement with environmental education. Another is a physicist that has 
worked mainly on conventional energy developments but now is focused on solar. I 
interviewed another man involved in environmental education, especially teaching 
permaculture methods to children and adults throughout the country. One of the women 
that I interviewed was involved in planning and administration, including the 
implementation of environmental programs, especially in Havana. I also interviewed a 
woman working in the ministry of trade.   
 This section builds on the scholarship of others, as did the previous sections, and 
participant observation in Cuba. The questions I asked my interviewees revolved around 
what recent changes in the economy and the energy sector mean in terms of Cuba’s 
energy future. I also asked how these would impact Cuba’s environmental gains and the 
levels of social inequality in the country. The interviews were only semi-structured and 
went into other subjects about environmental education, social philosophy in science, the 
U.S. blockade, the future of Cuba’s international relations, the global economic crisis and 
Cuba, the aging of the revolution and Cuba’s infrastructure, what Fidel Castro’s death 
might mean, political reform in the country, and views on neoliberal reforms in other 
parts of the world. Here I focus on the elements of the interviews most relevant for 
explaining Cuba’s third energy revolution and the implications for understanding energy 
justice in the present period.  
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Political economic change and development needs: Limited liberalization and aging 
infrastructure  
 In the latter half of the 1990s Cuba’s economy improved with the foreign 
exchange generated by tourism, as well as other sectors opened to foreign investment, 
and as a result of Cuba’s internal development, especially in the area of services. Energy 
consumption grew with the resuscitation of the economy. In 1999 Hugo Chávez was 
elected in Venezuela and formed an alliance with Cuba, leading soon after to the import, 
once again, of oil resources from South America, but this time in exchange for Cuban 
services, especially doctors. This started to transform the country. I asked the 
interviewees what they saw as the most important changes and what they mean for their 
work and for the society and their environmental programs. The permaculturalist I spent 
time with described the basic transition in the economy in the past fifteen years, how 
Cuba initiated sustainability programs, and how now there is a re-opening of the 
economy and greater options for import:  
Before the 1990s we had several business agreements with 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc then we didn’t have 
that and there was a period when we had more closed 
sectors and all of these beautiful processes of sustainability 
were started. Then there was this period when we started to 
receive some goods from Venezuela in exchange for 
ALBA, in exchange for doctors, things like that. [These] 
allow the country to even bring some imports and things. 
And even now this creates our stuff from China and some 
other places but you know sooner or later you have to pay 
for it, all of these things…so the situation is like high prices 
for food and high prices for different things in the market.  
 
This interviewee saw one the biggest changes in the economy to be the proliferation of 
small businesses and the new foreign partnerships. However, in the short-term he 
believes these have slowed down because of the global financial crisis:  
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There are some agreements with other countries, but the 
“lineamientos económicos”…the economic guidelines are 
trying to open more [of] the economy but I don’t think in 
the short term there will be a lot of investment or 
privatization or opening the country to that…I may be 
wrong but in the short term I don’t think that is going to 
change. 
 
Two major sectors of the economy that are open include the tourist sector and oil, where 
Spanish companies like Petrobras and Repsol have made investments. However, this 
interviewee sees the most significant change as the increase in the amount of self-
employment: “In my opinion, the biggest changes are not addressed more toward foreign 
investment, but to trying to explore more our national industries and the real intention is 
self-employment and little business in the country.” He went on to say, “I know that there 
are plans…” and he waved his hands wide in the air to illustrate how big the 
government’s plans are, but said “honestly, in a time of crisis, I don’t expect a lot of 
foreign investment.” (He was referring to the global economic crisis, which has slowed 
down the development of joint ventures in the economy.)  
 The woman I spoke with in the ministry of trade was more focused on foreign 
direct investment. Of course, this is her area of work. She identified the current economic 
development priorities as: (1) increasing luxury tourism by building better resorts and 
golf courses, (2) further development of ecotourism, (3) medical tourism, (4) nickel-
mining, (5) the export and internal use of recently discovered oil reserves, (6) explore 
potential for nuclear energy development, (7) the pharmaceutical and biotech industry, 
and services, including Cuba’s renowned medical teams, sports advisors, environmental 
experts, etc. She did say that “we don’t want to develop at any cost,” but that Cuba had 
too many unmet needs internally and there is pressure to improve the economy. Within 
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the tourist sector, while ecotourism has been the sector that gets the most attention, it 
doesn’t generate enough money. She said that “everyone that comes to Cuba now loves 
Cuba, loves the environment, but doesn’t have any money.” So, building golf courses, 
and so forth are meant to attract bigger spenders. She said “with low wages for twenty 
years, Cubans want more income, they want life to be easier.” Even the most committed 
in the country are ready for changes because the old model is unsustainable. Cuba and 
North Korea are the last command economies in the world and it isn’t working. Cuba 
does not want to be like the United States, but they do want change. The sectors listed 
above are seen as having some of the greatest economic potential for generating foreign 
exchange and employment. The Cuban government always retains at least a 51% or 
greater ownership in any joint venture. A journalist I met, who is not one of the 
interviewees listed here, said that the story of Cuba is not the command economy 
working well because there have been a lot of problems with that. The story is that it is an 
independent country, free from the U.S. in spite of the embargo, as well as all other 
foreign powers. This freedom has made all successes possible.   
 Immediate development needs identified by a woman I interviewed who worked 
in urban planning, with an environmental focus, were related to outdated, inefficient 
infrastructure.  She said one of the main challenges is that the revolution is now over fifty 
years old, and years of economic crisis have left infrastructure and housing in bad shape. 
She said that Havana ranks low in terms of livability amongst other cities of its size. 
Every day at least three houses collapse. Eighty percent of the city was built before 1958. 
Losses in water supply of around fifty percent increase energy demands in this sector. 
Energy waste occurs through losses that result from outdated technology and the need to 
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replace parts of the grid. There are also still people without access to electricity, or with 
insufficient access.  There needs to be a lot of restoration at the community level of 
buildings, schools, parks, hospitals, everything.  
 One of the biggest debates in Cuba today, which has arisen especially as a result 
of the inequalities that were discussed earlier as having been exacerbated during the 
special period, is the debate over the future character of the social safety net. One 
interviewee, the permaculturalist explains this debate here:  
Without any doubt, there will be a change of what Cuba has 
now and that is a debate in the society you know. For 
example, Cuba was very based on egalitarian thinking, 
everyone has there ration card. Right now there are more 
arguments about if it is better to subsidize people, not 
everybody but…you can see, for example, the person that 
plays in a salsa band, goes to Europe twice a year and 
makes a lot of money and he has a ration card. It doesn’t 
make too much sense.  
 
So there are some debates in the society about preserving 
equity, [which] is not the same as égalité. Equity in my 
opinion is more opportunities, more access and you can get 
something if you really need it and égalité is like everybody 
is the same but everybody is not the same…it is a debate in 
the society there are some people that are more old-
fashioned- they say that even during the worst part of the 
special period all of those what we call the conquers of the 
revolution education, health and some other things stayed 
the same at great cost you know financially and…it is a 
discussion in the society.  
 
In a country where equality regularly polls as one of the highest values, these kinds of 
debates permeate discussions of energy policy as well.  
Conventional energy, the environment, and society 
 The political economic changes Cuba is experiencing are related to the 
developments in the energy sector. Many policy-makers see the deep-water drilling and 
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the development of nuclear as potentially the only options for lifting the Cuban economy. 
However, as the woman in trade said, there are environmental concerns and there is 
debate over the potential costs. At the major environmental conference I attended, the 
director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Denis Flory, was invited to speak as 
an obvious attempt to convince the environmentalists present that nuclear was a good 
idea. His speech was out of place among the other talks that day in the main auditorium. 
However, it sent a clear signal that policy-makers are promoting nuclear. All of my 
interviewees, on the other hand, saw nuclear as a bad idea and premature, given oil 
developments might already make Cuba a net exporter.   
 Everyone that I interviewed thought that some energy development would be 
good for the country. Cuba is faced with an aging infrastructure that one interviewee 
discussed as reaching crisis proportions in terms of housing and water and electricity 
distribution. They also were concerned that life be easier for Cubans in terms of 
transportation, health and education facilities, etc. Therefore, no one I interviewed was 
against fossil fuels per se. In social terms, everyone I interviewed was concerned that 
social needs be the priority of energy development. As the woman working trade said, 
“oil is primarily for export, rather than to use much more energy at home, the money will 
go to address the needs of the people.” The permaculturalist with whom I spoke 
discussed this in a similar way. He said that just because there will be more energy “we 
are not spending energy like drunken [sailors]…Energy developments, like oil, are more 
central government projects so the profits should become part of the government finances 
and distributed equally, to the extent this happens…(shrugs)?”  This environmentalist 
identified one of the main struggles regarding this development for activists will be to 
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implement stronger legislation that requires a portion of the oil revenues to go toward 
projects geared to reduce Cuba’s dependence on fossil fuel. He said, “it will be desirable 
to take some of the inputs of the money from the energy and [make it]… law [that it] 
should be used for renewable energies, that is something which we will fight for in the 
future…this is something that needs to be the law, no?”  
 The urban planner noted that most Cubans aren’t major oil consumers. However, 
in Havana there has been a major influx of fancy new cars bought with remittances by 
wealthy Cubans and for use by tourists. She said, “for the first time, Cuba has smog.” 
This diverts resources toward road development and brings new air pollution related 
illnesses. The cars and smog in Havana for one interviewee were symbolic excesses that 
indicated the country was at a crossroads. This planner saw too much accommodation to 
tourists and those with money. Fuel is too expensive for most Cubans: according to the 
permaculturalist “one dollar twenty cents a liter for diesel, this is very expensive, 
especially for Cubans.”  
 In environmental terms, no one I interviewed saw fossil fuel development in Cuba 
as having much impact on global warming, because they consider any potential 
development as sure to be insignificant in global terms. Both the woman in trade and the 
permaculturalist emphasized Cuba’s carbon footprint is less than “zero point zero, zero, 
zero.” I think in fact (I heard at the conference), that Cuba emits .09% of world 
emissions. They are concerned about global warming, but feel they are limited in their 
contribution to solutions given they are not major polluters, nor do they expect to be. 
Thus, their environmental concerns about oil developments were focused in other areas.  
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 Cubans remember the economic and ecological catastrophe of previous oil spills 
off Cuba’s shores and are concerned about the possibility of offshore spills undermining 
decades of work to keep Cuba’s mangrove forests intact and the tourist industry. This 
seems to be the biggest concern regarding oil. I attended a small meeting that included a 
presentation by the top official in the Ministry of Science, Technology and the 
Environment. She said that when the BP spill happened she had to check her blood 
pressure twice a day. However, she maintained the importance of oil developments and 
emphasized the embargo and how there are few options to overcome the strangulation of 
such economic policies of the U.S. In terms of criticism of Cuba for this, she said that in 
the U.S. “it is important to take your own advice before giving it to everyone else.” She 
was referring to the comments she has received from people from the U.S. at 
conferences. 
 The scientists I spoke with who are involved in conservation see Cuba’s having 
the greatest area of intact mangrove forests and healthy coral reefs in the Caribbean as a 
major, but fragile, achievement. As once scientists said, “a disaster like BP in Cuba 
would be much worse” because of the size of the country, the lack of resources to handle 
such a crisis, the ecosystem loss, and the economic dependence on the coasts. This 
scientist explained how oil coats the roots of mangrove trees and actually suffocates 
them, and how dangerous this is in a hurricane prone nation because mangroves help 
protect the island in case of such extreme weather. These potential problems are 
exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. and Cuba have not formed any agreements about 
how to handle crises and have still had insufficient scientific exchange. So, Cubans worry 
about cooperation in event of a disaster in Cuban or U.S. waters.  
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 Every person I interviewed was very concerned about nuclear development and 
saw it as a completely bad idea. Two of the interviewees had some education in the 
Soviet Union and remember well the experience of Chernobyl. One scientist just shook 
their head at the thought of nuclear in Cuba. This interviewee sees nuclear “as the biggest 
mistake of policymakers with energy today.” Another interviewee saw the development 
of nuclear as a capitulation to an energy-intensive, consumption-oriented life style. One 
fear expressed in this interview was that nuclear represents the undermining of the values 
of the Cuban revolution, where achievement was defined in terms of education and 
culture, rather than consumption. He said, “it is not worth it.” All of the interviewees 
discussed the fact that Cuba is an island nation and that in the face of disaster, as the 
physicist I interviewed said, “there is no where to go.” The interviewees also see nuclear 
as further centralization, rather than decentralization of the energy grid and consider this 
a major problem. Every interviewee talked about the importance of decentralization to 
increase efficiency and energy conservation, reduce environmental impact, and increase 
security in case one power plant is damaged by hurricane or attack. “All it takes is one” 
natural or manmade to cause radical damage if a nuclear installment is affected, 
emphasized the physicist.   
 Some energy scientists refer to the availability of energy again after the Soviet 
collapse as the “third stage” in Cuba’s energy development since the revolution, 
consisting of better energy programs and planning and increased development of internal 
energy resources (IAEA 2008). However, one of my interviewees referred to the early 
2000s—when renewable energy projects picked up and there was increasing emphasis on 
conservation and efficiency not just as necessary (as in the special period) but as 
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ecological achievements—as the third energy revolution in Cuba. This energy revolution 
is seen as currently underway, competing in some ways with more conventional energy 
development, and part of Cuba’s broader environmental movement.  
The third energy revolution 
 Drawing from all of my interviews, I identified the following four themes as 
recurrent descriptions of what one scientist called the necessary third Cuban energy 
revolution: (1) conservation of energy, which Fidel likened to finding a great oil deposit; 
(2) energy efficiency, which in Cuba means something very different than in the U.S. 
since it is not geared toward profit; (3) anti-consumerist cultural change; and (4) the 
development of renewables, especially wind and solar. Many reforms in these directions 
were made early in the revolution. Some were the result of the special period. In the late 
1990s, for example, the Cuban government introduced more efficiency programs 
affecting industry and households, promoted bicycle use, and increased the use of 
bagasse from sugarcane for fuel oil. Solar and wind energy developments have also 
increased.  
 Environmentalists find themselves challenging two common views amongst 
policy-makers in Cuba. They are promoting appropriate technology and alternative 
energy that it is considered by some passé, simply an experiment, the need for which is 
obviated by renewed conventional energy availability, and they struggle to overcome the 
perception that it is too expensive, or that you can only work on these issues by going 
big, with the most expensive technology. As the permaculturalist put it, “the conventional 
approach to renewable energy is that you need very expensive wind turbines…there are 
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lot of gadgets on the market, solar panels, things like that cost a lot of money” but he 
emphasized other options that work.  
 The two Cuban energy scientists, the planner, and the permaculturalist all 
emphasized that small, localized, low-tech solutions joined with more high-tech solutions 
when possible (like wind turbines and bigger solar installments), can solve a lot of 
problems faster than big centralized projects, using less energy, and saving money.  The 
planner said that it is a matter of convincing  “office revolutionaries” that Cuba’s 
successes with smaller scale, more sustainable solutions should “no longer be seen as an 
experiment. It is now an experience.” She pointed out successes like the installation of 
solar water heaters, the replacement of inefficient lighting and appliances, and the 
educational campaigns as having saved Cuba a lot of energy with relatively little expense 
or inconvenience. The permaculturalist also emphasized that,  
there has been a lot of decentralized, for example, micro-
hydro, I’m not talking like a hydro-electric dam, that 
doesn’t make sense in times of climate change..[there are] 
things that can be made by hand, it is established science 
and appropriate technology but people they don’t consider 
it, when they think when they think of renewables they 
think hybrids, electric cars and things like that.  
 
Cubans are also “trying to expand more in wind energy…there are couple of installations 
to use tides and currents...there are some experiences also with temperature gradients in 
the ocean” (permaculturalist). However, the distribution of solar water heaters and the use 
of animal traction in agriculture are low-tech alternatives to dependence on conventional 
energy in households and the food system and expensive renewable technology. 
 One energy scientist asked me what energy source I thought they had in greatest 
abundance. Before I could suggest anything he said “el sol,” the sun. It is everywhere and 
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he noted evenly distributed in Cuba throughout the year and geographically. There has 
also already been success with solar, especially in electrifying rural areas. So, there is 
hope in developing more in this area, though this requires resources. With the solar 
projects in particular, you really hear the united social and ecological commitments of 
these scientists and environmental activists. Discussing the role of renewable energy in 
environmental change, the permaculturalist said (echoing the two energy scientists I 
spoke with earlier)  
The other part that…for me [matters most] is that there are 
100,00 houses in Cuba without electricity because they are 
so isolated that it doesn’t make any sense to put them on 
the grid because 1 km of the grid is $6,000, and then it 
would be very vulnerable to rain, [other weather] and 
things like that” “the idea is to power those houses through 
renewable energies” the family doctor clinics, video rooms 
(structures with t.v., a refrigerator for the community to 
share ) , and schools already have power in these 
communities. Now, when people express the desire for 
more energy, they ask for solar panels, not electricity.” 
 
The physicist pointed out that in Cuba, the expenses associated with implementing 
projects is much lower than other countries because the scientists and enginneers are state 
employees, “and this our routine work” he said. Because of the Cuban education system, 
there is also a high level of technical skill in the country, meaning that if alternative 
energy developments were emphasized more, Cuba could be a leader in innovations in 
this regard.  
  The main external limit placed on further developments of solar and other 
renewable projects that require more equipment and so forth is the blockade. “The 
blockade makes it very difficult” as one of the energy scientists said. The 
permaculturalist gave the following example of the limitations imposed: “the generator of 
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the wind turbine, 95% of it is made in the U.S., we cannot import it or use it, things like 
that. Those constraints are very clear. Nevertheless, he sees “that for a country like Cuba, 
[there are] a lot of very promising things: biomass, you know from bagasse, is very 
promising…and when I say biomass, you know I am not saying ‘biofuel’ or things like.” 
The energy scientist who is also a journalist wrote especially about the need for more 
education programs for Cubans on energy. He wanted to see people “think in energy” to 
prevent waste and include the communities in innovations given that they know their 
habits and needs better than anyone.  
The future of the third energy revolution 
 For the people I interviewed, the extent to which environmental reforms will take 
priority in the future is unclear as is the extent to which these will be offset by 
environmentally destructive economic reforms and the development of conventional 
energy. It is clear that environmentalists in Cuba are committed to keeping up their work, 
emphasizing social justice and ecology in the policies and practices they promote. They 
do have support in Cuba, relative to other countries.  The government emphasizes 
environmental achievements and continues to support them through the legal structure 
and materially, even if the influence of environmentalists in policy-making is not as 
strong as they would like.  
 The focus on education and collaboration is recurrent in my interview notes. 
These are in fact seen as the greatest hope for a more sustainable future. One interviewee 
emphasized that with all of the environmental knowledge developing around the world, 
and with the urgent environmental and social crises we face, sharing information and 
working together to develop new projects should be the first priority of international 
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relations. Interviewees understand the barriers to such cooperation represented by the 
United States. As one energy scientist put it, “the only two things Cuba and the United 
States have in common” in terms of international relations “is that they both send troops 
around the world and are fighting terrorism.” The difference ends there, as Cuba sends 
doctors rather than soldiers and the terrorist threat facing Cuba always emanates from the 
United States. All Cubans, including those people I interviewed, emphasized 
international cooperation must be on equal terms and this can never occur so long as the 
U.S. has domination as its goal. They also emphasized the ways in which the U.S. 
embargo distorts energy and environmental policy in Cuba, making it unclear what would 
be possible if the embargo were lifted. The discovery of oil led to one minister I heard 
speak say that she was very curious how transnationals would respond when the first oil 
gush appears in Cuba. In the U.S., indeed, business reports have already expressed 
enthusiasm over the fact that Cuba could come to resemble Ecuador or Colombia in terms 
of its energy exports (Piñon and Benjamin-Alvarado 2010, 21-22).  
 Socially, as mentioned before, the Cubans I interviewed see the introduction of 
inequalities within the country, and the gradual development of what we call conspicuous 
consumption (amongst tourists and wealthier Cubans), as eroding social solidarity and 
creating more pressure for energy-intensive development. Inequality coupled with the 
crisis of an aging leadership, which one interviewee saw as representing the failure to 
bring younger people into the revolution and the paternalism of the dominant political 
party, has made policymakers more desperate to bring prosperity to a somewhat 
disaffected population. 
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 In the face of these policy priorities, the environmentalists with whom I spoke 
saw their task as continuing to work toward convincing policy-makers that ecological 
reforms are necessary for the long-term health of the society rather than temporary 
measures to deal with the crisis or boutique, showcase experiments. They also work 
toward social provisioning in energy policy, understanding that the inequalities in Cuba 
today are not sustainable. Environmentalists clearly put a lot of effort toward educating 
their own populations and building bridges with environmentalists abroad. In sum they 
were optimistic that Cuba will not abandon what it has learned, though more lessons may 
be required.  
Cuba’s energy justice lessons  
 One of the clearest lessons of the first energy revolution in Cuba is that when the 
economy is re-oriented toward meeting human needs, it is possible to accomplish much 
more, with much less energy use per capita. Even when energy resources were more 
readily available, Cuba still managed to develop on a smaller per capita energy budget 
than other countries. Cuba’s experience in the first thirty years of the revolution show 
that great strides can be made toward overcoming historical burdens of oppression and 
inequality without the same level of ecological degradation and GDP found in other 
countries with far fewer achievements in human development. 
 A related lesson of this period is the necessity of Cuba’s assertion of sovereignty 
and the ongoing need to struggle against imperialism if there is any hope of meaningful 
ecological and social change. Cuba is one of the only modern countries in the world to 
completely extricate Big Oil. As explained in this dissertation, the re-orientation of the 
Cuban economy could not have been possible if Standard Oil, Esso, and Texaco had their 
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way. The case of Ecuador, explored in the previous chapter, tragically illustrates this 
point. By significantly overcoming internal inequalities and throwing off imperialist 
exploitation Cuba went a long way toward healing the social rift of the pre-socialist era. 
 The lessons of the second energy revolution are well studied in the environmental 
literature. In the face of Cuba’s own version of peak oil, Cuba’s response teaches us that 
we do not have to fall apart in the face of climate change, settle for risk avoidance rather 
than social change, or simply document our destruction of the planet and social inequality 
in ever more exquisite scientific detail. As analysts and activists have noted, Cuba 
represents an alternative model of how to handle crises, which will confront us all, even 
if they develop more gradually than did Cuba’s. As Bill McKibben wrote, echoing the 
insight of many others: 
There's always at least the possibility, however, that larger 
sections of the world might be in for “Special Periods” of 
their own. Climate change, or the end of cheap oil, or the 
depletion of irrigation water, or the chaos of really 
widespread terrorism, or some other malign force might 
begin to make us pay more attention to the absolute 
bottom-line question of how we get our dinner (a question 
that only a very few people, for a very short period of time, 
have ever been able to ignore). No one's predicting a 
collapse like the one Cuba endured—probably no modern 
economy has ever undergone such a shock. But if things 
got gradually harder? After all, our planet is an island, too. 
It's somehow useful to know that someone has already run 
the experiment. (McKibben 2005) 
 
McKibben wrote these words before the financial crisis hit in 2007, when things became 
immediately harder, rather than gradually.  
 Throughout the capitalist world austerity measures are proposed to deal with the 
financial crisis, while bank executives are given “golden parachutes” (Foster and 
Magdoff 2008), and we are told that economic crises preclude the possibility of 
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addressing environmental crises like climate change. During Cuba’s energy and 
economic crisis social spending increased and the energy resources they had were 
devoted to solving social problems and maintaining the social safety net. The entire food 
system was transformed according to agroecological principles to support these efforts. In 
this way, Cuba illustrated to the world that it could not be beat in a time of crisis, but 
could actually move the revolution forward in a significant way, working to overcome the 
ecological rift of the previous energy regime.  
 Another lesson from this period is that the social solidarity engendered during the 
first thirty years of the revolution as a result of strides toward equality and the significant 
gains in social provisioning and human development, made possible the best outcomes of 
the special period. What would happen in the United States if such an energy crisis 
occurred? We are nowhere near to developing the social consciousness or the economic 
or ecological priorities that helped Cuba survive in the 1990s. Who would suffer most? 
All social scientists have to do is look at the current crisis and ask who bears the burdens. 
A crisis like Cuba’s would have frightening and dramatic results in a country like the 
U.S. because we are not ready for it, in spite of, or because of our riches.  
 A final lesson from both the second and third periods of energy revolution in 
Cuba is that to the extent to which revolution is incomplete, contradictions emerge during 
times of crisis. Gender, race, and class inequalities increased during the special period, 
even if they were not as deep or did not have the same consequences as inequality in 
other societies. In a country where equality consistently polls as one of the highest values, 
these growing inequalities have presented political challenges, among others, for Cuba 
today. As discussed in the previous sections, these inequalities have implications for the 
 173 
ongoing revolutionary social and ecological projects started in Cuba. Energy injustices 
have arisen both in terms of who paid the highest costs of the energy crisis and who 
benefits most from increased energy availability.  
 One of the greatest hopes in Cuba today remains the persistence of the 
revolutionary ideals and the commitment of so many people in the country to what I call 
here, healing the ecological and social rift. Amongst energy scientists and other 
environmentalists this is reflected in the obvious commitment to what I outline in this 
thesis as energy justice. In their work, the goals of social equality, human development 
and ecological change are intertwined. They are committed to social and ecological 
provisioning and reproduction as the highest priority. It has been because of this 
orientation of values and practices in Cuba that the achievements for which they are most 
famous have been possible.  
 As social scientists in the U.S., Cuba’s example, lived in a very real way, begs the 
questions: What are our commitments? And what does this mean regarding the ends to 
which our work is put? We are in the middle of an energy crisis, which is perhaps most 
terribly represented by the wars in the Middle East and climate change. As social 
scientists we need to help define the energy crisis today in energy justice terms and make 
it politically unfeasible for those in power to continue destructive policies and claim that 
“there is no alternative” in times of crisis. Theoretical tools for such a redefinition are 
presented throughout this dissertation. The lessons from Cuba show that the struggle for 
energy justice is not utopian in times of crisis, it is necessary.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE ENERGY JUSTICE REVOLUTION  
 
 Today the dominant perspective on energy in the United States defines energy 
crises as crises of supply to fuel economic growth. According to this perspective the main 
challenges are the geopolitical control of resources and the need for investment in 
technological development to increase the diversity of energy sources available to the 
market. When questions of the environment or social inequality are raised, technology, 
increased efficiency, and keeping supply high to maintain low energy prices are the 
chosen answers. The dominance of this view is represented in the popularity today of 
Daniel Yergin, a former business professor, and now “America’s most influential energy 
pundit” (Garner 2011). The New York Times review of his latest book said that “in the 
[last] two decades…Mr. Yergin, operating as a kind of one-man think tank, has had a 
virtual monopoly on the subject of energy and geopolitics.” Moreover, “such is his 
influence that one half expects his competitors to file antitrust litigation against him” 
(Garner 2011). The fact that a business perspective would be more popular than a view 
from the social or natural sciences is not surprising in the U.S. context, though the 
consequences are grim.  
 Yergin promotes optimism in the face of climate change because we are all 
historical witnesses to the “great revolution.” He defines this energy revolution as the 
development of “technology and finding technologies that provide answers. We have 
been doing that for two-and-a-half centuries. And I don’t see why we will stop” (Yergin 
2011a).  This faith in technology and efficiency keeps Yergin in “an optimistic frame of 
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mind” (Yergin 2011a). The global energy quest, the subject of his most recent bestselling 
book, is truly a quest for continued capital dominance and expansion of the energy supply 
to fulfill the destiny of the globalized free market (Yergin 2011b). It is a triumphant 
story, similar to his Pulitzer-winning book The Prize, of the United States securing 
energy resources around the globe through war, business, and political maneuvering. 
What this has meant for people or the environment in countries like Ecuador, Nigeria, or 
Iraq, are not even a question. Environmental problems, like climate change, will be 
handled via technology and efficiency gains. In Yergin’s view on the global energy 
scenario now and in the future, “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds” 
(Baran and Sweezy 1966, 1).  
 Yergin’s view of energy revolution, then, is the process of technological 
innovation that occurs in any case under capitalism. In other words—business as usual. 
The point of the energy revolution is provisioning for future economic growth. Yergin 
sits on the U.S. Department of Energy’s committee that reviews the environmental 
impact of energy developments, such as hydraulic fracturing (fracking) to extract gas and 
oil from shale rock deep underground.  He is also on the U.S. Secretary of Energy’s 
advisory board. Outside of these official responsibilities, he is the founder of an energy 
consulting agency. When asked about the environmental problems associated with 
fracking, Yergin replies that jobs will be created and the environmental issues will be 
managed, “and that means technology” (2011b). He sees the extraction of shale oil as the 
“biggest innovation probably in 30 years,” an energy “revolution” (Yergin 2011c). The 
environmental research is actually less optimistic that this is the kind of revolution we 
need: 
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Preliminary research from Duke University seemed to 
indicate that indeed methane was showing up in drinking 
water; in December, the EPA released its first thorough 
study, conducted in the Wyoming town of Pavilion, where 
residents had reported brown, undrinkable water after 
nearby fracking operations. The EPA concluded that the 
presence in the water of synthetic compounds such as 
glycol ethers and the assortment of “other organic 
components” were “the result of direct mixing of hydraulic 
fracking fluids with ground water,” and told local residents 
to stop drinking from their wells…the evidence from 
Pavilion was a powerful indictment of the industry, and it 
led several leading doctors to call for a moratorium on 
fracking pending more health research.  
 
A second concern has to do with the damage being done to 
rivers and streams—and the water supply for homes and 
industries—by the briny soup that pours out of the fracking 
wells in large volume. Most of the chemical-laced slick 
water injected down the well will stay belowground, but for 
every million gallons, 200,000 to 400,000 gallons will be 
regurgitated back to the surface, bringing with it…not only 
the chemicals it included in the first place, but traces of the 
oil-laced drilling mud, and all the other noxious stuff that 
was already trapped down there in the rock: iron and 
chromium, radium and salt—lots of salt. (McKibben 2012) 
 
These consequences of fracking and others have led James Hansen, the world’s foremost  
climate scientist, to refer to fracking, like mountaintop removal mining, and oil extraction 
from tar sands, as “extreme energy.”  
 Extreme energy represents the innovative response to, what for capitalism, is a 
supply-side and geopolitical energy crisis. Whether sociologists define the problem in 
this way, or whether they are less optimistic about environmental crises than Yergin, the 
focus in the sociological literature on energy remains stuck within the limited 
technological vision that Yergin represents. That technological change dominates the 
sociological literature on energy and climate change was demonstrated in Chapter One of 
this thesis. The absence of concern about economic growth or social equality was also 
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demonstrated. The argument of this thesis thus represents an attempt to broaden the 
theoretical basis of the critical sociology of energy, building on previous critical work 
and energy studies generally, widening the frame of analysis.  
 As the preceding chapters demonstrate, if looked at through a different lens, 
which brings into focus issues of social inequality within and between nations, and 
ecology, the energy regime of capital no longer appears a mere technological problem. It 
is a problem of social organization conditioned by the values and priorities, under 
capitalism, of accumulation. And that is the bottom line. Technological development 
might have a role to play in positive social and environmental change, but only if it is 
harnessed by a new social metabolic order with a fundamentally transformed energy 
regime based on the requirements of human and ecological reproduction. There would 
have to be a revolutionary shift in priorities for this to occur, such as what took place in 
Cuba, but even deeper and on a global scale, and a redistribution of power, technology, 
and resources, such as that called for by the ecological debt movement led by 
Ecuadorans. A new value system, such as that proposed by Odum, and has been called 
for by feminist ecologists, would replace prices in energy decision-making. Only under 
these circumstances will technology be part of a strategy toward broader socio-ecological 
change intended to heal the ecological and social rift of capitalism. This would be a real 
energy revolution, and should be one whose goal is the achievement of energy justice.  
Post-racial, gender-neutral, green capitalism?  
 The current denial in social science, and amongst energy pundits, of the deep 
social and ecological rift at the heart of capitalism, which is impossible to transcend 
within the system, is only the current manifestation of long history of putting a happy 
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face on a legal and global organized crime ring that will stop at nothing to make money. 
History has proven this shamelessness. An early observer of capitalist globalization 
wrote:  
Capital eschews no profit, or very small profit…With 
adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10 per cent 
will ensure its employment anywhere; 20 per cent will 
make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300 per cent, 
and there is not a crime at which it will scruple, not a risk it 
will not run, even to the chance of its owner being hanged. 
If turbulence and strife will bring a profit, it will freely 
encourage both. Smuggling and the slave-trade have amply 
proved all that is stated here. (T.J. Dunning quoted in Marx 
[1867] 1990, 926, note 15) 
 
As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an 
environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil 
spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing 
to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from 
cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological 
health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market 
significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t 
make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at 
large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is 
much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take 
out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered 
by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from 
one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the 
market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate 
crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. 
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This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain 
prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of 
profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to 
keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be 
their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what 
happens with the boom goes bust.  
 The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and 
even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the 
language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and 
imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. 
Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social 
science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of 
capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society 
(Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There 
can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among 
other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively 
promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present 
capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the 
globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, 
2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary 
notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many 
“theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization” 
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(Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies 
despite the work of critical energy scholars.   
 Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with 
inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world 
system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic 
modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and 
Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, 
which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and 
Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and 
problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and 
social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social 
relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because 
it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of 
capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in 
which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the 
“social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part 
of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).  
 In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among 
other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of 
neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, 
feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, 
represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights 
in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that 
 181 
belies the notion that “there is no alternative.” They share a common commitment, as 
social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial 
inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the 
past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took 
hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one 
where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic 
globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement 
and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of 
the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43).  
Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction 
“are intimately linked because  the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were 
the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, 
facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural 
world itself”(43).  
 Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider 
environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and 
academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on 
technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that 
basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman 
2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in 
ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and 
environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the 
current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and 
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activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant 
to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of 
the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting 
economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of 
natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and 
trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as 
we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses 
shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the 
world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An 
energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and 
transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of  “externalizing 
the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.   
 Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-
nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the 
new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must 
be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The 
problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never 
developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It 
is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The 
problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first 
place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives, 
and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of 
our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product 
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capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. 
Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes 
energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our 
environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010). 
Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation 
 The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the 
ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often 
misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business 
continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the 
damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among 
other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased 
demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests 
that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional 
interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108).  Environmentally and socially 
destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear 
energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up:  
Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last 
30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more 
than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, 
demand is likely to remain positively correlated to 
economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% 
of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over 
75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106)  
 
Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use 
create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system 
and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009). 
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 These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. 
William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson 
(1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; 
the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for long-
range consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated 
costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson 
referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the 
result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at 
all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.  
 As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the 
economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue 
to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not 
severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to 
recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such 
planetary boundaries will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen 
2010; Foster 2011).  
 This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the 
costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy 
production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon 
communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may 
understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a 
necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the 
environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system: 
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“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the 
profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne 
primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social 
rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, 
have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. 
Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between 
nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from 
all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of 
energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy 
injustice through various theoretical lenses.  
 In sum, our current globalized ecological crises are inconceivable if it were not 
possible to externalize the costs of the current system onto the oppressed, vulnerable 
ecosystems, and future generations. It is equally inconceivable that we will make the 
social changes necessary to overcome these crises without an end to the racism, sexism, 
heterosexism, ethnocentrism, and class inequalities that create serious barriers both to 
diagnosing the energy problem correctly as a social problem and to the forging of 
egalitarian alliances to mount an adequate challenge to the status quo. “Thus, to attend to 
the problems of social inequality is also to attend to the problem of environmental 
degradation” (Anderson 1976, 139). Moreover, we must overcome the generational 
chauvinism of capitalism that says “après moi, le deluge”!  
 Problems associated with our energy regime are especially dramatic and represent 
one of the most formidable obstacles to realizing a society that functions within 
ecological limits and free of oppression. Energy studies thus provide an avenue in which 
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the problems of the system may be viewed through the lens of one of the limiting factors 
of social and ecological change: our energy regime. This makes the critical sociology of 
energy a perfect site for more inclusive theory that shines light on the workings of the 
system as a whole and the relationship of its parts.  
Recap: Energy justice and a sociology of energy for survival  
 In 1988, Rosa, Machlis, and Keating called for renewed attention to energy by 
sociologists given “that energy plays a crucial role, perhaps the crucial role, in the link 
between societies and their biophysical environments” (155). They noted that energy is a 
persistent predicament for all societies, a “chronic problem that requires continuous 
attention and that, if there is a sustained lapse in attention, can turn into a crisis” (168). 
Climate change, representing precisely the kind of crisis scholars have anticipated for 
over 100 years, though they were treated as so many Cassandras for saying so, indeed has 
renewed scholarly attention to energy. However, sociology as a discipline still pays little 
attention to energy. Several explanations for this were offered throughout this study. 
These include persistent disciplinary boundaries, specialization within sociology, and the 
lack of penetration of ecological concerns into the discipline as a whole. Other reasons 
are related to the blinders imposed by capitalist ideology, including the pervasiveness of 
modernization perspectives in social science, economic reductionism, and the related 
denial of social inequality and ecological degradation as inherent and functional aspects 
of the capitalist system. Moreover, as many critical scholars have pointed out, the 
experiences and insights of too many people are left out of our theoretical developments. 
Our “analytical tools carry sociological bias, that is to say, as long as its constructs are 
formulated in the absence of inputs by class, race, and sex-gendered others” (Salleh 2010, 
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215). Perspectives are too often missing from people of the global South, poor people, 
people of color, women, lgbt people, and other historically oppressed and disenfranchised 
social groups. The experience of other countries, like Cuba, which has defied capitalist 
logic in so many ways, especially while experiencing its own version of peak oil, is rarely 
treated seriously in the mainstream literature (Hernández 2002). This reflects that fact 
that social science has a long way to go toward becoming a people’s science with a basis 
in ecology (Lewontin and Levins 2007, 98). 
 Without theoretical starting points that make the invisible visible, it is difficult for 
empirical work to proceed that is focused on the interface between social inequalities and 
ecological depredations, or energy injustices, of the current energy regime. Therefore, 
much contemporary work on energy, especially that beholden to the dominate ideology, 
such as modernization perspectives, is neither truly sociological nor ecological. It 
therefore does not offer a good starting point for energy studies.  
 The theoretical perspective offered here builds on the work of environmental 
sociologists such as feminist ecologists, environmental justice scholars, and energy 
scholars, suggesting these have much to offer energy scholars by way of theoretical 
starting points. It also builds on ecological theory through the case study of Ecuador and 
includes insights from my own research in Cuba. The point in this thesis is to put these 
developments in a context in which they may complement one another so that they may 
inform the further development of the sociology of energy. This context is the ecological 
rift theory of environmental sociology. This approach to the sociology of energy thus 
begins with the general recognition that the social system inevitably “confronts natural 
systems and affects their ability to sustain life” (Clark and York 2005, 395-96). The 
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global patterns of ecological destruction, which threaten entire biospheric systems, and 
have resulted in species and cultural extinction at unprecedented rates, “can be attributed 
in each and every case to a primary cause: the current pattern of global socioeconomic 
development, that is the capitalist mode of production and its expansionary tendencies” 
(Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 18). The ecohistorical period of capitalism is defined by 
these depredations. “The whole problem can be called ‘the global ecological rift,’ 
referring to the overall break in the human relation to nature arising from an alienated 
system of capital accumulation without end” (18). The modern energy regime is 
foundational to capitalist development, as the classical theorists already understood. 
Indeed, no energy regime in history can be understood outside of the broader social 
contexts that drive energy developments and structure their outcomes. Energy regimes 
reflect the social and ecological priorities of any society. And, in a dialectical manner, 
“key features of social structure and change are conditioned by the availability of energy, 
the technical means for converting energy into usable forms, and the ways energy is 
ultimately used” (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988, 149).   
 Moreover, from this perspective, it is understood that “the ecological rift is, at 
bottom, the product of a social rift: the domination of human being by human being. The 
driving force is a society based on class, inequality, and acquisition without end. At the 
global level it is represented by…the imperial division between…North and South, rich 
and poor countries” (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 47). This interface identified between 
ecological degradation, oppression, and inequality, indicate the centrality of 
environmental justice within the broader ecological rift theory in environmental 
sociology. The further development of the ecological rift framework, as presented in this 
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study, illustrates the way in which the ecological rift is inherently bound with the 
development of the modern race, gender, class, and colonial order of capitalism. 
Developed in this way, it both complements and draws extensively on the work of 
feminist ecologists and other environmental justice scholars. Feminist ecologists have 
called for such further theoretical integration in environmental sociology, citing the 
ecological rift framework as a basis for such a synthesis (Salleh 2010). This study 
explicates the links between the ecological and social rift. On this basis, energy injustice, 
as the interface between social inequalities and ecological depredations of the modern 
energy regime are made clear and the social limitations to facing energy crises, such as 
climate change, are more recognizable.  
 A sociology of energy concerned with energy justice works toward exposing the 
inequalities embedded in the modern energy regime, and better explaining historical 
trends. For example, with an energy justice perspective it is much easier to see why it is 
not the type of energy that is the problem, it is the role of energy in capitalist 
development that drives the abuses we associate with oil, for example.  
 Lacking an energy justice perspective, it took a long time for environmentalists 
and academics in wealthy countries to see the social and ecological tragedies of biofuel 
developments, a popular ‘alternative’ energy. By the time reports emerged documenting 
the routine ecological and social abuses in the biofuel industry, it already had received 
enough policy support to entrench its growth as a fuel sector for the foreseeable future 
(Holleman 2012). Moreover, as York (2012) has made clear, ‘alternative energy’ does 
not displace fossil fuel demand, and therefore cannot address climate change, but only 
adds to an ever-growing energy throughput with major ecological and social 
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consequences. The case of biofuel, as an example of this, proves that it is impossible to 
understand social energy choices without linking critical ecology and social thought. It 
also is impossible to solve ecological crises, like global climate change, without 
addressing social inequality. As Anderson (1976) wrote, “the fact is that environmental 
degradation and social inequality are interrelated in numerous ways and neither can be 
reversed without fundamentally altering the course of the other” (139). 
 Feminist ecologists and Marxist scholars, among others, have linked ecological 
and social degradation to the immorality of capitalism, “which unabashedly celebrates 
wealth while commonly ignoring poverty and environmental destruction generated in its 
wake” (Foster 2002, 88; see also Waring 1999 and Salleh 2010). This immorality “is in 
fact so institutionalized in society that it hardly appears immoral at all. Nevertheless all 
other moral standards and bases of community are forced to give way before it” (88): 
If land—is turned into mere real estate to be bought and 
sold by the highest bidder, if the commons are enclosed and 
then exploited outside of any collective restraints, it is due 
to this reduction of everything to mere economic value…In 
a society of this kind, people are forced to regard 
everything about them—the land, the rivers, the natural 
resources of the earth, as well as their own labor power—as 
mere commodities, to be exploited for greater gain. (Foster 
2002, 88)  
 
These scholars have emphasized the need to transcend this system of institutionalized 
immorality, which treats the reproductive work of humans and nature as value-less. This 
is in spite of the fact that capitalism is in the end dependent upon these labors. As noted 
above, the immorality of capitalism is reflected in its economic reductionism wherein the 
bottom line is always the primary basis for assessing the worth any activity, person, or 
the environment.   
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 Transcending this economic reductionism requires methods of assessment based 
on completely different theoretical and methodological tools, reflecting an alternative 
morality. This requires replacing the focus on economic efficiency, with what Salleh 
(2010) calls “eco-sufficiency,” which emphasizes the long-term provisioning of social 
and ecological reproduction and has nothing to do with exchange value, prices, or the 
bottom line of capital. Salleh proposes the concept of metabolic value as new criteria for 
assessment. Metabolic value refers to the “intrinsic capacity for organic reproduction” of 
ecosystems and the regenerative labor done off capitalism’s accounting books especially 
by women, peasants, etc. “in supporting ecological integrity and the social metabolism” 
(210, 212). Howard T. Odum’s work in systems ecology reflects just such a system of 
assessment in terms of metabolic value, or what Odum calls emergy.  
 Odum developed emergy analysis as a framework for understanding the economy 
in ecological accounting terms focused on the long-term provisioning necessary for the 
reproduction of ecosystems and egalitarian social development. Emergy analysis provides 
a basis for understanding economic processes, such as trade, individual commodities, and 
entire societies, in terms of their ecological and social costs. This is accomplished by 
bringing the reproductive work of humans and ecosystems under a common ecological, 
non-exchange oriented accounting framework, making this invisible embodied energy 
visible.  
 In this study emergy analysis is brought into social science as an alternative 
methodology and theoretical framework for understanding ecological exchange and 
sustainability. Odum’s work provides a material basis for a wider conception of 
sustainability, and its violation in the form of unequal exchange, connecting social and 
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ecological injustice. Emergy helps make sense, in ecological terms, of the magnitude of 
the accumulated debts associated with the ecological rift of capitalism and the modern 
energy regime. Emergy analysis thus provides further empirical evidence of the enormity 
of the ecological debt owed by the North to the South, and between extractive regions 
within countries and the wealthier areas they supply.  Odum’s work on Ecuador 
illustrates the strength of emergy analysis as an approach to making sense of energy 
flows and inequalities within the modern energy regime. Emergy can help us evaluate 
and develop real energy alternatives, with ecology and equality as the criteria. 
 This thesis attempts a broader understanding of the enormous social and 
ecological costs of the capitalist system’s energy regime, and also provides insight into 
alternatives, in this case, Cuba. If the modern energy regime’s costs are 
disproportionately born by the poor, people of color, and women, as well as entire 
ecosystems and the biosphere as a whole, what do alternatives look like? Cuba is one of 
the only modern countries in the world to completely extricate Big Oil. As explained in 
this study, the re-orientation of the Cuban economy could not have been possible if 
Standard Oil, Esso, and Texaco had their way. During the energy crisis of the 1990s, 
Cuba became known worldwide for its survival of its own version of peak oil and its 
transformation of its agricultural and food systems based on ecological principles. 
However, Cubans also suffered during this period a great deal, and inequalities lingering 
after the revolution became exacerbated.  
 Today, Cuba faces prospects of a vast increase in its energy supply, so much that 
it may for the first time become a net oil-exporting nation. This has raised questions 
regarding the extent to which this development will be used, as previously in Cuba, to 
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raise the level of equality in Cuba, or whether this will initiate a transformation of the 
relationships between Cuba and foreign investors, challenging Cuba’s social gains and 
sovereignty. These energy developments also have led to increased environmental 
degradation in Cuba, with the future of nuclear and off-shore drilling still unclear. 
Though it is not completely independent of the system, or free of the burdens it imposes, 
Cuba continues to offer lessons in terms of what a society can do, working in solidarity, 
under a different set of social, economic, and ecological priorities.  
  The various insights provided in this study as a whole helps broaden the 
theoretical basis that already exists in environmental sociology for defining the energy 
crisis in sociological and ecological terms. Climate change represents an opening for 
sociologists, as more funding is available, and research programs are developing globally 
that support sociological work on climate change and energy. While it is easier to fall in 
step with the dominant perspective that defines energy as a technical engineering or 
economic problem, and puts hope in efficiency, it is unethical in a world-community 
sense in the face of the ecological and social disasters engendered by the modern energy 
regime. Sociologists have the theoretical and methodological tools to challenge the 
dominant view, and assert the social scientific realities of the energy crises, as James 
Hansen and other climate scientists have gone to great lengths to do around the world, 
from the perspective of their own disciplines. Some sociologists, of course, already do 
this, but they are clearly in the minority. Important for the current era, the approach 
outlined here allows for the conceptualization of the relationship between the 
accumulation of environmental and social degradation and the accumulation of capital, 
which is the driving force organizing productive relations across the globe. In further 
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developing the critical sociology of energy, which does not abstract away our ability to 
observe the relationships between oppression, exploitation and the political economy of 
energy, as well as the ecological impact of energy choices, this theoretical space is 
crucial.  
 The question from this perspective is not how do we keep the system from failing, 
by making possible constant energy infusions, but what will happen if the system 
survives? What will happen if capitalism persists another fifty years? As social scientists, 
this is something we can answer and we should. We should also not refrain from critique 
of the perspective dominating energy studies that ignores the implications of the diversity 
of social and ecological science. As Lewontin and Levins (2007) wrote, “we should not 
pretend or aspire to a bland neutrality but proclaim as our working hypothesis: all 
theories are wrong that promote, justify, or tolerate injustice” (99). They write that the 
“optimal condition for science is one foot in the university and one foot in the community 
in struggle, so that we have the richness and complexity of theory coming from the 
particular and the comparative view, and the generalizations that only some distance form 
the particular provide” (98). The sociology of energy, with energy justice at its heart, is 
the theoretical basis for just such a science of energy.   
 This approach to energy studies draws on theoretical developments that are 
complementary as a result of shared commitments to uniting materialist social and 
ecological analyses and connecting theory and praxis, moving back and forth between the 
academy and experience on the ground. Such groundwork furthers the focus on energy 
justice in sociology. This focus makes possible a more relevant contribution to the 
struggle for the next energy revolution, which is necessarily part of a larger 
 195 
transformation of the social metabolic order, transcending the social and ecological rift of 
capitalism. In other words, sociology should re-orient itself to provide for the scientific 
needs of the energy justice revolution, the components of which are perhaps best outlined 
in the Acuerdo de los Pueblos (People’s Agreement) of 2010, also called the 
Cochabamba Protocol. Ariel Salleh argues in her most recent book that “the case for 
leadership by the South is stronger than any moral position based on a ‘we are not the 
polluters’ argument. Many of these communities have invented models of economics that 
protect ecological sustainability” (Salleh 2009, 7). The People’s Agreement reflects the 
importance of this leadership, which builds on an advanced understanding of the interface 
between inequality and ecological depredations, in the struggle for energy justice.  
 In April of 2010 the people of the global South and their allies concerned with the 
ecological and social crises of this ecohistorical period held a major gathering in 
Tiquipaya, Bolívia, just outside of Cochabamba. An agreement was reached on the 
priorities of the Global Movement of Peoples for Mother Earth. This agreement calls for 
the immediate reduction of emissions, an end to militarism and the domination of the 
world’s people by the rich, and the repayment of the ecological debts associated with the 
history of imperialism and ecological degradation of capitalism. It focuses on the need for 
a re-orientation of our activities to address, what we call, the ecological and social rift of 
capitalism, and retrain our efforts to the restoration of the earth and our communities.  
Restoration, which involves the redress of ecological and social debts, is necessary to 
begin anew the relations between human beings and between human beings and the rest 
of the biosphere, of which we are only a part. Only under such new relations can the 
long-term provisioning for social and ecological reproduction be realized. To these ends 
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the agreement calls for the implementation of a legal framework that protects the rights of 
mother earth and the sovereignty of the world’s peoples, and makes it possible to bring 
those responsible for the crimes of oppression and ecological degradation to justice. It 
calls for a real binding, enforceable agreement based on an environmental justice 
framework, unlike the Kyoto protocol, and the favored “voluntary mechanisms” of 
governments and business for not addressing climate change. The protocol is clear that 
the struggle against climate change is the struggle against oppression, and a struggle for 
ecological and social restoration and recovery, in other words it is a struggle for energy 
justice.   
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